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Abstract 
Developmental prosopagnosia (DP) is a condition associated with severe difficulties 
recognising familiar faces, which occurs in individuals with normal intelligence, typical 
low-level vision, and in the absence of manifest brain injuries. The neuro-cognitive 
origins of DP are still debated. Cognitive accounts have attributed face recognition 
deficits to reduced holistic processing of faces (i.e., whereby individual features of faces 
are integrated into a unified perceptual whole), and mnemonic difficulties, whereby 
prosopagnosics may be able to form accurate percepts, but are unable to maintain those 
percepts over time. At the neurological level, differences have been reported in the 
structural and functional connectivity of occipito-temporal regions which include face 
selective areas. Chapter 2 of this thesis investigated facial emotion recognition in DP 
and revealed widespread difficulties recognising facial emotion in individuals with 
apperceptive profiles of DP (i.e., DPs exhibiting difficulties forming view-invariant 
structural descriptions of faces at early stages of encoding). Chapter 3 explored body 
recognition in DP and found evidence of impaired body and object recognition in DP 
individuals. Moreover, the lack of relationship between observers’ object and body 
recognition performances suggested that body and object recognition impairments in 
DP may co-occur independently. Chapter 4 investigated the susceptibility to the 
composite face illusion in two independent samples of individuals with DP and failed 
to show evidence of diminished composite face effects in both samples. Finally, 
Chapter 5 considered the contribution of perceptual encoding and short term face 
memory in DP using a delayed match-to-sample task and found that recognition 
impairments in prosopagnosics were insensitive to changes in retention interval and 
viewing angle, supporting an apperceptive characterisation of DP. The implications of 
these findings for the characterisation of DP and for understanding its underlying 
cognitive mechanisms, are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
	
	
2	
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to City, University of London for granting me a Doctoral Studentship, 
allowing me to complete this PhD. I am also very appreciative of the enormous help 
provided by all the people who took part in the studies presented in this thesis. Without 
their precious contribution, this work would not have been possible. 
Big thanks go to all the other psychology PhD students at City University who 
accompanied me throughout this journey, providing motivation and encouragement. In 
particular, thanks to Albert for inspiring me to aim higher, to Lucia and Lana for their 
sincere support, and to Rami and Alex for their precious advice. Thanks to my ‘science 
buddies’ Sophie, Rosy, and Dan whose success as young researchers has been a huge 
motivation in pursuing an academic career. I am extremely grateful to Rebecca Brewer, 
for her continuous help and encouragement, and for believing in me since the 
beginning.  
I am thankful to all my collaborators who brilliantly contributed to the studies presented 
in this thesis, including Brad Duchaine, Esther Wu, Hua Yang, and Guo Jiahui. Thanks 
to Katie Gray, for her precious theoretical inputs and for providing substantial support 
with data analysis and data collection. Finally, I am extremely grateful to my supervisor 
Richard Cook, for his immense support, for the enormous amount of time he dedicated 
to my work and for being such a brilliant supervisor. His method and scrupulousness 
shaped me as a researcher. I have been very lucky to be his PhD student.  
Thanks to all my wonderful friends for believing in me and supporting me with 
insightful advice and laughter.  
The biggest thanks go to my wonderful family. To my parents, for giving me everything 
and more to achieve my dreams, for their constant support and for their infinite love. 
This would not have been possible without them. Finally, thanks to Arash for truly 
believing in me, for giving me lots of encouragement especially during the last part of 
this PhD, and for always being there with unconditional love.  
 
 
	
	
3	
Authors contributions 
Chapter 2: Study design was conducted by Richard Cook and myself. I created the 
stimuli and RC helped perfecting the stimuli and programming the experimental 
paradigm. I collected the data and ran the analyses, under the supervision of RC. I 
drafted the manuscript, which was then edited and finalised by RC. 
Chapter 3:  RC and I designed the experiment. Stimuli were created by RC and myself. 
RC programmed the experimental paradigm. I collected the data and analysed the 
results, under the supervision of RC. All authors were involved in the interpretation of 
the analyses. I drafted the manuscript for publication, which was edited by all authors. 
Chapter 4: Esther Wu and I contributed equally to the study. RC and I designed, 
created the stimuli and programmed the experimental procedure for Experiment 1. I 
collected the data and conducted the analyses for Experiment 1, under the supervision 
of RC. EW, Hua Yang, Guo Jiahui and Brad Duchaine designed Experiment 2. EW, 
HY and GJ collected the data and conducted the analyses for Experiment 2, under the 
supervision of BD. All authors contributed to the interpretation of the analyses. EW and 
I drafted the manuscript, which was then edited by RC and BD. 
Chapter 5: RC and I designed the experiment. Stimuli were created by RC and I. RC 
programmed the experimental paradigm. Katie Gray and I collected the data and 
analysed the results. All authors were involved in the interpretation of the analyses. I 
drafted the manuscript for publication, which was edited by all authors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
4	
Declarations 
This thesis is submitted to City, University of London in support of my application for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by myself and has not been 
submitted in any previous application for any degree. 
This thesis is composed by a series of published papers, with the exception of Chapter 
5 which is currently in revision. The experimental chapters 2-4 are exact copies of the 
final version of the manuscripts accepted for publication, and are available as published 
journal articles on the relevant journal websites. As well as the introduction and 
discussion sections that are specific to each article, this thesis includes a general 
introduction, providing an overview of the literature relevant to the experimental 
chapters, and a general discussion of the main findings, interpretations, limitations and 
outstanding questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
5	
Table of contents 
 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………1 
Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………………2 
Authors contributions...............................................................................................................3   
About this thesis.......................................................................................................................4 
Table of contents……………………………………………………………………………..5 
Table of tables………………………………………………………………………………11 
Table of figures......................................................................................................................13 
Chapter 1. General Introduction……………………………………………………………16 
1.1 Background……………………………………………………………………………..16 
1.2 Diagnostic criteria ………………………………………………………………………18 
1.2.1 Computerised tests....................................................................................................18 
1.2.1.1 Testing of unfamiliar face recognition...............................................................18 
1.2.1.2 Testing of familiar face recognition...................................................................20 
1.2.2 Self-report measures………………………………………………………………21 
  1.2.3 Convergence of diagnostic evidence.......................................................................22   
1.3 Perceptual and cognitive accounts of DP……………………………………………….23 
1.3.1 Is DP due to a low-level visual deficit?.................................................................23 
1.3.2 Is DP due to diminished acquisition of perceptual expertise?...............................25 
1.3.3 Apperceptive accounts of DP……………………………………………………27 
1.3.3.1 Holistic processing………………………………………………………….28 
1.3.1.1.1 The Inversion Effect…………………………………………………….29 
1.3.1.1.2 The Composite Face Illusion……………………………………………30 
1.3.1.1.3 The Part-Whole Effect..…………………….…………………………...31 
	
	
6	
1.3.3.2 Domain-general configural processing……………………………………..31 
1.3.3.3 Norm-based coding…………………………………………………………32 
   1.3.4 Mnemonic accounts of DP……………………………………………………….33 
1.3.5 A heterogeneous disorder………………………………………………………..34 
1.3.5.1 Apperceptive and mnemonic profiles………………………………………34 
1.3.5.2 Non-face object deficits…………………………………………………….36 
1.3.5.3 The co-occurrence hypothesis………………………………………………39 
1.3.5.4 Non-visual impairments…………………………………………………….39 
1.3.5.4.1 Vocal recognition in DP………………………………………………....39 
1.3.5.4.2 Topographic processing in DP…………………………………………..41 
1.4 Neural accounts…………………………………………………………………………41 
1.4.1 Neural models of typical face perception………………………………………..41 
1.4.1.1 The Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini model…………………………………...42 
1.4.1.2 The Duchaine & Yovel model……………………………………………...42 
1.4.2 Electrophysiological findings………...…………………………………………43 
 1.4.3 Neuroimaging findings…………………………………………………….……45 
1.4.3.1 Structural findings………………………………………………………….45  
1.4.3.2 Functional findings…………………………………………………………46 
1.5 Objectives……………………………………………...………………………………..48 
1.6 References ………………………………………………………………………………50 
Chapter 2: Impaired perception of facial emotion in developmental  
prosopagnosia……………………………………………………………………………….68 
2.1 Abstract……………...……………………………………………………………....….69 
2.2 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..70 
2.3 Neuropsychological testing……………………………………………………………..73 
2.4 Experiment 1……………………………………………………………………………73 
2.4.1 Methods…………………………………………………………………………..75 
2.4.2 Results and discussion…………………………………………………………...76 
	
	
7	
2.5 Experiment 2……………………………………………………………………………79 
2.5.1 Methods………………………………………………………………………….80 
2.5.2 Results and discussion…………………………………………………………...82 
2.6 Experiment 3……………………………………………………………………………83 
2.6.1 Methods…………………………………………………………………………..83 
2.6.2 Results and discussion……………………………………………………….......84 
 2.7 Discussion…………...………………………………………………………………….85 
2.8 References………………………………………………………………………………88 
Chapter 3: Impaired body perception in developmental prosopagnosia……………………94 
3.1 Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………95 
3.2 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..95 
3.3 Methods…………………………………………………………………………………99 
3.3.1 Participants……………………………………………………………………….99 
3.3.2 Diagnostic testing………………………………………………………………...99 
3.3.3 Stimuli……………………..……………………………………………………101 
3.3.4 Procedure………………………………………...……………………………..101 
3.4 Results…………………………………………………………………………………102 
3.4.1 Group analyses………………………………………………………………….102 
3.4.2 Correlational analyses…………………………………………………………..104 
3.5 Discussion………….………………………………………………………………….105 
3.6 References……………………………………………………………………………..108 
Chapter 4: Normal composite face effects in developmental prosopagnosia……………..115 
4.1 Abstract………………………………………………………………………………..116 
4.2 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………117 
4.3 Experiment 1…………………………………………………………………………..119 
4.3.1 Methods…………………………………………………………………………120 
4.3.1.1 Participants………………………………………………………………...120 
4.3.1.2 Diagnostic testing………………………………………………………….120 
	
	
8	
4.3.1.3 The composite task………………………………………………………...121 
4.3.2 Results…………………………………………………………………………..123 
4.3.2.1 Accuracy…………………………………………………………………..123 
4.3.2.2 Response times……………………………………………………………124 
4.3.2.3 Individual differences……………………………………………………..126 
4.4 Experiment 2………………………………………………………………………….127 
4.4.1 Methods…………………………………………………………………………128 
4.4.1.1 Participants………………………………………………………………..128 
4.4.1.2 Diagnostic testing…………………………………………………………128 
4.4.1.3 The composite task………………………………………………………..129 
4.4.2 Results…………………………………………………………………………..130 
4.4.2.1 Accuracy………………………………………………………………….130 
4.4.2.2 Response times……………………………………………………………131 
4.4.2.3 Individual differences……………………………………………………..132 
4.5 Discussion…………………………………………………………………………….133 
4.5.1 Composite face effects in developmental prosopagnosia………………………134 
4.5.2 Composite face effect and face recognition ability……………………………..137 
4.5.3 Face composite designs…………………………………………………………138 
4.5.4 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...139 
4.6 Supplementary material……………………………………………………………….140 
4.6.1 Pseudo-word composite task……………………………………………………140 
4.6.2 Pilot testing of composite tasks for upright faces, inverted faces, and pseudo-
words………………………………………………………………………………….141 
4.6.2.1 Accuracy………….……………………………………………………….142 
4.6.2.2 Response times……………………………………………………………142 
4.6.3 Group comparison: pseudo-words……………………………………………....143 
4.6.3.1 Accuracy…………………………………………………………………..144 
 4.6.3.2 Response times….………………………………………………………...144 
4.7 References…………………………………………………………………………….146 
	
	
9	
Chapter 5: Is developmental prosopagnosia best characterised as an apperceptive or 
mnemonic disorder?.............................................................................................................152 
5.1 Abstract………………………………………………………………………………..153 
5.2 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………153 
5.2.1 Apperceptive characterisation…………………………………………………..154 
5.2.2 A deficit of perceptual encoding or perceptual maintenance?.............................155 
5.2.3 Present study……………………………………………………………………157 
5.3 Can DPs discriminate simultaneously presented faces?................................................157 
5.3.1 Methods…………………………………………………………………………158 
5.3.1.1 Participants………………………………………………………………...158 
5.3.1.2 Diagnostic testing………………………………………………………….158 
5.3.1.3 Stimuli and procedure……………………………………………………..159 
5.3.2 Results and discussion………………………………………………………….159 
5.4 Do face matching deficits seen in DP increase as a function of  
retention interval?.................................................................................................................162 
5.4.1 Methods…………………………………………………………………………164 
5.4.1.1 Participants………………………………………………………………...164 
5.4.1.2 Stimuli and procedure……………………………………………………...165 
5.4.2 Results and discussion………………………………………………………….167 
5.4.2.1 Group analyses…………………………………………………………….167 
5.4.2.2 Correlational analyses……………………………………………………..169 
5.5 General discussion……………………………………………………………………..172 
5.5.1 Evidence for an apperceptive characterisation………... ………...……………173 
5.5.2 Reconsidering the case against apperceptive accounts………………...………174 
5.5.3 Insensitivity of face matching deficits to viewpoint disparity…………………176 
5.5.4 Is DP associated with a face-specific or domain-general deficit?......................177 
5.6 References……………………………………………………………………………..179 
Chapter 6: Overview and discussion………………………………………………………187 
 6.1 Impaired perception of facial emotion in developmental prosopagnosia  
 (Chapter 2)………………………………………………………………………………...187 
	
	
10	
6.1.1 Summary and interpretation…………..………………………………………..187 
6.1.2 Limitations and outstanding questions…………………………………………189 
6.2 Impaired body perception in developmental prosopagnosia (Chapter 3)……………...191 
6.2.1 Summary and interpretation…………………………………………………….191 
6.2.2 Limitations and outstanding questions………………………………………….192 
6.3 Normal composite face effects in developmental prosopagnosia (Chapter 4)………...193 
6.3.1 Summary and interpretations…………………………………………………...193 
6.3.2 Limitations and outstanding questions………………………………………….195 
6.4 Is developmental prosopagnosia best characterised as an apperceptive or mnemonic 
disorder? (Chapter 5)………………………………………………………………………197 
6.4.1 Summary and interpretation……………………………………………………197 
6.4.2 Limitations and outstanding questions…………………………………………199 
6.5 General conclusion…………………………………………………………………….201 
6.5.1 Towards an apperceptive account of DP……………………………………….201 
6.5.2 Local (rather than global) face processing may explain deficits in DP………...202 
6.5.3 The domain-specificity issue in DP and co-occurring  
developmental agnosias………………………………………………………...…….203 
6.5.4 Toward an apperceptive characterisation of DP………………………………..203 
6.6 Limitations and future directions…………………………………………….....……..204 
6.6.1 Theoretical definitions and constructs………...………………………………..204 
6.6.2 Heterogeneity in DP………………………………….…………………………206 
6.6.3 Methodological considerations…………………….……………………...........207 
6.6.4 Considerations on diagnostic criteria…………….……………………………..209 
6.7 References……………………………………………………………………………..212 
 
 
 
 
	
	
11	
Table of tables 
Chapter 2 
Table 2.1. Diagnostic scores for each DP in Experiments 1-3…………………………….74 
Table 2.2. Diagnostic scores of DPs and TDs in Experiments 1-3…………….…………..75 
Table 2.3. Correlations between diagnostic scores and categorisation thresholds in 
Experiment 1……………………………………………………………………………….79 
Table 2.4. Correlations between diagnostic scores and the expression recognition 
accuracies in Experiment 2………………………………………………………………...83 
Chapter 3 
Table 3.1. Diagnostic scores for each DP…………..…..………………………………...100 
Table 3.2. Correlations between diagnostic scores and matching accuracy for bodies, cars, 
and faces…………………………………………………………………………………..105 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.1. Diagnostic scores for each DP in Experiment 1………………………………121 
Table 4.2. Mean accuracy and response time measures from  
Experiment 1……………………………………………………………………………...123 
Table 4.3. Diagnostic scores for each DP in Experiment 2………………………………128 
Table 4.4. Mean accuracy and response time measures from  
Experiment 2……………………………………………………………………………...130 
Table 4.5. Descriptive statistics from the young neurotypical controls in the piloting 
pseudo-word composite task……………………………………………………………...141  
Table 4.6. Mean accuracy and RTs from the NT and DP groups in the pseudo-word 
condition………………………………………………………………………………….144 
 
	
	
12	
Chapter 5 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics of the diagnostic scores  
for the DP and TD samples in Experiment 1……………………………………………..159 
Table 5.2. Diagnostic scores for each DP in Experiment 2………………………………165 
Table 5.3. Correlations between accuracy and RT matching performance in each condition 
of Experiment 2 and scores on the CFPT………………………………………………...170 
Table 5.4. Correlations between accuracy and RT matching performance in Experiment 2 
and diagnostic scores……………………………………………………………………..172  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
13	
Table of figures 
Chapter 1 
Figure 1.1. Neuro-cognitive models of face perception…………………………………...29 
Chapter 2 
Figure 2.1(a). Stimuli used in Experiment 1……………………………………………….77 
Figure 2.1(b). Mean categorisation thresholds for the three continua of TDs and DPs in 
Experiment 1……………………………………………………………………………….77 
Figure 2.1(c). Scatter plot of the relationship between thresholds for the Fear-Surprise 
categorisations and CFPT scores…………………………………………………………..77 
Figure 2.2(a). Single-case analysis of the surprise-fear thresholds  
in Experiment 1…………………………………………………………………………….78 
Figure 2.2(b). Single-case analysis of the overall performance  
in Experiment 2…………………………………………………………………………….78  
Figure 2.3(a). Stimuli used in Experiment 2……………………………………………….81 
Figure 2.3(b). Mean recognition accuracy of TDs and DPs in the three intensity conditions 
of Experiment 2…………………………………………………………………………….81 
Chapter 3 
Figure 3.1(a). Target stimuli presented in frontal view…………………………………..102 
Figure 3.1(b). Mask presented during retention interval…………………………………102 
Figure 3.1(c). Test stimuli presented in 3/4 views………………………………………..102 
Figure 3.2(a). Mean accuracy matching performance for TDs and DPs in all three 
conditions…………………………………………………………………………………103 
Figure 3.2(b). Mean RTs matching performance for TDs and DPs  
in all three conditions……………………………………………………………………..103 
	
	
14	
Figure 3.2(c). Scatter plots comparing participants’ matching accuracy in the three 
conditions…………………………………………………………………………………103 
Figure 3.3. Single-case data for each DP…………………………………………………104 
Chapter 4 
Figure 4.1(a). Composite stimuli of Experiment 1……………………………………….122 
Figure 4.1(b). Composite stimuli of Experiment 2……………………………………….122 
Figure 4.2. Mean accuracy and RT performances for upright faces and inverted faces in 
Experiment 1……………………………………………………………………………...125 
Figure 4.3. Inverse efficiency scores for aligned composites plotted against those seen for 
misaligned composites, for upright faces and inverted faces in Experiment 1…………...126 
Figure 4.4. Mean accuracy for upright faces and inverted faces in Experiment 2 (top). 
Accuracy scores for aligned composites plotted against those seen for misaligned 
composites in Experiment 2 (bottom).……………………………………………………132 
Figure 4.5. Composites stimuli used in the pseudo-word composite task………………..140  
Figure 4.6. Mean accuracy and RTs performances of young controls in the piloting of the 
pseudo-word composite task……………………………………………………………...143 
Figure 4.7. Mean accuracy and RTs performances of DPs and age-matched NTs in the 
piloting of the pseudo-word composite task……………………………………………...145 
Chapter 5 
Figure 5.1(a). Stimuli used in Experiment 1……………………………………………...160 
Figure 5.1(b). Mean performance of the TD and DP groups in Experiment 1…………...160 
Figure 5.1(c). Participants’ scores on the upright trials plotted against their inverted 
performance in Experiment 1……………………………………………………………..160 
Figure 5.1(d). Analysis of the best, moderate, and worst performers  
in Experiment 1…………………………………………………………………………...160 
	
	
15	
Figure 5.2. Model representing the application of a hypothetic apperceptive deficit…….162 
Figure 5.3. Stimuli used in Experiment 2………………………………………………...166 
Figure 5.4(a). Mean accuracy performance in Experiment 2…………………………….168 
Figure 5.4(b). Mean RTs performance in Experiment 2………………………………….168 
Figure 5.5(a). The relationship between CFPT scores and face and car matching accuracy 
in Experiment 2…………………………………………………………………………...171 
Figure 5.5(b). The relationship between constant- and different-viewpoint matching 
accuracy for faces and cars in Experiment 2……………………………………………..171 
Figure 5.5(c). The relationship between long- and short-interval matching accuracy for 
faces and cars in Experiment 2…………………………………………………………...171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
16	
Chapter 1. General Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The first cases of individuals with face recognition difficulties following a cerebral 
disease were reported at the end of the 19th century (Charcot, 1883; Wilbrand, 1892). 
The term prosopagnosia was proposed by Bodamer, who described the condition based 
on three brain-injured German soldiers who showed severe face recognition 
impairments after brain damage, which were not accompanied by broader object 
agnosia (Bodamer, 1947). These patients showed incapacity to recognise faces and used 
information such as voice, gait, clothes or accessories to aid recognition. Over time 
these symptoms were found to be associated with lesions of the right hemisphere, as 
face recognition difficulties were often accompanied by left visual field defects and 
visual-spatial agnosia, and cases of acquired prosopagnosia also emerged after surgical 
removal of brain portions in the right hemisphere (Hecaen & Angelergues, 1962).  
In 1976, McConachie described the first case of developmental prosopagnosia (DP), 
in which the condition occurred in the absence of apparent neurological lesions and 
appeared to have a familial component (McConachie, 1976). Crucially, the lack of brain 
damage is critical to the distinction with acquired prosopagnosia, in which impairments 
stem from neural injuries in occipito-temporal areas underpinning face recognition 
(Bodamer, 1947). In her early observation, McConachie advanced the possibility that 
“perhaps the condition is more common than is presently thought [and] there may be a 
developmental aspect to prosopagnosia” (McConachie, 1976, p.81). In fact, DP was 
once thought to be extremely rare until the beginning of the 21st century, when the 
simplified access to information together with a growing attention of international 
media on the condition, revealed an increasing number of cases. The prevalence rate of 
DP has been estimated to be approximately between 1.9 and 2.47% of the general 
population (Kennerknecht, et al., 2006; Kennerknecht, Yee-Ho, & Wong, 2008). Both 
studies used large samples of participants (689 German students in Kennerknecht et al., 
2006; 533 Chinese students in Kennerknecht et al., 2008) who had to complete self-
report questionnaires and undertake interviews, but lacked of any objective assessment. 
A following prevalence study employed objective tests to screen 241 Australian adults, 
using a cut-off criterion of impairment defined as two standard deviations below the 
control mean (Bowles et al., 2009). The authors found a similar incidence rate to 
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previous studies as between 2 and 2.9% of their sample exhibited face recognition 
impairments.  
Today, DP is defined as a neurodevelopmental condition associated with severe 
difficulties recognising familiar faces and learning new identities, which occurs in 
individuals with normal intelligence and low-level vision, and typical social cognition 
(Susilo & Duchaine, 2013; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006b; Behrmann & Avidan, 2005; 
Kress & Daum, 2003). Some authors prefer the term congenital prosopagnosia to 
indicate that the condition emerges from birth (e.g., Behrmann & Avidan, 2005). The 
use of the term developmental prosopagnosia, instead, refers to the possibility that in 
some individuals the condition may appear at some stage of neuro-development and 
not necessarily from birth.  
People with DP develop compensatory strategies over time to cope with recognition 
difficulties. Familiar others are identified using non-facial cues such as voice, gait, 
clothing, hair-style or distinctive features, but also the context in which people are met 
aids identification (Cook & Biotti, 2016; Shah, Gaule, Sowden, Bird, & Cook, 2015). 
Consequently, recognition worsens when this type of information is not available or 
occluded (Shah, Gaule, Sowden, Bird, & Cook, 2015). Despite growing exposure, there 
is still insufficient awareness of the condition, especially compared to other 
neurodevelopmental disorders. Therefore, people with DP often blame bad memory or 
lack of attention as the source of their deficits. Some of them may report to an 
ophthalmologist, when problems are erroneously attributed to poor visual acuity, but 
rarely people will seek out neurological advice (Bate & Tree, 2017). 
Recurrent failures recognising familiar others cause embarrassing situations, 
especially when those who experience lifelong difficulties are unaware of any organic 
cause that may account for their problems. Over time prosopagnosics tend to avoid 
social situations, resulting in detrimental interpersonal interactions. Crucially, 
occupational disability has also been reported in DP, whenever affected individuals 
struggle or fail to recognise their work colleagues, patients, students or employees 
(Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008). In some cases, social 
anxiety and depression can occur as a consequence of social disability (Yardley et al., 
2008; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006b).  
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1.2 Diagnostic criteria 
Identifying DP is not straightforward and standardised diagnostic criteria have to be 
defined (see Barton & Corrow, 2016; Dalrymple & Palermo, 2016; Shah, Gaule, 
Sowden, Bird, & Cook, 2015). In fact, DP is not recognised as a psychiatric disorder in 
the latest Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (American 
Psychatric Association, 2013). Nevertheless, a developmental form of prosopagnosia is 
listed in the second edition of the Application of the International Classification of 
Diseases to Neurology (ICD-NA) (World Health Organization, 1997), and its signs may 
meet the criteria for a mental disability given the long-term negative impact on people’s 
daily life (Lockwood, Henderson, & Thornicroft, 2012). Current standard batteries rely 
on subjective self-report measures as well as objective computerised tests.  
1.2.1 Computerised tests 
Objective instruments include an array of computer-based tests which have been 
validated and standardised on large samples and investigate different facets of face 
recognition.  To justify inclusion in a DP sample it is conventional that authors present 
evidence that individuals score poorly on an array of computerised tests. The more 
evidence is collected, the stronger the case for individuals’ inclusion.  
1.2.1.1 Testing of unfamiliar face recognition 
Traditional tests of face recognition were developed to study both typical 
participants and neuropsychological patients. The Recognition Memory Test (RMT; 
Warrington, 1984) requires participants to recognise targets paired with distractors. 
During the initial phase 50 target faces are presented for 3 seconds each. Subsequently, 
participants are presented with 50 forced-choice pairs consisting of one target face and 
one distractor face. This test is biased by several non-facial cues present in the pictures 
(e.g., hair, emotional expressions, photo artifacts, clothing). Therefore, individuals with 
DP can score normally on this test using such cues (Nunn, Postma, & Pearson, 2001; 
Duchaine, 2000). On the other hand, the Benton Facial Recognition Test (BFRT; 
Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983) consists of a face matching test 
where observers have to match a target face with three of six simultaneously presented 
test faces. Performance at this test has been shown to rely greatly on feature matching 
strategy (Duchaine & Weidenfeld, 2003). Since target face and test faces appear on 
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screen at the same time, participants with DP can use cues such as eyebrows or lips 
shape to perform within the typical range (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2004; Kress & 
Daum, 2003; Nunn, Postma, & Pearson, 2001). The Glasgow Face Matching Test 
(GFMT; Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010) provides an alternative to the BFRT to study 
face matching avoiding feature matching strategies. In fact, observers make 
same/different judgements on the identity of two simultaneously presented faces whose 
pictures are taken on the same day, using neutral poses only, under the same light 
condition, but using different cameras. Crucially, it has been widely shown that even 
typical participants find this task very difficult, with average error rates of 20% (see 
White, Rivolta, Burton, Al-Janabi, & Palermo, 2017). This can be explained by a well 
documented advantage of familiarity on face matching performance (e.g., Megreya & 
Burton, 2006; 2007; White, Burton, Jenkins, & Kemp, 2014). Crucially, some authors 
advanced the possibility that unfamiliar face matching does not rely on face-specific 
mechanisms (Megreya & Burton, 2006). In fact, DPs have been reported to score 
typically on the GFMT (White et al., 2017).  
The Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006a) was 
created to address the limitations of previous tests. Currently, it is the most used test of 
unfamiliar face recognition and has both strong validity and high reliability (e.g., 
McKone et al., 2011; but see Bate & Tree, 2017). While keeping the memory paradigm 
of the RMT with multiple identities, the CFMT does not allow for the use of non-facial 
cues as this information is occluded. The test is divided in three phases with incremental 
levels of difficulty. Initially, observers have to memorise six unfamiliar male faces 
viewed from three different view-points. In the second phase the target faces are 
reviewed for 20 seconds. Subsequently, participants have to recognise the target among 
two unfamiliar distractors presented in 30 forced-choice trials. Finally, the third phase 
is similar to the second phase with the difference that images contain levels of Gaussian 
noise to make the task more difficult and to force participants to use mechanisms used 
in typical face recognition (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006a). The final score is an 
average of the correct responses in the three individual phases (maximum score = 72). 
Norm data from the original paper, using 50 controls (Mage = 20.2), reported an average 
score of 57.9 (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006a). Norm data coming from later studies 
found similar results (e.g., 58.9 in Garrido, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008; 59.6 in 
Duchaine, Yovel, & Nakayama, 2007; 54.6 and 55.3 in Bowles et al., 2009). Versions 
of the CFMT have been developed to match the face stimuli with ethnicity (e.g., the 
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CFMT-Australian by McKone et al., 2011; the Taiwanese Face Memory Test by Shyi, 
Cheng, Cheng, & Chen, 2015) and age (e.g., the CFMT-Children by Croydon, 
Pimperton, Ewing, Duchaine, & Pellicano, 2014) of participants.  
The Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT; Duchaine, Germine, & Nakayama, 
2007) provides a measure of face perception ability minimizing memory demands. 
Participants have to sort faces based on resemblance to a target face shown above. The 
six faces are created by morphing the target face with a distractor face and each one 
contains different proportions of the target image. The structure of this paradigm makes 
it prone to the use of compensatory strategies (e.g., looking for trivial details in the 
pictures); it has been shown to have poor reliability (Rezlescu, Susilo, Wilmer, & 
Caramazza, 2017; Bowles et al., 2009); and the necessity of using a mouse or laptop 
trackpad to move the items often interferes with execution, especially with elder 
participants. Therefore, good performances on this test are difficult to interpret as in 
some cases results could reflect its relative insensitivity rather than normal face 
perception.  
1.2.1.2 Testing of familiar face recognition 
There are substantial qualitative differences between unfamiliar and familiar face 
processing. Overall, familiar face recognition relies greatly on internal features (e.g. 
nose, eyes, mouth) and familiar faces are easily and effortlessly detected even in low-
attention conditions. On the other hand, unfamiliar recognition is based more on 
external features such as hair and face shape, and it places higher demands on working 
memory (for a review see Johnston & Edmonds, 2009). Given these differences, tests 
have been developed to assess familiar and unfamiliar face recognition separately in 
DPs. The Famous Face Tests (e.g., Duchaine, 2000; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005; 
Macquarie Famous Face Test 2008, Palermo, Rivolta, Wilson, & Jeffery, 2011) consist 
of a good estimate of familiar face recognition, as observers have to recognise faces of 
celebrities. However, performance on these tests is highly influenced by individual 
differences such as participants’ interest in popular culture, age, and demographics. In 
addition, celebrities must be carefully selected based on the geographical area of 
observers. To minimise the effect of these variables, the standard FFTs use celebrities 
from various backgrounds (e.g. music, cinema, sport, politics), and the final score is 
calculated relative only to those stimuli participants are familiar with.   
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A familiar face matching test using famous faces has also been created to provide a 
more ecologically valid measure to the GFMT. In the Local Heroes Test (LHT; White, 
Rivolta, Burton, Al-Janabi, & Palermo, 2017) participants view pairs of images of 
either famous or unfamiliar people and have to establish whether the pictures depict the 
same identity. Unlike the GFMT, the LHT uses pictures taken under unconstrained 
conditions which should better represent everyday face perception. Given the 
advantage of familiarity in face matching tasks, it is expected that individuals with 
typical face recognition ability will perform significantly better when matching famous 
faces. 
1.2.2 Self-report measures 
Based on the assumption that people who struggle recognising familiar faces are 
aware of their difficulties, researchers have developed self-report instruments to 
provide an overall picture of the severity of self-reported problems (e.g., Shah, Gaule, 
Sowden, Bird, & Cook, 2015; Kennerknecht, et al., 2006). Self-report measures alone 
are not sufficient for a diagnosis of DP, but they represent an efficient screening tool 
(see Bate & Tree, 2017). For example, some authors have used semi-structured 
interviews to explore face recognition difficulties in everyday life (e.g., Grueter et al., 
2007; Murray, Hills, Bennetts, & Bate, 2018), while studies with larger samples have 
benefitted from the use of self-ratings to recruit and select participants (e.g., the 
Hereditary Prosopagnosia questionnaire in Kennerknecht et al., 2006; the self-rated 
face recognition questionnaire in Bowles et al., 2009). However, these measures were 
purposely developed for individual studies, and lacked a formal validation procedure. 
The 20-item Prosopagnosia Index (PI20; Shah et al., 2015) was created to provide the 
first validated and standardised self-report test for DP diagnosis. The questionnaire 
consists of 20 items examining face recognition in everyday life, providing part-takers 
with hypothetical tangible scenarios to which they can easily relate. Strong correlations 
are normally observed between PI20 scores and objective measures of familiar and 
unfamiliar face recognition (i.e., the FFT, the CFMT, the CFPT), allowing the 
distinction between individuals with typical and atypical face perception. In addition, 
scores in the higher range (i.e. 65-100) can be broadly clustered into groups of severity 
(i.e., mild, moderate and severe). The predictive value of the PI20 found in Shah and 
colleagues (2015) is in contrast with the view that people may have little or no insight 
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into their face recognition ability (e.g., Bowles et al., 2009; Laguesse et al., 2013; 
Palermo et al., 2017). However, the PI20 is a measure which has been created as a 
diagnostic instrument, with items constructed ad hoc to investigate prosopagnosic traits 
rather than general face recognition abilities (see Gray, Bird, & Cook, 2017). Therefore, 
any attempt to conceive PI20 results as an indication of face recognition ability per se 
would be misleading. Instead, the PI20 should be used to complement other diagnostic 
measures in order to provide additional evidence that bad performance on computer-
based tests indicate actual atypical face processing rather than lack of motivation, 
boredom or fatigue effects. Moreover, an increasing number of authors are starting 
using the PI20 as a quick screening tool to sample DP participants, or when recruiting 
participants from online platforms.   
1.2.3 Convergence of diagnostic evidence 
On one hand, questionnaires are a useful screening tool enabling researchers to select 
putative prosopagnosics based on where their score falls compared to the norm. 
Though, these instruments alone cannot be regarded as the only diagnostic criterion. In 
fact, some people may be prone to either underestimate or overestimate their actual face 
recognition ability - in the typical population only little correlations were found 
between subjective assessments and objective scores (Bindemann, Attard, & Johnston, 
2014; McGuin, Richler, Herzmann, Speegle, & Gautier, 2012). Therefore, it is common 
practice to integrate questionnaires with computerised measures for a precise 
assessment.  
On the other hand, performance on computer-based tests is more objective but does 
not always generate reliable evidence. For example, it has been shown that the statistical 
sensitivity in identifying prosopagnosics is highly influenced by the composition of the 
control group, which must be matched for age, ethnicity, gender, and intelligence to 
produce reliable data (Bowles et al., 2009; McKone et al., 2011). Moreover, aspects 
such as lack of motivation, boredom, test anxiety and poor mouse control may also 
affect the execution of these tests (Butcher, Perry, & Atlis, 2000; see also Shah, Gaule, 
Sowden, Bird, & Cook, 2015). Coversely, existing impairments may not be always 
revealed by traditional tests, whenever individuals with a lifelong history of face 
recognition difficulites may be prone to apply compensatory strategies to execute 
diagnostic tasks.  
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Currently, the diagnostic approach of many researchers is leaning towards the use 
of different measures which can contribute to convergent evidence. For example, recent 
findings revealed that less than 1.5% of the general population score below 65% on the 
CFMT and more than 65 on the PI20 (Gray, Bird, & Cook, 2017). This data suggests 
that the use of multiple tests, including both objective and self-report measures, may be 
a particularly effective approach when classifying individuals with DP. 
1.3 Perceptual and cognitive accounts of DP 
Face recognition ability is distributed in the general population; the majority of 
people collocate in the middle of a bell-shaped curve, where at the two extreems are 
individuals with either exceptional skills (i.e. super recognisers, Russell, Duchaine, & 
Nakayama, 2009), or pronounced face recognition difficulties. It is rather tempting to 
describe DP on the basis of quantitative differences with the typical population. If this 
were the case, we would expect deficits to emerge merely from reduced functioning of 
the same mechanisms subtending face perception in neurotypical individuals. 
Conversely, prosopagnosics may rely on qualitatively different processes, which are 
less effective and forceful than those used typically. 
Developmental disorders can vary on the degree to which cognitive deficits are 
widespread or specific to certain domains (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). In this 
respect, DP appears to be relatively restricted regarding its symptoms, the majority of 
which pertain to the visual domain. Despite this apparent simplicity, the cognitive 
characterisation of DP is not straightforward - after two decades of intense research, the 
causes of the condition remain unclear and our understanding is hindered by conflicting 
evidence. What we know for certain is that DP is a heterogeneous disorder which 
manifests with a variety of behavioural profiles (Susilo & Duchaine, 2013; Duchaine 
& Nakayama, 2006; Behrmann, Avidan, Marotta, & Kimchi, 2005).  
1.3.1 Is DP due to a low-level visual deficit? 
General low-level vision is thought to be intact in many DPs as authors infer normal 
low-level processing from typical performance in non-face conditions. Therefore, a 
very few studies have included measures of basic visual processing. Despite little 
attention, low-level visual properties have a significant effect on our perception of face 
stimuli (see Barton, Cherkasova, Press, Intriligator, & O'Connor, 2004). For example, 
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luminance sensitivity can affect how we perceive subtle shades which provide 
important cues to facial contour and local shapes, and information about facial shape is 
conveyed by low and high spatial frequencies (e.g., Fiorentini, Maffei, & Sandini, 
1983).  
Nunn, Postma, and Pearson (2001) investigated an individual with DP who showed 
a selective impairment at face recognition despite normal basic visual skills (i.e., visual 
acuity, colour perception, line orientation, visual motor integration, visual matching and 
copying, perception of form, visuo-constructive ability and perceptual integration). 
Another single case was examined who showed normal low-level vision (i.e., visual 
fields, visual copying of figures and objects, visual matching of figures, length, size, 
and orientation, perception of overlapping figures) despite significant deficits at both 
face and object recognition (Duchaine, Nieminen-von, New, & Kulomaki, 2003).  
A particular attention has been given to the role of high and low spatial frequencies 
in the perception of local and global features. It has been suggested that the perceptual 
advantage for global vs local structure found in neurotypical individuals may be 
mediated by low spatial frequency channels which operate at early visual processing 
(e.g., Lamb & Yund, 1993; Badcock, Whitworth, Badcock, & Lovegrove, 1990). To 
rule out the possibility that configural processing deficits commonly found in DP may 
be due to aberrant sensitivity to low spatial frequencies, Behrmann and colleagues 
(2005) tested the contrast spatial frequency sensitivity of 5 individuals with DP. 
Performances fell within the typical range. Furthermore, sensitivity to spatial relations 
between features was also tested and all DP individuals were able to derive contours 
from small Gabor patches whose stimuli varied in number, orientation and distance 
between each other (Behrmann et al., 2005).  
Nevertheless, when tested on sensitive psychophysical tasks, 3 individuals with DP 
showed mixed results regarding their basic visual processing (Barton, Cherkasova, 
Press, Intriligator, & O'Connor, 2003). Impairments were found in spatial contrast 
sensitivity (3 DPs), particularly for high spatial frequencies, luminance discrimination 
(2 DPs), saturation discrimination (1 DP), spatial resolution (3 DPs), and dot 
displacement discrimination (3 DPs) (for a summary refer to Table 2 in Barton et al., 
2003). 
Mid-level vision is also been investigated in DP. The extraction of global form, 
where local elements are integrated into a coherent whole, is essential to face perception 
and sensitivity to global form can be studied using Glass patterns (1969) or a compound 
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letter task (Navon, 1977). Glass patterns are created by overlaying two identical random 
patterns of dots; rotation of these patterns over a central axis results in the perception 
of different spatial patterns like spirals or circles. In fact, patterns rotation allows to 
introduce correlations between the two set of dots and our eyes are able to detect these 
spatial relationships in the form of concentric global shapes. Sensitivity to these global 
patterns is assessed by varying the ratio of signal dots (i.e. paired dotes) to noise dots 
(i.e. unpaired dots). Crucially, typical adults can detect global form even if carried by 
only 12% of signal dots (Lewis et al., 2004; Le Grand et al., 2006), and individuals with 
DP have been reported to show similar sensitivity to that of neurotypical observers (Le 
Grand et al., 2006). Prosopagnosics also exhibit typical perception of global motion (Le 
Grand et al., 2006), assessed by varying the proportion of noise dots moving in random 
directions to signal dots moving in the same direction. 
Similarly, many DPs have been shown to perform typically on compound letters 
tasks (Duchaine, Germine, & Nakayama, 2007; Duchaine, Yovel, & Nakayama, 2007; 
Schmalzl, Palermo, & Coltheart, 2008), in which they have to identify compound letters 
either at global or local level (Navon, 1977). However, it must be mentioned that some 
authors found a local bias in prosopagnosics, resulting in slower reaction times for 
global judgements, especially when the global letter was inconsistent with the local 
letters (Behrmann, Avidan, Marotta, & Kimchi, 2005; Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 
2011). 
1.3.2 Is DP due to diminished acquisition of perceptual expertise? 
The ability of typical adults to perceive and recognise faces so quickly and 
accurately may be explained by considering faces objects for which humans have 
developed a high degree of perceptual expertise (Diamond & Carey, 1986). This 
expertise is aided by the fact that all faces share a common arrangement of their 
features, and humans are particularly sensitive to this configuration (Gauthier & Tarr, 
2002). Therefore, acquiring perceptual expertise means to be sensitive to the typical 
configuration of faces, which are perceived using holistic processing rather than a part-
based one. As a result of perceptual expertise, compared to other objects faces are 
salient stimuli that can be detected quickly and efficiently, when they are in their typical 
upright configuration. Accordingly, people tend to automatically and preferentially 
orient their attention to face stimuli when they are present in a visual context (e.g., 
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Rousselet, Macé, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2003; Ro, Friggel, & Lavie, 2007), and selective 
orientation of attention towards face-like configurations has been reported already in 
newborn infants (e.g., Morton & Johnson, 1991; Gliga, Elsabbagh, Andravizou, & 
Johnson, 2009), suggesting that some inherited preference for certain patterns may be 
present since birth.  
Crucially, DP may result from a failure in developing perceptual expertise for faces. 
This idea has been explored in other develomental conditions that share face perception 
difficulties. For example, Schultz (2005) has proposed a compelling account of ASD 
as a breakdown in attention orientation towards face stimuli, in particular those with 
emotional salience, which affects the normal development of brain networks (i.e. 
amygdala-fusiform face area) involved in social perception. If this is true for DP, we 
might expect atypical behaviour at very early stages of face processing. 
Face detection refers to “the process of finding a face in a visual scene” (Garrido, 
Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008, p. 119) and it appears to be reduced by changes in the 
typical configuration of faces (e.g. inversion) or in their low-level visual properties (e.g. 
luminance, contrast, sharpness, hue) (e.g., Purcel & Stewart, 1986, 1988; Lewis & 
Edmonds, 2003, 2005; Rousselet, Mace, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2003; but see Garrido et al., 
2008). Face detection is the very first step of face processing. Despite its relevance in 
computer sciences and machine learning, it has received only little consideration from 
vision scientists and its neuro-cognitive mechanisms are not covered by influentials 
models of face perception (Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000).  
Whether face detection can be dissociated from other mechanisms of face 
processing, like face recognition for example, is a matter of debate. The inversion 
effects found in tasks of face detection are smaller compared to those normally observed 
in face recognition tasks (see Lewis & Edmonds, 2003, 2005). However, as suggested 
by Garrido and colleagues (2008), the presence of contextual cues in detection 
paradigms may reduce the size of the inversion effect. Evidence of dissociation with 
face recognition comes from findings of intact face detection in patients with acquired 
prosopagnosia (e.g., de Gelder & Rouw, 2000; Schiltz et al., 2006). Similarly, 
individuals with DP show typical face detection in tasks where they have to 
discriminate between a face and a scrambled face (e.g., de Gelder & Rouw, 2000; Le 
Grand et al., 2006; Duchaine, Nieminen-von, New, & Kulomaki, 2003; Duchaine, 
2000; Duchaine, Yovel, Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2006). Nevertheless, when a more 
ecologically valid paradigm was used, in which participants had to locate face stimuli 
	
	
27	
among distractors presented in a visual array, Garrido and colleagues (2008) found 
impaired face detection at the group level in 14 prosopagnosics. 
1.3.3 Apperceptive accounts of DP 
Historically DP has been conceived as a form of prosopagnosia which affects 
people’s ability to encode the structure of faces (De Renzi, Faglioni, Grossi, & Nichelli, 
1991; Behrmann & Avidan, 2005; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006b). Specifically, the 
impairment was thought to occur early in the face processing stream, before the analysis 
of various face attributes (e.g., identity, emotion expression) segregates (Bruce & 
Young, 1986; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). Accordingly, face perception is not 
a monolithic function but is modulated by separate functional units which can act either 
in series or in parallel (Bruce & Young, 1986, Figure 1.1a; Haxby et al., 2000; Figure 
1.1b). After an initial structural encoding which allows for a perceptual description, two 
relatively independent systems are responsible for the analysis of changeable (i.e. 
expressions, lip movement, eye gaze) and invariant (i.e. identity) aspects of faces. 
Depending on where the impairment occurs in this hierarchical model, deficits will 
likely emerge in all the subsequent processing stages, leading to a variety of impairment 
profiles. 
In support of apperceptive accounts of DP, many prosopagnosics show difficulties 
when matching unfamiliar faces presented simultaneously (e.g., Duchaine, Germine, & 
Nakayama, 2007; Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Shah, Gaule, Gaigg, Bird, & 
Cook, 2015; White, Rivolta, Burton, Al-Janabi, & Palermo, 2017). Moreover, some 
DPs also present co-occurent impairments at categorising facial age and gender (Ariel 
& Sadeh, 1996), and emotion expressions (Burns, Martin, Chan, & Xu, 2017; Duchaine 
et al., 2007). The CFPT is been widely used to investigate apperceptive deficits 
minimising memory demands. However, its structure makes this test prone to 
compensatory strategies, and performance can also be influenced by aspects such as 
participants’ visual acuity, anxiety when performing against the clock, or ability in 
using a trackpad or mouse. As a result, many DPs often fail to show impaired 
performance on the CFPT at the single case level (e.g., Bowles et al., 2009; Ulrich et 
al., 2017). However, differences at the group level that emerged in other studies (e.g., 
Duchaine et al., 2007; Shah et al., 2015; White et al., 2017) highlight the possibility of 
apperceptive deficits, which sometimes get undetected due to poor test-retest reliability. 
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1.3.3.1  Holistic processing  
An influencial apperceptive account has tried to explain the deficits observed in DP 
as a consequence of aberrant visual processing, wherby faces cannot be perceived 
holistically. Crucially, faces are represented in a unique way compared to other visual 
stimuli: they are perceived as a perceptual whole rather than as a combination of the 
individual constituents (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Maurer, Le Grand, & 
Mondloch, 2002; for a review see Piepers & Robbins, 2013). This representational style 
is known as configural processing, which refers to the natural tendency to i) being tuned 
to first-order relations, which correspond to the typical configuration of faces, ii) 
integrate individual facial features into a perceptual whole (i.e. holistic processing), and 
iii) being sensitive to second-order relations, which allow the distinction of different 
identities by extracting spatial distances between local features (Maurer, Le Grand, & 
Mondloch, 2002). This special modality of processing faces compared to other objects 
seems to develop as consequence of expertise (Diamond & Carey, 1986). The enormous 
amount of faces that people encounter throughout a lifetime makes it crucial to be able 
to differentiate and recognise them effortlessly and in different conditions. Therefore, 
a failure in configural processing appears to be associated with reduced face recognition 
(Rivest, Moscovitch, & Black, 2009), and some authors attempted to describe DP as a 
breakdown in configural processing (Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Carbon, 
Grüter, Weber, & Lueschow, 2007; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Lobmaier, Bölte, Mast, & 
Dobel, 2010; Palermo et al., 2011). Accordingly, training prosopagnosics on holistic 
processing is being reported to improve their face recognition (DeGutis, Cohan, & 
Nakayama, 2014). Evidence of configural processing comes from phenomena such as 
the inversion effect (IE) (Yin, 1969), the composite face illusion (CFI) (Young, 
Hellawell, & Hay, 1987), and the part-whole effect (PWE) (Tanaka & Farah, 1993).  
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Figure 1.1. Neuro-cognitive models of face perception. (a) Bruce & Young, 1986, p. 312;  
(b) Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000. 
	
1.3.3.1.1 The Inversion Effect  
The IE refers to the disproportionate decline of perception when faces are viewed 
upside-down, and not in their normal upright configuration (Yin, 1969). This 
phenomenon occurs as people are sensitive to first-order relations (i.e. two eyes above 
a nose and a mouth) which trigger holistic processing. When faces are inverted, 
configural processing is disrupted and observers rely on featural processing, whereas 
local facial components are processed individually (Farah, Tanaka, & Drain, 1995). 
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Since non-face objects are generally perceived with a part-based approach, the IE is not 
as evident for other visual categories (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998). Reports 
investigating the IE in prosopagnosics show mixed results, partially due to differences 
in sample sizes and tasks employed (Behrmann, Avidan, Marotta, & Kimchi, 2005; 
Duchaine, Yovel, & Nakayama, 2007; Garrido, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008; Nunn, 
Postma, & Pearson, 2001; De Gelder & Rouw, 2000).  
1.3.3.1.2 The Composite Face Illusion 
Holistic processing is also studied by looking at people’s sensitivity to the CFI, 
where the perception of one face-half is inevitably influenced by the other half, when 
these are presented aligned and in the typical upright configuration (Young, Hellawell, 
& Hay, 1987). The perceptual illusion emerges when the top half of a face is aligned 
with the bottom of another, giving rise to the impression of a new facial identity (Young 
et al., 1987). Typically, individuals’ perception is affected when composites are 
presented upright and aligned spatially, and people are unable to judge the target half 
disregarding the distractor, even when explicitly instructed to do so. However, 
recognition of the target half is preserved both in aligned and misaligned arrangements 
when faces are presented inverted (for a review see Murphy, Gray, & Cook, 2017). The 
traditional paradigms employed to investigate the CFI can be either simultaneous (e.g. 
Hole, 1994) or delayed (e.g. Goffaux & Rossion, 2006; Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, 
& Brent, 2004) matching tasks, where participants are required to make a 
same/different judgment of the top halves of two simultaneously or sequentially 
presented composites, which can be aligned or misaligned, upright or inverted. Holistic 
processing is revealed by the disproportionate detriment of performance when 
composites are presented aligned and upright compared to the other conditions. A 
compelling account of DP as consequence of impaired holistic processing stems from 
the idea that the process measured by the CFI is closely related to face recognition 
ability (DeGutis, Wilmer, Mercado, & Cohan, 2013; Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 
2002; Piepers & Robbins, 2013). However, comparing people’s sensitivity to the 
composite face effect and their face recognition produced mixed results in the general 
population (for a review see Murphy, Gray, & Cook, 2017). Whilst some authors found 
a positive association (DeGutis, Wilmer, Mercado, & Cohan, 2013; Engfors, Jeffery, 
Gignac, & Palermo, 2017; Wang, Li, Fang, Tian, & Liu, 2012), others only observed 
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little or no correlation (Rezlescu, Susilo, Wilmer, & Caramazza, 2017; Konar, Bennett, 
& Sekuler, 2010). Interestingly, evidence from individuals with DP is also varied and 
a few studies have shown comparable CFI in both prosopagnosics and matched controls 
(Le Grand et al., 2006; Susilo et al., 2010; Schmalzl, Palermo, & Coltheart, 2008), 
whilst three studies concluded that DP is associated with reduced susceptibility to the 
illusion (Palermo et al., 2011; Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 
2014).  
1.3.3.1.3 The Part-Whole Effect 
Another way of measuring holistic processing is through the part-whole effect, 
where facial components are perceived disproportionately better when they are 
englobed in the context of a whole face rather than as isolated parts (Tanaka & Farah, 
1993). This phenomenon exposes the sub-component of configural processing which 
allows the detection of relative distances between face features, when these are 
presented canonically (i.e. “second-order relations” in Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 
2002). In fact, the part-whole effect disappears with non-face objects and inverted faces 
(Tanaka & Farah, 1993). The standard task requires observers to memorise a target face 
and subsequently identify the whole-face paired with a distractor which differs in either 
eyes, nose or mouth, or identify the individual components of the target face shown in 
isolation with distractor components. This paradigm was employed to train a group of 
5 DPs on other-race face recognition and pre-training data revealed a reduced, although 
not significantly different from controls, holistic advantage for whole faces in the DP 
group (DeGutis, DeNicola, Zink, McGlinchey, & Milberg, 2011). A later study using a 
very large sample of prosopagnosics (N = 38) observed a lack of holistic advantage for 
the eye region but not for the mouth (DeGutis, Cohan, Mercago, Wilmer, & Nakayama, 
2012) posing interesting questions on the value of the eyes as critical source of 
information for face discrimination.  
1.3.3.2 Domain-general configural processing 
Taken together these results show a complex picture, where holistic processing 
appears to manifest as a variety of functions rather than as a monolithic phenomenon 
(for a review see Rezlescu, Susilo, Wilmer, & Caramazza, 2017). The inconsistency of 
results in DP may be partly due to the attempt of ascribing results in individual tests to 
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holistic processing as a whole, whereas only certain processes of it may be impaired. 
Crucially, aberrant processing of configurations may also extend to non-face stimuli. 
Individuals with DP have been described to show a local processing bias with 
compound Navon stimuli, whereas local letter identification was faster than global 
identification (Behrmann, Avidan, Marotta, & Kimchi, 2005; Avidan, Tanzer, & 
Behrmann, 2011). Furthermore, Avidan and colleagues (2011) found a significant 
correlation between performance on a composite face task and a local bias index 
emerged in the global-local task. These results indicate that in individuals with face 
recognition deficits there might be an association between impairments in holistic face 
processing, measured with the composite task, and general configural processing of 
non-face stimuli, measured with the Navon task. However, this association does not 
always occur, and a case of acquired prosopagnosia showing clear dissociations 
between the two tasks has been reported (Busigny & Rossion, 2011), suggesting 
different cognitive mechanisms underlying the execution of these two tasks.  
1.3.3.3 Norm-based coding 
A compelling theoretical framework of face recognition postulates the existence of 
a cognitive map onto which each facial identity is represented as a point in this putative 
multidimensional face space (Valentine, 1991; for a review see Webster & MacLeod, 
2011). The centre of this space consists of the average of all faces experienced hitherto 
and individual faces are coded based on the average norms. Distance and direction from 
the centred average determine distinctiveness and deviance along multiple dimensions 
of each perceived face, respectively. For example, distant faces will be judged as less 
typical than faces that collocate close to the centre. Faces are discriminated between 
each other based on where they are in this representational system – the closer two faces 
are together, the more similar they are perceived by the observer. Surprisingly, 6 
individuals with DP were tested on different tasks where they had to judge face 
identities and showed typical representation of faces which was consistent with a face 
space model (Nishimura, Doyle, Humphreys, & Behrmann, 2010). The authors 
postulate that face recognition impairments in this population may originate from 
difficulties accessing mental representations. Specifically, aberrant holistic processing 
may prevent them from combining local features which can be perceived typically 
(Nishimura et al., 2010). In fact, DPs generally rely on distinctive features when 
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identifying faces, with consequent detriment in performance when faces appear alike 
(Le Grand et al., 2006; Nunn, Postma, & Pearson, 2001). Conversely, typically 
developed observers may use salient cues when faces are enough distinctive, but take 
advantage of feature-binding mechanisms with more standard-looking faces 
(Nishimura et al., 2010; Mondloch, LeGrand, & Maurer, 2002).  
The adaptation aftereffects reveal the unceasing updating of our face space, whereby 
extended exposure to a face biases perception in the opposite direction (Rhodes & 
Leopold, 2011). Palermo and colleagues (2011) employed an adaptation paradigm to 
examine whether face recognition difficulties may be associated to aberrant adaptive 
face coding in a group of 14 prosopagnosics. The DPs failed to show typical adaptation 
to face identity, whilst their aftereffects to facial shape was comparable to that of 
controls, suggesting that their mechanisms of face adaptation may be impaired, or at 
least different from those used by neurotypical individuals, only relatively to face 
identity.   
1.3.4 Mnemonic accounts of DP 
Evidence against an apperceptive characterisation of DP has emerged, as several 
findings show that DPs can encode face structure typically, resulting in unimpaired 
matching of simultaneously presented faces (e.g., Bowles et al., 2009; Dalrymple, 
Garrido, & Duchaine, 2014; Ulrich et al., 2017), accurate recognition of facial emotion 
(e.g., Humphreys, Avidan, & Behrmann, 2007; Palermo et al., 2011; Dobel, Bölte, 
Aicher, & Schweinberger, 2007), and typical susceptibility to the composite face 
illusion (e.g., Le Grand et al., 2006; Susilo et al., 2010; Ulrich et al., 2017). These 
findings have led some authors postulating the possibility that DP is caused by impaired 
short-term face memory (STFM), whereby DPs are able to derive an accurate structural 
description, but have difficulties maintaining the percept in memory over time (e.g., 
Dalrymple et al., 2014; Dalrymple & Palermo, 2016; Jackson, Counter, & Tree, 2017; 
Stollhoff, Jost, Elze, & Kennerknecht, 2011; Ulrich, et al., 2017).  Accordingly, cases 
of DPs have been reported who show impaired performance on the CFMT, performing 
typically on tests with minimal memorial components such as the CFPT (e.g., Bowles 
et al., 2009; Dalrymple et al., 2014; McKone et al., 2011; Ulrich et al., 2017). Shah and 
colleagues (2015) systematically investigated the contribution of memory and 
perceptual deficits in DP. In a delayed match-to-sample paradigm, the authors 
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manipulated the retention interval, maintaining constant the perceptual demand. 
Interestingly, although DPs were less accurate and slower compared to controls in both 
conditions, the long-interval condition did not disproportionally impair their 
performance, suggestive of perceptual deficits (Shah et al., 2015). Similarly, a recent 
study which manipulated memory load by increasing the number of target faces to 
memorise failed to show a disproportionate decrement of performance as a function of 
memory load in the DP group compared to typical controls (Jackson, Counter, & Tree, 
2017). Taken together these findings suggest that problems at face matching observed 
in DP may stem from a perceptual deficit, rather than from aberrant retention.  
1.3.5 A heterogeneous disorder 
DP is a heterogeneous condition and it is often accompanied by difficulties 
recognising complex non-face objects (Behrmann, Avidan, Marotta, & Kimchi, 2005; 
De Haan & Campbell, 1991; Duchaine, Germine, & Nakayama, 2007; Duchaine & 
Nakayama, 2005; Ariel & Sadeh, 1996; McConachie, 1976; Lee et al., 2010; Todorov 
& Duchaine, 2008). A recent meta-analysis found that the 80.3% of the analysed data 
(N = 238 cases) consisted of DP individuals with concurrent object recognition 
difficulties, whilst only 19.7%1 were pure cases of prosopagnosia (Geskin & Behrmann, 
2017). Even when considering face recognition impairments alone, individual DPs vary 
regarding which aspects of face perception are affected by the condition, whether it is 
the perception of face structure and local features, or the retention of faces in short term 
memory. 
1.3.5.1 Apperceptive and mnemonic profiles 
Face processing difficulties observed in DP appear to have a different origin when 
considering individual cases. Some DPs (apperceptive) are unable to encode the 
structure of faces, resulting in deficits distinguishing unfamiliar faces (e.g., Avidan, 
Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Behrmann, Avidan Marotta, & Kimchi, 2005; Duchaine, 
Yovel, Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2006; Shah, Gaule, Gaigg, Bird, & Cook, 2015; 
White, Rivolta, Burton, Al-Janabi, & Palermo, 2017; Fisher, Towler, & Eimer, 2017), 
and judging aspects of faces other than identity, like facial emotion (Duchaine et al., 
																																								 																				
1 This figure may underestimate the actual number of pure cases, as authors eliminated from the 
analyses all those studies which found normal object recognition but omitted to report RT data. 
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2006; Ariel & Sadeh, 1996; de Haan & Campbell, 1991; Duchaine, Murray, Turner, 
White, & Garrido, 2009; Minnebusch, Suchan, Ramon, & Daum, 2007; Schmalzl et al., 
2008), facial age (Ariel & Sadeh, 1996), and facial gender (Ariel & Sadeh, 1996; de 
Haan & Campbell, 1991; Jones & Tranel, 2001). On the other hand, mnemonic DPs can 
succesfully encode facial structure and perceive emotion expressions (Dobel, Bölte, 
Aicher, & Schweinberger, 2007; Humphreys, Avidan, & Behrmann, 2007; Palermo et 
al., 2011), age and gender (Chatterjee & Nakayama, 2013) typically.  
The heterogeneity observed in DP is consistent with the historical classification of 
prosopagnosia, which was based on acquired cases who presented either an 
apperceptive or an associative (or mnemonic) profile of impairment (De Renzi, 
Faglioni, Grossi, & Nichelli, 1991). In associative forms of prosopagnosia, a structural 
description can be extracted but the percept cannot be associated to its representation 
stored in face memory, resulting in impairments at face recognition tests (e.g., the FFT, 
the CFMT, the RMT). In acquired prosopagnosia, associative subtypes result from 
lesions in the right anterior temporal lobe and patients have been described to show 
impaired access to face memory despite preserved face perception (Pancaroglu et al., 
2011). Furthermore, the recognition of familiar faces, tested using a variant of the FFT, 
results particularly impaired in patients with right and left anterior temporal lesions 
(Tsukiura et al., 2002; Tsukiura, Suzuki, Shigemune, & Mokizuki-Kawai, 2008; but see 
Gainotti, 2007).  
The presence of apperceptive and associative profiles of impairment reflects the 
multifaceted nature of face recognition, which relies equally on face perception and 
face memory. While face perception refers to those processes contributing to the 
representation of face properties, face memory consists of those processes which allow 
the storing, retention and retrieval of identity information (Dalrymple et al., 2014). 
Evidence of dissociation between face perception and face memory emerges from 
studies of patients with acquired prosopagnosia, but also by looking at neurotypical 
development. Overall, perceptual impairments stem from lesions localised more 
posteriorly in occipito-temporal regions, whilst amnesic deficits arise from more 
anterior lesions (Barton & Cherkasova, 2003; Barton, Press, Keenan, & O'Connor, 
2002; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990; but see Dalrymple et al., 2014). On the other 
hand, anterior injuries will likely affect face memory (Busigny, et al., 2014; Davies-
Thompson, Pancaroglu, & Barton, 2014). However, this distinction is not always clear-
cut, and some case reports showed atypical face perception resulting from damage in 
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the right anterior temporal lobe (Busigny et al., 2014; Williams, Savage, & Halmagyi, 
2006).  
Furthermore, face perception and face memory appear to segregate later in 
development, with face memory developing more slowly and reaching the peak of 
maturation after the first decade of life (Weigelt et al., 2014). For example, children 
with DP are equally impaired on perceptual and memory tasks, whereas adults show a 
dissociation (Dalrymple, Garrido, & Duchaine, 2014).  
1.3.5.2 Non-face objects deficits 
The extent to which DP affects face-specific mechanisms is still debated. 
Reportedly, some individuals perform in the typical range on standardised object 
recognition tests (e.g., Bentin, Deouell, & Soroker, 1999; Nunn, Postma, & Pearson, 
2001). Duchaine and colleagues (2006) described a pure case of DP who showed good 
recognition of several complex objects including cars, guns, tools, horses and 
sunglasses, despite severe impairments in various components of face processing (i.e., 
recognition of identity, perception of gender, facial emotion and attractiveness). 
Interestingly, pure cases appear to be relatively common in DP (e.g., Duchaine & 
Nakayama, 2005; Garrido, et al., 2009; Susilo et al., 2010; Lee, Duchaine, Nakayama, 
& Wilson, 2010). These reports indicate the existence of forms of DP which can only 
affect face-specific processes, suggesting that mechanisms for the visual processing of 
face and non-face objects can follow independent developmental trajectories.  
However, these results could be also explained by the fact that face recognition 
deficits are exacerbated by within-class discrimination, whereby several exemplars 
must be recognised within the same category, whilst such ability is not usually required 
in object recognition tests employed by several studies (e.g., the Birmingham Object 
Recognition Battery; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1993). Moreover, many of these studies 
only report accuracy data, which alone may not be sensitive to detect deficits when 
participants trade speed for accuracy (see Gauthier, Behrmann, & Tarr, 1999). 
The degree of dissociability between face and object recognition poses interesting 
questions on the nature of the processes that regulate both. Evidence of face recognition 
impairments with spared object recognition supports the view that face processing 
relies, at least in part, on dedicated mechanisms. This idea has been supported by 
evidence gathered from neuropsychological cases (e.g., Farah, 1996; McNeil & 
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Warrington, 1993; Busigny & Rossion, 2010; Riddoch, Johnston, Brecewell, Boutsen, 
& Humphreys, 2008; Busigny, Graf, Mayer, & Rossion, 2010), neuroimaging (e.g., 
Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; 
Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004), electrophysiological (e.g., Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & 
McCarthy, 1996), and behavioural (e.g., Leder & Carbon, 2006; Young, Hellawell, & 
Hay, 1987) studies.  
An alternative account postulates the existence of common, or partially overlapping, 
recognition mechanisms subserving the visual processing of both faces and objects 
(Tarr & Cheng, 1993; O'Toole, Jiang, Abdi, & Haxby, 2005; Haxby, et al., 2001; 
Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000). In support, the neural substrates of face 
and non-face object recognition are located in adjacent brain areas, and a certain degree 
of overlapping has been found (e.g., Grill-Spector, 2003; Kanwisher, 2000). However, 
only little association (i.e., 13.6% of shared variance) was found in typically developed 
individuals between their perfomances on the CFMT and the CCMT (Dennett et al., 
2011), suggesting that face and object recognition (cars in this case) may rely onto 
different mechanisms.  
Remarkably, any comparison between the visual processing of face and general 
objects must take into account certain differences between the two categories. For 
example, the discrimination among different examplars of non-face objects, alike face 
recognition, relies greatly on local features (e.g., Farah, Levinson, & Klein, 1995; 
Farah, 1992). Greebles stimuli have been created to find a control class of objects whose 
within-class recognition could be closely comparable to that of faces (Gauthier, 1998). 
Greebles consist of a novel object category with a fixed spatial configuration and 
distinguishable small local components. Similarly to faces, they can only be 
discriminated by looking at their second-order properties (i.e., individual parts).  
A compelling account challenges the assumption that a lack of association between 
face and non-face objects recognition may necessarily reflect separable neurocognitive 
mechanisms. In fact, the ability to recognise certain objects could be modulated by the 
degree of perceptual experience that individuals have with that class of objects 
(Gauthier et al., 2014; Wang, Gauthier, & Cottrell, 2016). Faces, for example, can be 
seen as a peculiar object for which people have developed a high degree of expertise 
due to constant exposure and to their critical evolutionary importance (Diamond & 
Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). In support to this claim, the Fusiform Face Area 
(FFA), a region showing selective activation for face stimuli compared to other objects 
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(Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004), 
strongly responds also to non-face objects of expertise (e.g., McGuin, Newton, Gore, 
& Gauthier, 2014; Xu, 2005; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; Gauthier, 
Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). Therefore, so called ‘face-specific’ 
mechanisms may also support the processing of other visual stimuli that share common 
perceptual characteristics with faces, for example a good amount of experience 
individuating within-class exemplars.  
Interestingly, in support of the expertise hypothesis, Greebles have been used as 
control stimuli in a paradigm where subjects undertake a learning training until they 
become fast and precise at individuating different exemplars (for the procedure see 
Gauthier & Tarr, 2002). Evidence shows that Greeble expertise recruites the same 
neuro-cognitive mechanisms of face recognition, with selective activations of FFA 
(e.g., Gauthier & Tarr, 2002), face-like electrophysiological responses (e.g., Rossion, 
Gauthier, Goffaux, Tarr, & Crommelinck, 2002) and the employment of holistic 
processing (e.g., Gauthier, Williams, Tarr, & Tanaka, 1998).  
Despite several perceptual similarities between faces and Greebles, a case of DP 
with intact recognition of Greebles has been reported (Duchaine, Dingle, Butterworth, 
& Nakayama, 2004), suggesting the existence of separable mechanisms for face and 
Greebles processing. However, the conclusions of this study have been challenged on 
the basis of the lack of a control task using face stimuli to be compared with the Greeble 
recognition task, and the unknown underlying causes of prosopagnosia in the DP 
individual tested, particularly those regarding the acquisition of expertise (see Bukach 
et al., 2012). Interestingly, Behrmann and colleagues (2005) found that a group of 5 
individuals with DP and 3 acquired prosopagnosics were remarkably slower at fine-
grained discriminations of Greebles  compared to normal controls, indicating that 
impairments in non-face novel objects might be elicited by RT rather than accuracy. 
Similarly, a comprehensive investigation of Greeble expertise attainment in a case of 
acquired prosopagnosic showed that despite the patient could reach the typical expertise 
criterion, replicating Duchaine et al. (2004), his learning trajectory was slower and used 
qualitatively different mechanisms compared to normal controls (Bukach et al., 2012).  
To date there are no definitive studies which can demonstrate whether faces are 
processed by domain-specific or domain-general mechanisms. Future studies using the 
DP population should include i) large samples, ii) comparable face and non-face objects 
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tasks, iii) measures of speed/accuracy trade-offs, and iv) should take into account the 
contribution of expertise.   
1.3.5.3 The co-occurrence hypothesis 
Emerging theories have proposed alternative interpretations of the complex 
heterogeneity of DP. For example, Gray and Cook (2018) have advanced the possibility 
that different forms of developmental agnosia may co-occur as independent conditions 
(i.e., the Independent Disorders Hypothesis, IDH). This idea is strengthened by a factual 
observation that co-occurrence is a common phenomenon of many developmental 
disorders, and by the possibility that common genetic or environmental factors may 
play a role in the development of neural substrates involved in general visual processing 
(e.g., Kaplan, Dewey, Crawford, & Wilson, 2001).  
Accordingly, for the IDH there is no such thing as DP disorder, but rather people 
inherit a predisposition to abnormal neural development of occipito-temporal areas 
(Gray & Cook, 2018) which are involved in the visual processing of both face and non-
face objects (e.g., Grill-Spector, 2003; Kanwisher, 2000). For example, aberrant 
development can be observed as reduced integrity of white matter (WM) tracts 
connecting these areas (Thomas et al., 2009; Song et al., 2015), and it has been shown 
that depending on the specific location of WM alterations it is possible to predict 
perceptual impairments for non-face objects in subjects with DP (Gomez et al., 2015).  
The IDH implies the existence of pure forms of developmental agnosia, which can 
only affect a specific category of visual stimuli, as the occurrence of one disorder 
simply increases the predisposition to develop another disorder. This is in clear contrast 
with the idea that co-occurrence of face and object recognition problems is due to 
common underlying domain-general mechanisms.  
1.3.5.4 Non-visual impairments 
1.3.5.4.1 Vocal recognition in DP 
Less focus has been given to non-visual deficits in DP. There are many similarities 
between face and voice identity recognition. Leading neuro-cognitive models of voice 
recognition share many parallels with the Bruce and Young (1986) model of face 
perception (e.g., Ellis, Jones, & Mosdell, 1997; Belin, Fecteau, & Bedard, 2004). After 
initial structural encoding of the auditory stimulus, voices are analysed by independent 
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systems which work in parallel and are responsible for the extraction of speech 
information, vocal affect information and vocal identity information (Belin et al., 2004; 
for a summary see Garrido et al., 2009).  
Moreover, both face and voice recognition activate the right anterior temporal lobe, 
whose damage has been associated to associative forms of acquired prosopagnosia 
(Barton, 2008; Pancaroglu et al., 2011). Interestingly, patients with acquired 
prosopagnosia following lesions in the anterior temporal lobe have been reported to 
show impaired voice recognition only when damage was bilateral (Liu, Pancaroglu, 
Hills, Duchaine, & Barton, 2014). The authors advanced the hypothesis that a 
multimodal person recognition syndrome may occur when associative variants of 
prosopagnosia are accompanied by bilateral anterior temporal lesions, resulting in 
deficits recognising the identity of a person by their face and voice.  
Along with congenital cases of face recognition impairment, cases of developmental 
phonagnosia have also been described showing severe voice recognition difficulties in 
the absence of brain damage (Garrido et al., 2009; Herald, Xu, Biederman, Amir, & 
Shilowich, 2014; Roswandowitz et al., 2014). This observation together with data from 
lesion studies, suggest that similar findings can emerge in DP. Given the existence of 
developmental forms of apperceptive and associative prosopagnosia, the latter may be 
associated with difficulties in voice recognition which could stem from a wider 
multimodal person recognition syndrome.  
To date there are only a few reports of impaired voice recognition in DP (e.g., Liu, 
Corrow, Pancaroglu, Duchaine, & Barton, 2015; von Kriegstein, Kleinschmidt, & 
Giraud, 2006) and the picture that emerges from these studies reveals that voice-related 
deficits are quite rare within DP. For example, Liu and colleagues (2015) found that 
only 1 of their 12 prosopagnosics showed voice recognition impairments. In von 
Kriegstein and colleagues (2006) a single case of DP was examined who revealed a 
selective impairment at familiar voice recognition but normal unfamiliar voice 
perception. Further investigations found that alike controls DP participants failed to 
show a face-benefit effect when learning voices paired to facial identities (von 
Kriegstein et al., 2008). Overall, these results show that DPs tend to exhibit typical 
voice recognition in unimodal testing conditions (i.e. when participants have to learn 
the voice alone), but their vocal identity recognition is not enhanced by multisensory 
interaction, resulting in worse perfomances at familiar voice recognition (for a review 
see Maguinness & von Kriegstein, 2017).  
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1.3.5.4.2 Topographic processing in DP 
Other non-visual deficits have been found in topographic processing. Often, 
individuals with DP report difficulties in spatial navigation (e.g., Duchaine, Parker, & 
Nakayama, 2003; Grueter et al., 2007). Formal testing focussing on landmark 
recognition and route learning found that DP participants show normal performance on 
these tests, contrary to anecdotal evidence (Corrow et al., 2016). However, when tested 
on topographic memory tasks which require participants to generate and apply metric 
representations of the environment, Klargaard and colleagues (2016) found that a group 
of DPs was less able to retain topographic information compared to typically developed 
individuals. Interestingly, the poor performance was not associated to visual short-term 
memory, as some participants with DP had preserved topographic memory despited 
impaired face memory. The authors suggest that while topographic memory 
impairments may co-occur with DP, the two conditions have to be taken as independent. 
1.4 Neural accounts 
1.4.1 Neural models of typical face perception 
The processing of faces proceeds through several functional modules which are 
supported by dedicated brain areas in the bilateral ventral occipito-temporal cortex, 
forming the core system of face perception (e.g., Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; 
Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; 
Tsao & Livingstone, 2008) (Figure 1.1b). Neuroimaging studies have repeatedly 
observed that these areas show greater response for faces than non-face objects in 
typically developed individuals (e.g., Kanwisher et al., 1997; Gauthier et al., 2000; for 
a review see Duchaine & Yovel, 2015). Alongside neuroimaging evidence, lesion 
studies and brain stimulation experiments have supported the functional organization 
of the face-processing network. Cases of acquired prosopagnosia have been reported to 
occur after damage in the occipito-temporal cortex, particularly in areas such as the 
OFA and the FFA (e.g., Rossion et al., 2003; Sorger, Goebel, Schiltz, & Rossion, 2007; 
Barton, 2008). Transient prosopagnosia also emerges from temporary deactivation of 
core regions using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (e.g., Pitcher, Garrido, 
Walsh, & Duchaine, 2008; Pitcher, Walsh, Yovel, & Duchaine, 2007).  
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1.4.1.1 The Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini model 
Haxby, Hoffman and Gobbini (2000) proposed a neural model of face perception 
based on the leading cognitive model by Bruce and Young (1986). In this model, each 
step of face perception is subtended by a dedicated brain area in the occipito-temporal 
cortex. The inferior occipital gyrus includes the occipital face area (OFA) and underpins 
the early visual processing, allowing for the structural encoding of face-like percepts. 
From this point, different aspects of face perception are analysed by dedicated areas: 
The fusiform gyrus encompasses the fusiform face area (FFA), which subtends the 
extraction of information that can be associated to a specific identity allowing for face 
recognition; whilst the superior temporal sulcus (STS) supports the analysis of 
changeable aspects of faces (e.g., expression, eye gaze, lip movement).  
Together with the core system, an extended system is involved in those aspects of 
face recognition which involve access to semantic memory and the social cognition 
domain (see Gobbini & Haxby, 2007) (Figure 1.1b). For example, perceiving a familiar 
face will trigger episodic and biographical information associated to that identity, 
eliciting an emotional response towards that person. The extraction of personal 
knowledge is supported by the anterior paracingulate, which encodes personal traits 
and attitudes, the posterior STS/temporoparietal junction, which regulates those 
processes associated with Theory of Mind, the anterior temporal cortex, which retrieves 
biographical information, and the precuneus, which retrieves episodic memories. 
Finally, the emotional response is regulated by the amygdala, the insula and the 
striatum. 
1.4.1.2 The Duchaine & Yovel model 
Recently, a new neural core system of face processing has been proposed, based on 
emerging evidence that could not be explained solely by referring to the traditional 
models (Duchaine & Yovel, 2015). The newly proposed framework includes the three 
core areas of traditional models (i.e., the FFA, the OFA, and the STS) and three new 
areas which have been identified recently; The anterior temporal lobe face area (ATL-
FA), the anterior superior temporal sulcus face area (aSTS-FA) and the inferior frontal 
gyrus face area (IFG-FA). These areas have been reported to function into two distinct 
pathways which interact with each other. On one hand, the ventral pathway, which 
includes the OFA, FFA, and ATL-FA, is responsible for the processing of information 
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associated to the structure and the surface of faces, allowing the perception of identity, 
age, sex, and expression. On the other hand, the dorsal pathway, consisting of pSTS-
FA, aSTS-FA, and IFG-FA, represents changeable aspects of faces, like expression, 
eye gaze, and mouth movements, and it is involved during the percepetion of dynamic 
faces.  
Most research on the neural functional correlates of DP has focused on the 
functioning of areas in the core and extended systems. Below I provide an overview of 
the key findings within three main methodological areas.  
1.4.2 Electrophysiological findings  
Event-related brain potential (ERP) technique is a direct measure of the brain 
electrical response to a perceptual event. Research in face perception has focussed on 
the N170, a component which has been associated to the neural processing of faces. 
Compared to other visual stimuli, faces elicit greater negativity 140-200 ms after 
stimulus presentation in electrodes placed in occipito-temporal sites, particularly in the 
right hemisphere (e.g., Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Allison, Puce, 
Spencer, & McCarthy, 1999;  Eimer, 2000). Specifically, N170 has been related to face 
structural encoding, in particular to early stages of face detection and perception of first-
order relations (e.g., Ghuman, et al., 2014; Rossion & Jacques, 2008). Interestingly, 
given the close relationship of N170 with the analysis of face configuration, this 
component is highly influenced by face inversion, with larger and delayed N170 
responses to inverted compared to upright faces (e.g., Bentin et al., 1996; Itier, Alain, 
Sedore, & McIntosh, 2007; Eimer, 2000). Leading interpretations of this phenomenon 
suggest that inverted faces might trigger additional neural processes involved in object 
perception (e.g. Rossion et al., 2000; but see Towler & Eimer, 2012). Alternatively, 
face-selective neural populations may increase their response to faces which are more 
difficult to perceive (Towler, Fisher, & Eimer, 2017). 
The study of the N170 component in DP helps to clarify the nature of the underlying 
causes of impairment (for a review see Towler & Eimer, 2012 and Towler, Fisher, & 
Eimer, 2017). Since N170 reflects early structural encoding, any abnormality in this 
component may be reflective of apperceptive forms of DP, whereby the deficit occurs 
at early stages of perception. On the other hand, mnemonic subtypes of DP may not be 
revealed by simply looking at the N170, given that their deficits occur later on in the 
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processing stream, and involve the association of the percept with identity 
representations stored in long term memory. 
The heterogeneity found in behavioural studies reflects in the ERP findings where 
only some of the prosopagnosics tested showed reduced face-sensitivity of the N170, 
whilst others appeared to have typical neural responses (e.g., Bentin, Deouell, & 
Soroker, 1999; Kress & Daum, 2003; Harris, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2005; Righart & 
de Gelder, 2007; Minnebusch, Suchan, Ramon, & Daum, 2007; Bentin, DeGutis, 
D'Esposito, & Robertson, 2007; Nemeth, Zimmer, Schweinberger, Vakli, & Kovacs, 
2014; Rivolta, Palermo, Schmalzl, & Williams, 2012). A study using a sizeable group 
of 16 DPs found normal face-sensitive N170 responses to upright faces, but failed to 
show the typical enhanced N170 for the inverted faces in the DP group , suggesting that 
they may process similarly upright and inverted faces at the neural level (e.g., Towler, 
Gosling, Duchaine, & Eimer, 2012).  
Alternatively, the typical N170 response in DPs may be triggered by the processing 
of the eye region which is known to elicit this component (Bentin, Golland, Flevaris, 
Robertson, & Moscovitch, 2006), and this interpretation is consistent with the idea that 
DP affects global rather than local processing (e.g., Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 
2011; Carbon, Grüter, Weber, & Lueschow, 2007; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Lobmaier, 
Bölte, Mast, & Dobel, 2010; Palermo et al., 2011). However, even when tested using 
Mooney faces, which prevent the engagement of feature-based processes, DPs show 
face-sensitive N170 responses, indicating that they may also rely on some global 
information at early stages of face perception (Towler, Gosling, Duchaine, & Eimer, 
2016).  
Despite normal activations of face-selective posterior areas within 200 ms from 
stimulus onset, prosopagnosics fail to show the typical pattern of enhancement and 
delay of N170 to inverted faces (e.g., Towler, Gosling, Duchaine, & Eimer, 2012) and 
scrambled faces (Towler, Parketny, & Eimer, 2016), suggesting that DPs may be less 
sensitive not only to face configuration but also to changes in the canonical spatial  
arrangement of local components. Towler and colleagues (2017) have suggested that 
the lack of modulation of N170 with non-canonical faces in DPs may reflect the fact 
that prosopagnosics recruit additional neural populations which respond to non-face 
objects. Therefore, they may treat faces and objects as similar perceptual stimuli. 
Alternatively, face-selective neurons that fire more with more difficult stimuli (i.e. 
inverted and scrambled faces) in neurotypical individuals, may respond similarly to 
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both canonical and non-canonical faces in the DP population, suggesting that the 
difficulty does not vary sistematically for prosopagnosics.   
1.4.3 Neuroimaging findings 
1.4.3.1 Structural findings 
Studies looking at the structural correlates of DP reveal a more striking picture, and 
white matter (WM) tracts appear a suitable candidate in the search for neural markers 
of prosopagnosia. White-matter tracts are bundles of myelinated axons which connect 
different brain areas. Reportedly, structural properties of the inferior longitudinal 
fasciculus (ILF), a large tract connecting occipital with temporal regions, have been 
associated with a variety of behaviours, including face recognition (e.g., Catani, Jones, 
Donato, & Ffytche, 2003; Gschwind, Pourtois, Schwartz, Van De Ville, & Vuilleumier, 
2012; Pyles, Verstynen, Schneider, & Tarr, 2013; Saygin et al., 2012). Where high tract 
integrity facilitates information exchange between occipital and fusiform face areas, 
individuals may experience excellent face perception (e.g., Tavor et al., 2004). 
Conversely, where information exchange within this network is impaired, individuals 
may exhibit perceptual deficits for faces (e.g., Thomas et al., 2009; Gomez et al., 2015; 
Behrmann, Avidan, Gao, & Black, 2007).  
Thomas and colleagues (2009) tried to functionally define ILF in relation to face-
specific deficits observed in DP and found that reduced structural integrity in DPs 
correlated with errors in face recognition. Interestingly, more recent studies reported 
that local WM properties of ILF, rather than the entire fasciculus, accounted for 
category-specific behaviours (Gomez et al., 2015; Song et al., 2015). In Gomez et al. 
(2015) WM local properties of fibres within the ILF interconnecting face-selective 
regions correlated with performance on the Benton Face Recognition task; while 
integrity of the local structure of fibres in place-selective areas correlated with accuracy 
in a scene-recognition memory test. These findings extended and complemented 
previous research, showing that WM associated with specific regions may be a better 
predictor of behavioural performance. Crucially, a “local approach” in connectivity 
studies helps explaining the variability of ILF perturbation across different DPs 
revealed by Thomas et al. (2009). Since ILF interconnects areas in the visual cortex 
which mediate different functions, it is possible that different profiles of disruption may 
account for the individual differences widely observed in DP.  
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The evidence of differential WM properties in face-selective areas observed in DPs 
implicates that behavioural deficits associated with the condition may arise from 
aberrant neuro-structural development affecting the signal propagation through the core 
system of face perception (see Behrmann, Avidan, Gao, & Black, 2007). In fact, 
standard neuroimaging scans of DP individuals fail to show any  apparent lesions or 
neurological anomalies of specific areas (e.g., Jones & Tranel, 2001; Kress & Daum, 
2003; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006; but see Behrmann et al., 2007). However, more 
sensitive techniques have shown differences in the microstructure of face-selective core 
regions in prosopagnosics. Reduced grey matter volume in areas such as the inferior 
temporal lobe, STS and FFA has been observed in DP, and these abnormalities are 
associated with face recognition performance (Garrido et al., 2009; Behrmann et al., 
2007).  
1.4.3.2 Functional findings  
Activation studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have 
repeatedly shown that the core regions of face perception of neurotypical adults 
generate stronger responses to faces than other objects (e.g., Kanwisher, McDermott, 
& Chun, 1997; Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, & McCarthy, 1996). Moreover, BOLD 
signal suppression can be observed in the fusiform gyrus and in STS following the 
repetition of the same identity or expression, respectively (e.g., Winston, Henson, Fine-
Goulden, & Dolan, 2004; Fox, Moon, Iaria, & Barton, 2009; Rotshtein, Henson, Treves, 
Driver, & Dolan, 2005). In the DP population findings are more inconsistent: Some 
individuals show reduced or absent face-selective responses in the core regions (e.g., 
Hadjikhani & De Gelder, 2002; Minnebusch, Suchan, Köster, & Daum, 2009; Bentin, 
DeGutis, D'Esposito, & Robertson, 2007; Furl, Garrido, Dolan, Driver, & Duchaine, 
2011; Dinckelacker et al., 2011), but the vast majority of DPs reveal typical activations 
(e.g., Hasson et al., 2003; Avidan, Hasson, Malach, & Behrmann, 2005; Bentin, 
DeGutis, D'Esposito, & Robertson, 2007; Zhang, Liu, & Xu, 2015; Avidan et al., 2014). 
A single case of DP has been reported showing typical activation of the left FFA, but 
reduced response in the right FFA to familiar and unfamiliar faces (von Kriegstein, 
Kleinschmidt, & Giraud, 2006). Furthermore, a few studies have shown typical 
repetition suppression to familiar faces in DPs (e.g., Avidan, Hasson, Malach, & 
Behrmann, 2005; Williams, Berberovic, & Mattingley, 2007). 
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Furl and colleagues (2011) suggest the possibility that the inconsistency found in 
functional studies may reflect the fact that face recognition is distributed in the general 
population, with DP representing the lower end of the distribution. Therefore, affected 
mechanisms may function less well than those of neurotypical individuals without 
necessarily being qualitatively different or absent. Consequently, neural responses in 
DPs would be reduced and related to behavioural performance, rather than completely 
non-existent. Accordingly, using a sizeable sample of 15 DPs the authors found an 
overall reduced face-selectivity in the bilateral FFA in the experimental group. 
Critically, the neural response of the right fusiform gyrus was positively related to face 
identity recognition performance, but not to expression or object recognition, in the 
whole sample, corroborating the prediction that heterogeneous functional results in DP 
indicate quantitative individual differences in this population (Furl et al., 2011). 
An alternative account has been proposed recently by looking at the size of receptive 
fields (RF) of neuronal populations in the core face-selective regions of individuals with 
DP (Witthoft et al., 2016). Participants with DP showed smaller RFs in the core regions 
of face processing, but not in early visual cortex, compared to typically developed 
individuals. Crucially, this difference in size positively correlated with behavioural 
performance on a face recognition task. Since smaller RFs are associated with reduced 
spatial integration, the authors conclude that DPs may be able to perceive facial local 
information, but they might struggle integrating visual information from disparate face 
regions into a perceptual whole (Witthoft et al., 2016). The evidence provided by this 
study is in line with behavioural evidence of reduced holistic processing in DP (e.g., 
Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et al., 2011). 
Moreover, it helps unravelling the lack of functional differences in the face-selective 
regions of most DPs. In fact, face selectivity could purely emerge from neural responses 
to facial features irrespective of the extent of visual field that is actually attended by the 
observer.  
Effective connectivity has also been investigated in DP (Lohse et al., 2016). 
Dynamic causal modeling (DCM) allows to estimate the directionality of the 
information flow within a pre-defined functional network.  Lohse and colleagues (2016) 
found that face-related visual information modulates the coupling of regions in the face 
processing network. In particular, three main feedforward effective connections were 
found between the early visual cortex (EVC) and OFA, FFA and the posterior STS. 
Crucially, in the DP subjects the connection strength was reduced in EVC-FFA 
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(bilaterally) and EVC-right pSTS connections, and this diminished connectivity was 
associated to reduced face selectivity in those occipitotemporal areas. These findings 
are in line with the hypothesis that deficits in DP may result from a failure in signal 
propagation from occipital to temporal regions (Behrmann, Avidan, Gao, & Black, 
2007), and are further corroborated by structural evidence of major physical alterations 
in the ILF of DPs  (e.g., Thomas et al., 2009).  
1.5 Objectives 
Taken together, the outcomes concerning the cognitive mechanisms of DP reported 
in the reviewed literature thus far have been controversial, yielding mixed results. 
Whether mixed findings are attributable to differences in methodology across studies, 
or to different compositions of experimental samples, is debatable. What does emerge 
is that the main theoretical accounts of DP seem to diverge around two main empirical 
open questions: the first concerning the type of mechanisms involved (e.g. apperceptive 
versus mnemonic), the second regarding the nature of the deficit (e.g. domain-specific 
versus domain-general). Apperceptive accounts of DP have attributed face recognition 
impairments to reduced holistic processing of faces and poor perceptual encoding. On 
the other hand, mnemonic accounts ascribed the deficits to difficulties maintaining face 
percepts over time. Regarding the specific nature of deficits, some studies found face-
selective impairments, whilst others attributed co-occurring non-face object recognition 
problems to a domain-general impairment.  
The present thesis sought to systematically assess these main open empirical 
questions using sensitive psychophysical tasks and sizable samples of individuals with 
DP, tested on several diagnostic measures and in controlled settings. Chapter 2 aimed 
to explore the apperceptive versus non-apperceptive debate by looking at facial emotion 
recognition in DP, an ability that is dissociated from face memory according to leading 
models of face perception. Chapter 3 sought to explore the specificity of deficit by 
investigating face, body, and object recognition using a task in which the three 
conditions were matched in cognitive demand. Chapter 4 re-examined the susceptibility 
of DPs to the composite face illusion using two independent samples of prosopagnosics 
and two slightly different versions of the composite face task. Finally, Chapter 5 sought 
to examine the contribution of perceptual encoding and short term face memory in DP 
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using a delayed match-to-sample task where view-point and retention interval were 
systematically manipulated.  
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Chapter 2: Impaired perception of facial emotion in developmental prosopagnosia 
2.1 Abstract 
Developmental prosopagnosia is a neurodevelopmental condition characterised by 
difficulties recognising faces. Despite severe difficulties recognising facial identity, 
expression recognition is typically thought to be intact in developmental prosopagnosia; 
case studies have described individuals who are able to correctly label photographic 
displays of facial emotion, and no group differences have been reported. This pattern 
of deficits suggests a locus of impairment relatively late in the face processing stream, 
after the divergence of expression and identity analysis pathways. To date, however, 
there has been little attempt to investigate emotion recognition systematically in a large 
sample of developmental prosopagnosics using sensitive tests. Interestingly, when 
questioned, many prosopagnosics report problems recognising expressions in their 
daily lives, raising the possibility that expression recognition difficulties may be more 
common in this population than currently thought. In the present study, we describe 
three complementary psychophysical experiments that examine the recognition of 
facial and vocal emotion in a sample of 17 developmental prosopagnosics. In 
Experiment 1, we investigated observers’ ability to make binary classifications of 
whole-face expression stimuli drawn from morph continua. Psychophysical analyses 
revealed diminished ability to classify morphed facial expressions in our sample of 
developmental prosopagnosics, relative to typical observers. We replicated this group 
difference in Experiment 2 when observers judged facial emotion using only the eye-
region (the rest of the face was occluded). In our third experiment, we examined the 
ability of observers to classify the emotion present within segments of vocal affect. 
Despite difficulties judging facial emotion, the prosopagnosics exhibited excellent 
recognition of vocal affect. Contrary to the prevailing view, our results suggest that 
many prosopagnosics do experience difficulties classifying expressions, particularly 
those with apperceptive profiles. These individuals may have difficulties forming view-
invariant structural descriptions at an early stage in the face processing stream, before 
identity and expression pathways diverge.  
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2.2 Introduction 
Developmental prosopagnosia2 (DP) is a lifelong neurodevelopmental disorder 
associated with impaired face recognition, thought to affect as many as one in every 50 
people (Kennerknecht et al., 2006; Kennerknecht, Ho, & Wong, 2008). Individuals with 
DP exhibit deficits recognising personally familiar faces as well as problems 
discriminating unfamiliar faces, despite normal intelligence, typical low-level vision, 
and an absence of manifest brain injury (Behrmann & Avidan, 2005; Duchaine & 
Nakayama, 2006b; Susilo & Duchaine, 2013). Due to characteristic problems with face 
recognition, individuals with DP often utilise cues derived from hairstyle, voice, and 
gait, for person recognition. Nevertheless, recognising familiar people encountered out 
of context or following changes in external appearance, can prove challenging (Shah, 
Gaule, Sowden, Bird, & Cook, 2015).  
The precise origin of the face recognition deficits seen in DP remains unclear. 
Cognitive accounts have argued that, relative to typically developing (TD) individuals, 
DPs exhibit reduced holistic processing of faces – whereby individual features (eyes, 
nose, mouth) are integrated into a coherent unified whole – compromising the accuracy 
and efficiency of their face recognition (Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Liu & 
Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et al., 2011). At the neurological level, differences in cortical 
structure (Behrmann, Avidan, Gao, & Black, 2007; Garrido et al., 2009), structural 
(Gomez et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2009) and functional connectivity (Avidan & 
Behrmann, 2009; Avidan et al., 2013) have been observed in inferotemporal regions 
including the fusiform gyrus, a region thought to be crucial for face processing 
(Kanwisher, 2000). Strikingly, DP often runs in families (Duchaine, Germine, & 
Nakayama, 2007; Johnen et al., 2014; Lee, Duchaine, Wilson, & Nakayama, 2010; 
Schmalzl, Palermo, & Coltheart, 2008), suggestive of a genetic component.  
The characteristic deficits of facial identity recognition seen in DP have attracted 
substantial research attention (Susilo & Duchaine, 2013). However, there has also been 
considerable interest in the expression recognition abilities of individuals with DP. The 
facial expressions of others are a rich source of social information, conveying cues to 
affective and mental states (Adolphs, 2002; Frith, 2009; Parkinson, 2005). The ability 
																																								 																				
2 We use the term Developmental Prosopagnosia in preference to Congenital Prosopagnosia to reflect 
the possibility that the condition emerges during development, and may not necessarily be present from 
birth. 
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to interpret facial expressions correctly is therefore important for fluent social 
interaction and wider socio-cognitive development. Moreover, the question of emotion 
recognition in DP also has important implications for neurocognitive accounts of the 
condition (Bate & Bennetts, 2015; Kress & Daum, 2003a). Where observed together, 
difficulties recognising facial identity and facial emotion are suggestive of apperceptive 
prosopagnosia (De Renzi, Faglioni, Grossi, & Nichelli, 1991); difficulties may arise 
early on in the face processing stream, leaving observers unable to form an accurate, 
view-invariant description of face shape (Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby, Hoffman, & 
Gobbini, 2000). Alternatively, intact expression recognition despite impaired 
recognition of facial identity suggests a locus of impairment relatively late in the face 
processing stream, after the divergence of expression and identity analysis pathways 
(Bruce & Young, 1986; Duchaine, Parker, & Nakayama, 2003; Haxby et al., 2000). 
Presently, difficulties recognising facial expressions are thought to be relatively 
uncommon in DP. Palermo et al. (2011) examined the performance of twelve DPs on 
three emotion recognition tests: The Ekman 60 Faces Test, in which participants label 
60 greyscale images of prototypical basic emotions (Young, Perrett, Calder, 
Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002); The Emotion Hexagon Test, in which participants 
label expressions drawn from morph continua constructed from the six basic emotions3 
(Young et al., 2002); and The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, in which participants 
identify subtle social emotions from cues present around the eye region (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). Strikingly, the twelve DPs were unimpaired 
at both the group and single-case level, relative to aged-matched controls, on all three 
tasks (Palermo et al., 2011). Dobel, Bölte, Aicher & Schweinberger (2007) described 
intact emotion recognition in six DPs, having administered the Tübingen Affect Battery 
– a 4 alternative-forced-choice (AFC) emotion labelling task. Similar findings were 
reported by Humphreys, Avidan and Behrman (2007), having administered The 
Emotion Hexagon Test to three DPs3, and Lee, Wilson, Duchaine and Nakayama 
(2010), having tested three DPs using The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test and a 
3AFC match-to-sample task. Several further studies of single cases have described 
intact emotion recognition in DP (Bentin, Degutis, D'Esposito, & Robertson, 2007; 
																																								 																				
3 While expression stimuli were drawn from morph continua, psychophysical analyses were not 
employed (e.g., psychometric functions were not estimated). The authors’ analysis was restricted to 
proportions of correct responses, defined through reference to the dominant emotion signal present in 
each stimulus.    
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Duchaine et al., 2003; Kress & Daum, 2003b; Nunn, Postma, & Pearson, 2001). 
Moreover, a study of four DPs indicated that they made typical judgements of facial 
trustworthiness (Todorov & Duchaine, 2008), an inference thought to be mediated by 
subtle emotion cues.    
Nevertheless, many DPs report problems recognising facial expressions in their 
daily lives (e.g., Lee et al., 2010), and case studies have described individuals with DP, 
who do exhibit deficits of expression recognition (Ariel & Sadeh, 1996; De Haan & 
Campbell, 1991; Duchaine, Murray, Turner, White, & Garrido, 2009; Duchaine, Yovel, 
Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2006; Minnebusch, Suchan, Ramon, & Daum, 2007; 
Schmalzl et al., 2008). For example, Duchaine et al. (2006) described a 53-year-old 
male DP, Edward, who exhibited clear expression recognition impairments on The 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test and on a 3-AFC match-to-sample task. Similarly, De 
Haan and Campbell (1991) tested AB, the original case of DP first described by 
McConachie (1976), and found that as an adult she exhibited problems labelling 
prototypical basic emotions. Importantly, however, these reports are relatively 
infrequent (regarded as ‘the exception’ rather than ‘the norm’), and no systematic 
investigation has found evidence for a group difference.  
The present study sought to re-examine the expression recognition abilities of 
individuals with DP. As discussed above, this question offers critical insight into the 
locus of the perceptual difficulties seen in this condition. In particular, we sought to test 
systematically a large sample of DPs using sensitive tests. The ability of different tests 
to detect emotion recognition deficits varies widely. For example, Edward, the DP 
described by Duchaine et al. (2006), was substantially impaired on The Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Test (4.1 standard deviations below the TD mean), but only mildly 
impaired on The Emotion Hexagon Test (1.4 standard deviations below the TD mean). 
In Experiment 1, we investigated observers’ ability to make binary classifications of 
whole-face expression stimuli drawn from morph continua. In Experiment 2 observers 
judged facial emotion using only the eye-region (the rest of the face was occluded). In 
our third experiment, we examined the ability of observers to classify the emotion 
present within segments of vocal affect. 
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2.3 Neuropsychological testing  
A group of 17 (11 females) individuals with DP participated in the study (Table 2.1). 
DP participants were recruited through www.troublewithfaces.org. All members of the 
DP sample described lifelong face recognition problems. None of the DPs had a history 
of brain injury or psychiatric disorder (e.g., Schizophrenia, Autism Spectrum Disorder). 
Convergent diagnostic evidence for the presence of DP was collected using the 
Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006a), the Cambridge 
Face Perception Test (CFPT; Duchaine, Germine, & Nakayama, 2007) and the Twenty-
Item Prosopagnosia Index questionnaire (PI20; Shah, Gaule, Sowden et al., 2015). 
When administered in the upright orientation, performance on the CFMT correlated 
closely with scores on the CFPT (r = -.73, p < .001) and the PI20 (r = -.82, p < .001). 
There were also strong correlations between the PI20 and the CFPT (r = .61, p < .001). 
The prosopagnosics’ scores on the CFMT and CFPT were compared with a comparison 
group of 35 age- and gender-matched TD controls. All but one of the DPs scored at 
least two standard deviations below the control mean (the remaining DP participant was 
1.77 standard deviations below the TD mean). In addition to the face recognition tests, 
participants completed the Cambridge Car Memory Test (CCMT; Dennett et al., 2011) 
and the Cambridge Bicycle Memory Test (CBMT; Dalrymple, Garrido, & Duchaine, 
2014) to assess their wider object recognition ability. In addition, the DPs were screened 
for colour blindness using Ishihara’s Tests for Colour-deficiency (Ishihara, 1993). 
2.4 Experiment 1 
Measuring individual differences in expression recognition ability is not straight-
forward. In particular, tasks that require participants to label prototypical emotional 
expressions (e.g., happy, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise) may lack sensitivity 
due to ceiling effects or noise introduced by differences in guessing base-rates (Ipser & 
Cook, 2015). In our first experiment, we sought to determine whether DPs are impaired 
at making binary categorisations of whole-face emotional expression stimuli drawn 
from morph continua. Psychophysical modelling of categorisation probability yields 
sensitive and reliable estimates of expression recognition ability. Previous studies 
suggest that this approach can reveal group effects that may go undetected by simple 
labelling paradigms (Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013).  
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Should individuals with DP exhibit subtle expression recognition deficits, we reasoned 
that a psychophysical approach may be most likely to reveal these problems.  
2.4.1 Methods 
The performance of the DPs was compared with a group of 23 TD controls (6 males; 
Mage = 42.65, SDage = 13.44). All TD participants were screened for DP (Table 2.2). All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Ethical clearance was 
granted by the local ethics committee and the study was conducted in line with the 
ethical guidelines laid down in the 6th (2008) Declaration of Helsinki. All participants 
gave informed consent. 
 
 
Three morph continua (happiness-anger, disgust-sadness, fear-surprise) were 
produced by blending incrementally two greyscale photographs of emotional facial 
expressions, produced by a single actor, selected from Ekman and Friesen’s (1975) 
Pictures of Facial Affect. Image morphing was performed using Morpheus Photo 
Morpher Version 3.11 (Morpheus Software, Indianapolis, IN). Each continuum 
consisted of seven stimuli which varied in emotion intensity between 20% and 80% in 
equidistant 10% increments. Stimuli were cropped to exclude external features (e.g., 
ears, hairline) and presented in greyscale (Figure 2.1a).  
Participants completed a computer-based task written in MATLAB (The 
MathWorks, Natick, MA) using Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
Experimental trials presented a single image centrally for 1200 ms. Each stimulus 
subtended approximately 6.5° × 4.0° of visual angle when viewed at 60 cm. Following 
stimulus offset, participants were asked to make a binary categorisation about the 
stimulus image (e.g., happiness or anger?). Each of the 21 expression stimuli (3 
continua × 7 levels of morph intensity) was presented 20 times in a randomised order. 
Table 2.2. Performance of the Developmental Prosopagnosics (DPs) and the typically 
developing controls (TDs) used in Experiments 1-3 on The Cambridge Face Memory Test 
(CFMT), The Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT), and The Twenty-Item Prosopagnosia 
Index (PI20).  
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Participants completed 6 practice trials before starting the experimental task. No 
feedback was provided during the practice or experimental procedures.  In total, the 
procedure consisted of 420 trials and took approximately 20-25 minutes to complete. 
Participants’ responses were modelled by fitting cumulative Gaussian functions to 
estimate separate psychometric functions for the three continua. Function fitting was 
carried out in MATLAB using the Palamedes Toolbox (Prins & Kingdom, 2009). The 
key parameter of interest, inferred from the psychometric function, was the estimate of 
categorisation threshold. The threshold estimate is a measure of the precision with 
which stimuli are categorized and was defined as the standard deviation of the 
symmetric Gaussian distribution underlying each cumulative Gaussian function 
(subject to a log transform to attenuate positive skewing). Threshold estimates are 
inversely related to the slope of the psychometric function; steep and shallow slopes 
are associated with low and high threshold estimates, respectively. Lower threshold 
estimates indicate that observers can perceive subtle differences in stimulus strength 
and vary their responses accordingly. Greater threshold estimates reveal that 
participants’ responses are relatively invariant to changes in stimulus strength, 
indicative of imprecise categorization. 
2.4.2 Results and discussion 
The threshold estimates obtained for the DP and TD groups are shown in Figure 
2.1b. Threshold estimates were analysed using ANOVA with Continuum (happiness-
anger, disgust-sadness, fear-surprise) as a within-subjects factor and Group (TD, DP) 
as a between-subjects factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of Continuum [F(1.46, 
55.35) = 46.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .55]. Contrasts indicated that fear-surprise 
categorisations were associated with greater thresholds (M = 2.81, SD = .58) than 
happiness-anger (M = 1.59, SD = .87) [t(39) = 8.15, p < .001] and disgust-sadness (M 
= 2.33, SD = .48) categorisations [t(39) = 5.74, p < .001]. Disgust-sadness 
categorisations were also associated with greater thresholds than happiness-anger 
categorisations [t(39) = 5.25, p < .001]. Crucially, the analysis also revealed a main 
effect of Group [F(1,38) = 4.19, p = .04, ηp2 = .10]. Collapsing across the three continua, 
the DPs exhibited higher thresholds (M = 7.26, SD = 1.54) than the TD controls (M = 
6.36, SD = 1.24). No Continuum × Group interaction was observed [F(1.46, 55.35) = 
1.02,  p = .33, ηp2 = .03]. 
	
	
77	
However, simple contrasts indicated a significant difference between the groups 
only in their fear-surprise thresholds, where the thresholds of the DP group (M = 3.11, 
SD = .69) were higher than those of the controls (M = 2.59, SD = .37) [t(38) = 3.07, p 
= .004]. Eight of the DPs scored at least one SD below the TD mean, and three (M3, 
F5, F11) were significantly impaired at single-case level (Figure 2.2a).  
Clear correlations were observed between participants’ categorisation thresholds for 
the fear-surprise continuum and their CFMT (r = -.57, p <.001) and PI20 (r = .51, p 
=.001) scores (Table 2.3). However, a striking correlation was found between 
Figure 2.1. (a) Morphed expression stimuli used in Experiment 1. (b) Mean categorisation 
thresholds for the three continua exhibited by the typical observers and the developmental 
prosopagnosics. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. (c) Scatter plot of the 
relationship observed between participants' scores on the Cambridge Face Perception Test 
(CFPT) and their thresholds for the Fear-Surprise categorisations.  
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participants’ fear-surprise thresholds and their performance on the CFPT (r = .78, p 
<.001; Figure 2.1c).  
 
To investigate this relationship further, the DP sample was split into two sub-groups 
based on their performance on the CFPT. Eight DPs who scored at least 2 SD below 
the control mean on the CFPT (Table 2.1), and the remaining nine DPs, were 
categorised as apperceptive and non-apperceptive, respectively. Simple contrasts 
revealed a significant difference in fear-surprise categorisation thresholds between the 
Figure 2.2. (a) Single-case analysis of the surprise-fear thresholds observed in Experiment 1. 
(b) Single-case analysis of the overall performance observed in Experiment 2. Error bars 
represent ±1 standard deviation. *denotes performance <1 standard deviation below the TD 
mean; **denotes performance at least 2 standard deviations below the TD mean.  
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apperceptive subgroup (M = 3.54, SD = .73) and TD controls (M = 2.59, SD = .37) 
[t(29) = 4.8, p < .001]. Interestingly, however, the fear-surprise categorisation 
thresholds of the non-apperceptive subgroup (M = 2.72, SD = .33) did not different 
significantly from the TD sample [t(30) = .95, p = .35].  
 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that our emotion categorisation task and the 
CFPT may tap very similar processes. The CFPT requires participants to rank order test 
faces according to their resemblance to a target face. Because the test and target faces 
are presented throughout each trial, the test is thought to measure observers’ ability to 
form perceptual descriptions of faces, under conditions of minimal working memory 
load. However, because the physical differences between test faces are subtle, the CFPT 
provides a demanding test of observers’ face encoding. Where perceptual descriptions 
are compromised, observers may be left unable detect and interpret subtle physical 
differences between stimuli, resulting in i) poor sorting performance on the CFPT and 
ii) judgements of expression that vary less closely with physical stimulus changes.  
2.5 Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that relative to TD controls, individuals with 
DP are less able to categorise whole-face expression stimuli drawn from continua that 
morph emotional facial expressions. While our analyses suggest a trend for less precise 
categorisation overall, difficulties were particularly clear when observers were required 
to detect the subtle physical differences between stimuli drawn from the fear-surprise 
continuum. At least two accounts may be advanced to explain the group difference 
observed in Experiment 1. First, difficulties integrating information from disparate 
facial regions may prevent observers with DP forming unified perceptual descriptions 
of facial expressions. Consistent with this possibility, some observers with DP exhibit 
Table 2.3. Correlations between the expression categorisation thresholds observed in 
Experiment 1 and participants' scores on the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT), the 
Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT), the 20-item Prosopagnosia Index (PI20), the 
Cambridge Car Memory Test (CCMT) and the Cambridge Bike Memory Test (CBMT).  
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reduced composite interference for facial expressions (Palermo et al., 2011), suggestive 
of reduced holistic processing of facial emotion. Second, observers with DP may have 
a fundamental difficulty encoding the shape of local facial features. For example, cases 
of acquired prosopagnosia have been described who appear to have particular problems 
using information from around the eye region to discriminate (Bukach, Le Grand, 
Kaiser, Bub, & Tanaka, 2008) and recognise (Caldara et al., 2005) facial identities. 
Interestingly, problems using cues from the eye-region are thought to be associated with 
particular problems recognising facial expressions of fear (Adolphs et al., 2005).   
In Experiment 2 we sought to distinguish these rival explanations by examining 
participants’ ability to judge facial emotion using cues from the eye-region alone (i.e., 
a local region), using a variant of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001). If the impairments observed in Experiment 1 arise from diminished 
integration of information from disparate facial regions, we reasoned that the DP group 
should perform typically on a task that does not require whole-face processing. 
However, if the impairment in emotion recognition is due to difficulties encoding the 
shape of local features, the group difference should still be evident.  
2.5.1 Methods 
The performance of the DPs was compared with a group of 23 TD controls (7 males; 
Mage = 44.26, SDage = 13.59). All TD participants were screened for DP (Table 2.2). All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Ethical clearance was 
granted by the local ethics committee and the study was conducted in line with the 
ethical guidelines laid down in the 6th (2008) Declaration of Helsinki. All participants 
gave informed consent. 
The original Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test requires observers to recognise 
complex ‘social emotions’ (e.g., concerned vs. unconcerned, sympathetic vs. 
unsympathetic), and may therefore tax both mentalizing and perceptual processes. To 
minimize any mentalizing demands, our novel variant included different exemplars of 
four commonly encountered facial emotions. Stimuli were constructed from six 
Caucasian identities (3 females) selected from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner 
et al., 2010). For each identity, we produced four morph continua by blending images 
of the actor exhibiting a neutral expression, with images of the same actor expressing 
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happiness, anger, fear and sadness4. The expression morphs containing 30%, 50% and 
70% of each emotion (corresponding to low, moderate and high intensity) were cropped 
so that only the eye-region was visible, and presented in greyscale (Figure 2.3a). The 
position of the eyes in the resulting 72 images (6 identities × 4 emotions × 3 levels of 
emotion intensity) was standardised to ensure similar cues were available in each 
stimulus. Stimulus images subtended approximately 2.5° × 6.5° of visual angle when 
viewed at 60 cm.  
Experimental trials presented a single stimulus centrally for 1200 ms, followed by a 
prompt to make a 4-AFC response (happiness, anger, fear, or sadness). The 72 stimuli 
were presented three times each, in a randomised order, yielding a total of 216 trials. 
The experiment was preceded by 6 practice trials. No feedback was provided during 
the practice or experimental procedures. The task lasted approximately 20 minutes. The 
experimental program was written in MATLAB using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  
																																								 																				
4	Pilot testing of a 6-AFC procedure (happiness, anger, disgust, sadness, fear, and surprise) revealed that 
typical participants were unable to reliably distinguish i) angry and disgusted eyes, and ii) fearful and 
surprised eyes. One expression in each of the two problematic pairs was therefore dropped (i.e., disgust 
and surprise). 
 
Figure 2.3 (a) Examples of the eye-region stimuli used in Experiment 2. (b) The mean 
recognition accuracy exhibited by the typical observers and the developmental prosopagnosics 
in the three emotion intensity conditions. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean.  
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2.5.2 Results and discussion 
The performance (% correct responses) of the DP and TD groups in the three 
intensity conditions is depicted in Figure 2.3b. Results were analysed using ANOVA 
with Intensity (30%, 50%, 70%) as a within-subjects factor and Group (TD, DP) as a 
between-subjects factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of Intensity [F(2,74) = 
453.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .92]. Fewer correct responses were provided in the 30% 
condition (M = .47, SD = .07) than in the 50% (M = .69, SD = .10) [t(38) = 18.39, p < 
.001] and 70% conditions (M = .80, SD = .08) [t(38) = 27.20, p < .001]. The 50% 
condition was also harder than the 70% condition [t(38) = 10.60, p < .001]. The analysis 
also revealed a main effect of Group [F(1,37) = 6.49, p = .01, ηp2 = .15], indicating that 
the DP group (M = .62, SD = .07) correctly identified fewer emotions than the TD group 
(M = .68, SD = .06), when performance was collapsed across emotion intensity. 
Interestingly, however, Intensity interacted significantly with Group [F(2,74) = 4.43, p 
= .01, ηp2 = .12]. Simple contrasts indicated that the TD group (M = .82, SD = .05) 
outperformed the DP group (M = .77, SD = .09) in the 70% condition [t(37) = 2.04 , p 
= .04]. A similar difference was seen between the DP (M = .64, SD = .09) and TD (M 
= .73, SD = .08) groups for the 50% condition [t(37) = 3.24 , p = .003], but not for the 
30% condition [t(37) = 1.14, p = .26]. Eight of the DPs scored at least one SD below 
the TD mean, and three (M1, M3, F10) were significantly impaired at single-case level 
(Figure 2.2b).  
Significant correlations were found between participants’ overall performance 
(collapsing across Group and Intensity) and their scores on the PI20 (r = -.48, p = .003), 
the CFMT (r = .48, p = .002) and the CFPT (r = -.58, p < .001) (see Table 2.4). Once 
again, the DP sample was split into apperceptive and non-apperceptive sub-groups 
based on their performance on the CFPT. Simple contrasts revealed a significant 
difference in emotion recognition ability of the apperceptive subgroup (M = .60, SD = 
.09) and TD controls (M = .68, SD = .06) [t(28) = 2.74, p = .01]. Interestingly, however, 
the performance of the non-apperceptive subgroup (M = .64, SD = .06) did not differ 
significantly from the TD sample [t(29) = 1.48, p = .15]. The inability of the 
apperceptive DPs to judge facial emotion using cues from the eye-region alone does 
not appear to be a product of diminished integration of information from the eye and 
mouth regions (Palermo et al., 2011), or to a strategic failure to use information from 
the eye region (Adolphs et al., 2005).  
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2.6 Experiment 3 
The results of the first two experiments indicate that DP individuals are less able to 
categorise ambiguous facial expressions than TD controls. In Experiment 3 we sought 
to determine whether this affect recognition deficit was specific to faces, or whether 
these difficulties extend to other domains. Crucially, aberrant limbic functionality may 
leave observers unable to interpret emotion per se (Calder & Young, 2005). For 
example, individuals with developmental alexithymia – a neurodevelopmental 
condition associated with problems interpreting emotional experiences and other forms 
of interoceptive sensation (Bird & Cook, 2013; Brewer, Happe, Cook, & Bird, 2015) – 
exhibit a range of emotion recognition difficulties, including problems categorizing 
facial (Cook et al., 2013), vocal (Heaton et al., 2012), and musical affect (Allen, Davis, 
& Hill, 2012). To determine whether DPs exhibit face-specific emotion recognition 
difficulties, we examined their ability to recognise vocal affect. Typical performance 
on this task would suggest that the poor categorisation exhibited by the DP group in the 
first two experiments is a product of face, not emotion, perception deficits. 
2.6.1 Methods  
The performance of the DPs was compared with a group of 22 TD controls (8 males; 
Mage = 42.86, SDage = 12.89). All TD participants were screened for DP (Table 2.2). All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal hearing. Ethical clearance was granted 
by the local ethics committee and the study was conducted in line with the ethical 
guidelines laid down in the 6th (2008) Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave 
informed consent. All participants spoke English as first language.  
Table 2.4. Correlations between the expression recognition accuracies scores observed in 
Experiment 2 and participants' scores on the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT), the 
Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT), the 20-item Prosopagnosia Index (PI20), the 
Cambridge Car Memory Test (CCMT) and the Cambridge Bike Memory Test (CBMT).  
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The stimuli employed in Experiment 3 were short (< 3000 ms) audio sequences of 
British actors (2 males, 2 females) uttering 3-digit numbers (“two-hundred-and-fifty-
five” and “five-hundred-and-twenty-eight”) with different emotional inflections 
(happiness, disgust, fear, sadness, anger and surprise). Stimuli were recorded in a 
soundproof studio. Having cropped the audio files, and removed background noise 
using Audacity sound-editing software (http://audacity.sourceforge.net/), stimuli were 
validated in an online rating study. To create exemplars with varying degrees of 
ambiguity, we sought to manipulate the pitch of the stimuli, a vital component of vocal 
affect (e.g., Scherer, 1986). Different amounts (0%, 30%, 60%) of jitter – variability in 
pitch over the course of the sound – were added to the audio tracks using the ‘Raspiness’ 
function in Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2015). In total, 144 stimuli were employed (2 
exemplars × 6 emotions × 4 actors × 3 levels of degradation). 
Experimental trials presented a single audio clip, followed by a prompt to make a 6-
AFC response (happiness, anger, disgust, fear, sadness, or surprise).  Each stimulus was 
presented once, in a randomised order, yielding a total of 144 trials. The task lasted 
approximately 15 minutes. Twelve practice trials (all with 0% jitter) preceded the 
experimental procedure to help familiarise participants with the actors’ voices. No 
feedback was provided during the practice or experimental procedures. The 
experimental program was written in MATLAB using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  
2.6.2 Results and discussion 
The performance (% correct responses) of the DP and TD groups was analysed using 
ANOVA with Jitter (0%, 30%, 60%) as a within-subjects factor and Group (TD, DP) 
as a between-subjects factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of Jitter [F(2,74) = 
13.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .26]. As expected, greater pitch degradation was associated with 
poorer recognition: Fewer incorrect responses were provided in the 60% condition (M 
= .61, SD = .09) than in the 30% (M = .65, SD = .10) [t(38) = 3.21, p = .003] and 0% 
conditions (M = .68, SD = .09) [t(38) = 4.95, p < .001]. The 30% condition was also 
harder than the 0% condition [t(38) = 2.29, p = .03]. Crucially, however, we observed 
no main effect of Group [F(1,37) = 1.90, p = .18, ηp2 = .05], nor a Group × Jitter 
interaction [F(2,74) = .99, p = .38, ηp2 = .03], indicative of similar recognition accuracy 
in the TD and DP groups.  
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These results support the view that the emotion recognition difficulties exhibited by 
the DP group in the first two experiments are face-specific, and are not indicative of 
broader emotion processing impairments. The ability of the DP sample to interpret 
vocal signals accurately accords with anecdotal evidence that DPs often recognise 
familiar others using their voice (Cook & Biotti, 2016). We note, however, that 
recognition of vocal identity and vocal affect are thought to dissociate; for example, 
cases of developmental phonagnosia have been described who appear to exhibit broadly 
intact recognition of vocal affect, despite striking difficulties recognising vocal affect 
(Garrido, Eisner, et al., 2009; Garrido, Furl, et al., 2009).  
2.7 Discussion 
Despite severe difficulties recognising facial identity, emotion recognition deficits 
are thought to be relatively uncommon in DP (Bate & Bennetts, 2015; Humphreys et 
al., 2007; Palermo et al., 2011). Contrary to this view, however, we find evidence for 
widespread deficits in this population. In Experiment 1 we tested observers’ ability to 
make binary classifications of whole-face expression stimuli drawn from morph 
continua. Psychophysical analyses revealed diminished ability to classify morphed 
facial expressions in our sample of DPs, relative to TD observers. We replicated this 
group difference in Experiment 2 when observers categorised facial emotion using only 
the eye-region. In our third experiment, we examined the ability of observers to classify 
the emotion present within segments of speech. Despite their difficulties judging facial 
emotion, the prosopagnosics exhibited excellent recognition of vocal affect, suggestive 
of a face-specific difficulty.  
In our first two experiments, we observed striking correlations between expression 
classification accuracy and performance on the CFPT (Duchaine et al., 2007). The 
CFPT is thought to provide a demanding test of face encoding – observers’ ability to 
represent and discriminate facial shape – in the absence of substantial demands on 
visual memory. Poor performance on this test is suggestive of an apperceptive form of 
prosopagnosia (Dalrymple, Garrido et al., 2014; Duchaine et al., 2007; Shah, Gaule, 
Gaigg, Bird, & Cook, 2015). Strikingly, when the DP sample was split into 
apperceptive and non-apperceptive subgroups based on CFPT performance, only the 
apperceptive subgroup exhibited impaired recognition of facial emotion. DPs with an 
apperceptive profile may have difficulties forming view-invariant structural 
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descriptions of faces at an early stage in the face processing stream, before the 
divergence of identity and expression processing (Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby et al., 
2000). Inaccurate descriptions of local feature shape may result in imprecise expression 
categorisation as well as severe problems recognising facial identity.  
To our knowledge, these findings are the first evidence of impaired recognition of 
facial emotion in DP, at the group level. Importantly, our results suggest that the ability 
to detect emotion recognition difficulties in this population may be extremely sensitive 
to the procedure used. In our first experiment, the clearest group difference was 
observed when observers were required to categorise expressions containing different 
degrees of surprise and fear. Typical observers also found these categorisations more 
demanding, and the increased difficulty may be responsible for the clear group 
difference observed. Alternatively, DPs with an apperceptive profile may have 
particular problems encoding the shape of the eye-region, variation crucial for 
distinguishing emotions, notably fear and surprise (Adolphs et al., 2005). In our second 
experiment, a clear group difference was observed only when judging the eye-region 
stimuli containing intermediate emotion intensities. All three levels of emotion 
intensity (30%, 50%, 70%) yielded recognition performance comfortably above chance 
(floor) and below 100% (ceiling) when typical observers were tested. However, stimuli 
either side of the 50% ‘sweet-spot’ may i) contain sufficiently obvious cues to be 
detected by observers with apperceptive deficits, or ii) be difficult for some typical 
observers to categorise reliably.  
In light of these results, we recommend that authors demand a high standard of 
evidence before concluding that cases of DP exhibit intact emotion recognition. With 
respect to methodology, task sensitivity is a crucial issue. Modelling the categorisation 
of stimuli drawn from morph continua, by fitting psychometric functions, offers a 
precise means to estimate perceptual sensitivity independently of response bias5. Where 
morph continua are employed, the use of 7 levels of stimulus intensity affords greater 
sensitivity than the 5 stimulus levels present in the ‘morph hexagon’ used previously 
(Humprhreys et al., 2007; Palermo et al., 2011). The use of longer presentation 
durations and ambiguous expression stimuli may have also increased sensitivity in the 
																																								 																				
5	 In previous studies employing the morph hexagon, the authors have selected particular levels and 
analysed % correct. Fitting psychometric functions may yield more accurate measures of perceptual 
precision that allow for individual differences in response bias. 
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present study. With respect to sample size and composition, it is important that group 
studies have sufficient power to detect impairments. As awareness of DP increases, it 
should be easier to run group designs with reasonable sample sizes. Our results also 
suggest that studies with larger numbers of apperceptive DPs may be more likely to 
find expression recognition deficits. Where samples include relatively few DPs with an 
apperceptive profile, authors may also consider qualifying their conclusions 
accordingly.  
Problems recognising facial identity – the defining feature of DP – can impact 
substantially on the social development and behaviour of sufferers. DPs often avoid 
social situations experiencing feelings of guilt and shame about actual or imagined 
offense caused to others (Davis et al., 2011). Long-term consequences can include 
reduced social circle, loss of self-confidence and limited work opportunities 
(Dalrymple, Fletcher et al., 2014; Fine, 2012; Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, 
& Nakayama, 2008). In severe cases, DP can also contribute to the development of 
depression and anxiety (Yardley et al., 2008). Where observed, problems recognising 
the expressions of interactants will likely exacerbate these difficulties. Reduced ability 
to detect the emotional and mental states of others may prevent DPs responding 
appropriately and hinder social interaction, particularly in situations where vocal cues 
are unavailable. At present, relatively little is known about the impact of DP during 
childhood (Dalrymple, Corrow, Yonas, & Duchaine, 2013). The present results suggest 
the possibility that reasoning about the mental states of others (‘theory of mind’) may 
sometimes develop atypically in DP.    
In summary, having tested a group of 17 DPs on complementary emotion 
recognition tasks, we find evidence of widespread difficulties recognising facial affect. 
These findings are contrary to the view that emotion recognition deficits are relatively 
uncommon in this population (Humphreys et al., 2007; Palermo et al., 2011). Deficits 
were apparent when observers were asked to categorise emotion using cues from the 
whole-face or from the eye-region only, and thus do not appear to reflect diminished 
integration of information from disparate facial regions (i.e., aberrant holistic 
processing). Instead, individuals with apperceptive forms of DP appear to have 
difficulties encoding facial shape, at an early stage in the face processing stream, before 
the divergence of identity and expression pathways. More broadly, these findings serve 
to illustrate how existing theoretical frameworks can be used to make sense of the 
heterogeneity seen in this population. 
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Chapter 3: Impaired body perception in developmental prosopagnosia 
3.1 Abstract  
Developmental prosopagnosia (DP)6 is a lifelong neurodevelopmental disorder 
associated with difficulties recognising and discriminating faces. In some cases, the 
perceptual deficits seen in DP appear to be face-specific. However, DP is known to be 
a heterogeneous condition, and many cases undoubtedly exhibit impaired perception of 
other complex objects. There are several well-documented parallels between body and 
face perception; for example, faces and bodies are both thought to recruit holistic 
analysis and engage similar regions of visual cortex. In light of these similarities, 
individuals who exhibit face perception deficits, possibly due to impaired holistic 
processing or aberrant white matter connectivity, might also show co-occurring deficits 
of body perception. The present study therefore sought to investigate body perception 
in DP using a sensitive delayed match-to-sample task and a sizeable group of DPs. To 
determine whether body perception deficits, where observed, co-vary with wider object 
recognition deficits, observers’ face and body matching ability was compared with 
performance in a car matching condition. Relative to age-matched controls, the DP 
sample exhibited impaired body matching accuracy at the group level, and several 
members of the sample were impaired at the single-case level. Consistent with previous 
reports of wider object recognition difficulties, a number of the DPs also showed 
evidence of impaired car recognition. Interestingly, however, we observed little or no 
relationship between observers’ car perception ability and their body perception. We 
speculate that forms of developmental agnosia affecting the perception of faces, bodies, 
and objects may be best thought of as independent neurodevelopmental conditions.  
3.2 Introduction  
Developmental prosopagnosia (DP) is a lifelong neurodevelopmental disorder 
associated with difficulties recognising familiar faces and deficits of unfamiliar face 
discrimination. The condition occurs in people with normal intelligence, typical low-
level vision, and with no apparent brain lesions (Behrmann & Avidan, 2005; Duchaine 
																																								 																				
6	We use the term developmental prosopagnosia instead of congenital prosopagnosia to indicate the 
possibility that in some cases the disorder may appear during development and not necessarily from birth. 
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& Nakayama, 2006b; Susilo & Duchaine, 2013). As many as one in every 50 people 
are thought to experience lifelong face recognition difficulties severe enough to disrupt 
their daily lives (Kennerknecht et al., 2006; Kennerknecht, Ho, & Wong, 2008). 
Individuals with DP identify others using non-face cues, including hairstyle, voice, and 
gait. Consequently, DPs often experience great difficulty when familiar people are met 
in unusual contexts or when they alter their appearance (Cook & Biotti, 2016; Shah, 
Gaule, Sowden, Bird, & Cook, 2015). In addition to problems recognising facial 
identity, some DPs also exhibit problems perceiving facial emotion (Biotti & Cook, 
2016; Duchaine, Yovel, Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2006). 
DP frequently runs in families, indicating that the condition has a genetic component 
(Duchaine, Germine, & Nakayama, 2007; Johnen et al., 2014; Schmalzl, Palermo, & 
Coltheart, 2008). However, the origins of DP remain poorly understood. From a 
cognitive perspective, reduced holistic processing – whereby information from 
disparate facial regions is integrated into a unified perceptual description – may 
underlie the face recognition difficulties seen in DP (Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 
2011; DeGutis, Cohan, Mercado, Wilmer, & Nakayama, 2012; DeGutis, Cohan, & 
Nakayama, 2014; Palermo et al., 2011). At the neurological level, studies have revealed 
reduced grey matter volume in occipitotemporal cortex of individuals with DP 
(Behrmann, Avidan, Gao, & Black, 2007; Garrido et al., 2009), and have suggested 
atypical functional connectivity in high-level visual areas (Avidan & Behrmann, 2009; 
Avidan et al., 2013; Lohse et al., 2016). In addition, recent studies have revealed 
striking white matter differences in the occipital and temporal lobes of DPs (Gomez et 
al., 2015; Song et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2009). Reduced density and coherence of 
the inferior longitudinal fasciculus (ILF) may impair information exchange within the 
face processing network.  
In some cases, the perceptual deficits seen in DP appear to be face-specific; many 
individuals achieve perfect or near-perfect performance on standardised object 
recognition batteries (e.g., Bentin, Deouell, & Soroker, 1999; Nunn, Postma, & 
Pearson, 2001). For example, Duchaine and colleagues (2006) described Edward, a 53-
year old male, who exhibited a pure case of DP. Despite severe face recognition 
difficulties, Edward showed typical recognition of a range of objects including cars, 
tools, guns, horses, and sunglasses. Moreover, Edward was able to discriminate houses 
either on the basis on of elemental or configural differences, and showed typical 
learning and individuation of Greebles. However, DP is known to be a heterogeneous 
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condition, and many cases undoubtedly exhibit impaired perception of other complex 
objects (Behrmann, Avidan, Marotta, & Kimchi, 2005; Dalrymple, Elison, & Duchaine, 
2016; De Haan & Campbell, 1991; Duchaine et al., 2007). For example, of seven 
siblings with DP tested by Duchaine and colleagues (2007), five were significantly 
impaired at car perception, and 3 showed significant gun perception deficits. The extent 
to which cases of DP are face-specific or extend to other classes of object, may depend 
on the nature and extent of an individual’s aberrant white matter connectivity (see 
Gomez et al., 2015).  
There has been much interest in potential similarities between the visual processing 
of faces and bodies in typical observers (de Gelder et al., 2009; Minnebusch & Daum, 
2009; Peelen & Downing, 2007; Slaughter, Stone, & Reed, 2004). Like faces, bodies 
are salient stimuli that capture attention when other classes of object go undetected 
(Downing, Bray, Rogers, & Childs, 2004; Stein, Sterzer, & Peelen, 2012). Faces and 
bodies both appear to preferentially engage regions of visual cortex. Strikingly, two 
areas thought to play a crucial role in body perception, the extrastriate (EBA; Downing, 
Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001) and fusiform (FBA; Peelen & Downing, 2005) 
body areas, are spatially adjacent to the occipital (OFA; Pitcher, Walsh, & Duchaine, 
2011) and fusiform (FFA; Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006) face areas, respectively, 
suggestive of parallel networks (Peelen & Downing, 2007). Similar event-related brain 
potentials (ERPs) are elicited by both faces (N170; Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & 
McCarthy, 1996; Eimer, 2011) and bodies (N190; Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004; 
Thierry et al., 2006). Both the N170 and N190 components are delayed and increased 
when stimuli are presented upside-down, however their origin appears to be distinct 
and dissociable (Sadeh et al., 2011). 
There has also been great interest in whether or not bodies recruit holistic processing 
similar to that engaged by faces. Composite effects, whereby the presence of an aligned 
task-irrelevant region alters observers’ perception of a target region, provide direct 
evidence of holistic face processing (Murphy, Gray, & Cook, 2016; Rossion, 2013). 
Interestingly, similar composite effects have recently been reported with expressive 
body postures (Willems, Vrancken, Germeys, & Verfaillie, 2014), but not for body 
shapes in neutral poses (Bauser, Suchan, & Daum, 2011). Sizeable inversion effects, 
often cited as an indirect measure of holistic processing, are seen for both faces and 
bodies (Cook & Duchaine, 2011; Robbins & Coltheart, 2012a). Inversion effects are 
particularly strong when participants are required to match sequentially presented body 
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postures (Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 2003; Reed, Stone, Grubb, & McGoldrick, 
2006). It is unclear, however, whether these effects reveal holistic body processing; for 
example, the magnitude of the posture inversion effect is disproportionately affected by 
the presence and position of the head (Yovel, Pelc, & Lubetzky, 2010). 
Where individuals exhibit deficits of face perception, possibly due to impaired 
holistic processing or aberrant white matter connectivity, one might therefore expect 
co-occurring deficits of body perception. Consistent with this intuition, Righart and de 
Gelder (2007) found that the N170 marker of body processing exhibits atypical 
modulation following orientation inversion in three observers with DP. Nevertheless, 
many DPs report using body shape and bodily motion cues to recognise others (Biotti 
& Cook, 2016), and several empirical results suggest that body perception may be 
broadly typical in this population. For example, a recent study found no differences in 
torso matching accuracy when a sample of 11 DPs were compared with matched 
controls7 (Rivolta, Lawson, & Palermo, 2016). Similarly, a sample of 16 DPs exhibited 
typical discrimination of hands – stimuli known to elicit strong responses in EBA (see 
Peelen & Downing, 2007) – in a match-to-sample procedure (Shah, Gaule, Gaigg, Bird, 
& Cook, 2015). Typical body matching has also been described in individual cases of 
DP (Duchaine et al., 2006). DPs and matched controls show broadly similar responses 
to body stimuli in core areas of the body processing network, including EBA and FBA 
(Van den Stock, van de Riet, Righart, & de Gelder, 2008), and multi-voxel pattern 
analysis (MVPA) suggests that distributed neural representations of body stimuli in 
inferotemporal cortex are largely typical (Rivolta et al., 2014).  
The present study sought to investigate body perception in DP through the use of a 
sensitive identity matching task of headless torsos, using a sizeable group of DPs (N = 
20). Individual differences in body matching ability were compared with performance 
in comparable car and face matching conditions. In light of the equivocal literature on 
body perception in DP, we anticipated a range of abilities in our sample. However, we 
were interested in the possibility that co-occurring deficits of body perception, where 
observed, may co-vary with wider object recognition deficits described previously 
(Behrmann et al., 2005; Dalrymple et al., 2016; De Haan & Campbell, 1991; Duchaine 
et al., 2007). In neurotypical individuals, the perception of faces, bodies, and objects is 
																																								 																				
7	While prosopagnosics and controls did not differ in body matching accuracy, the prosopagnosics 
responded slower.    
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thought to rely on functionally and spatially distinct networks (Pitcher, Charles, Devlin, 
Walsh, & Duchaine, 2009). However, the diffuse white matter differences seen in some 
cases of DP (Gomez et al., 2015; Song et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2009) may predispose 
individuals to a range of perceptual deficits.  
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants  
Participants were 43 right-handed adults, 20 with (6 males; Mage = 38.04 years, SDage 
= 13.05 years) and 23 without DP (9 males; Mage = 40.30 years, SDage = 14.38 years). 
The groups did not differ significantly in age [t(41) = .54, p = .593] or proportion of 
males [X2(1) = .09, p = .760]. Ethical approval was granted by the local ethics 
committee. The study was conducted in line with the ethical guidelines provided by the 
6th (2008) Declaration of Helsinki. All participants provided informed consent. 
3.3.2 Diagnostic testing 
DP participants were recruited through www.troublewithfaces.org. All members of 
the DP sample described lifelong face recognition difficulties. None of the DPs had a 
history of brain injury or psychiatric disorder (e.g., schizophrenia, autism spectrum 
disorder). Diagnostic evidence for the presence of DP was collected using the 
Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006a), the Cambridge 
Face Perception Test (CFPT; Duchaine et al., 2007) and the Twenty-Item 
Prosopagnosia Index (PI20; Shah, Gaule, Sowden et al., 2015). The prosopagnosics’ 
scores on the diagnostic procedures were compared with a group of 56 age-matched 
controls (Mage = 40.25 years, SDage = 13.71 years, 24 males). All DPs scored at least 
two standard deviations below the mean of the comparison sample on the PI20 (Table 
3.1). All but one of the DPs scored at least two standard deviations below the 
comparison average on the CFMT; the remaining DP scored -1.86 standard deviations 
below the comparison average. Thirteen of the DPs also scored two standard deviations 
below the comparison average on the CFPTupright. In addition to the face recognition 
tests, participants completed the Cambridge Car Memory Test (CCMT; Dennett et al., 
2011), to assess their wider object recognition ability, and were screened for colour 
blindness using Ishihara’s Tests for Colour-Blindness (Ishihara, 1993).  
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3.3.3 Stimuli 
Each category (faces, bodies, cars) comprised fifty exemplars (Figure 3.1). 
Individual categories were further organised into five subsets of ten exemplars based 
on approximate similarity. Each exemplar was depicted twice: once in frontal view, 
once in 3/4 view. When viewed at 57 cm, the face and body stimuli subtended 11° of 
visual angle vertically; the cars subtended 8° vertically. Face stimuli (male Caucasian 
faces) were created using FaceGen Modeller Version 3.3 (Singular Inversions Inc.). 
Body stimuli (Caucasian male torsos) were created with Poser 7.0 (e frontier America, 
Inc.). Car stimuli (black saloon / sedan cars and SUVs) were generated through 
www.3dtuning.com. The use of torsos prevented observers employing simple limb-
matching strategies and allowed us to present body stimuli a scale that accentuated 3D 
shape variation. We note that torsos, unlike other body parts, elicit strong responses 
both the EBA and FBA (Taylor, Wiggett, & Downing, 2007). 
3.3.4 Procedure 
Testing took place at City, University of London. Trials started with a fixation point 
(750 ms), before a single target stimulus was presented centrally (400 ms). Targets were 
always shown in frontal view. A retention interval (3000 ms) followed target offset. A 
mask image – constructed by recombining regions cropped from other target images 
from the same category – was presented throughout the retention interval. An array of 
four test items followed the retention interval. The array comprised the target and three 
lures from the same within-category subset, all shown in 3/4 view8. Test arrays were 
visible until a keypress response was registered. Participants were asked to locate the 
target item with speed and accuracy. All stimuli appeared as a target once, yielding 150 
experimental trials, which were preceded by six practice trials. Trial type (Face, Body, 
Car) was interleaved within each mini-block. No feedback was provided during the 
procedure. The task lasted approximately 30 minutes and included three short breaks. 
The matching task was programmed in MATLAB using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  
 
																																								 																				
8 The requirement to identify exemplars across different viewpoints prevents the use of simple 
image matching strategies; instead, observers must form a view-invariant 3-dimensional representation 
of the target (e.g., Longmore, Liu, & Young, 2008). 
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Group analyses 
Matching accuracy (% correct; Figure 3.2a) was analysed using ANOVA with 
Category (bodies, cars, faces) as a within-subjects factor and Group (DP, TD) as a 
between-subjects factor. The analysis revealed significant main effects of Category 
[F(2,82) = 5.29, p = .007, η2 = .11], and Group [F(2,41) = 24.03, p < .001, η2 = .37], as 
well as a significant Group × Category interaction [F(2,82) = 5.46, p = .006, η2 = .19]. 
As expected, simple contrasts indicated that the DP group (M = .45, SD = .13) was less 
accurate at face matching than the TD group (M = .66, SD = .15) [t(41) = 4.97, p < 
.001]. Crucially, however, the TD group also outperformed the DP group when 
matching bodies (TD: M = .54, SD = .09; DP: M = .46, SD = .09) [t(41) = 2.69, p = .01] 
Figure 3.1. (a) Target stimuli were presented in frontal view for 400 msec. (b) During the 
retention interval (3000 msec) a mask was presented, constructed by recombining regions 
cropped from other target images from the same category. (c) Test arrays presented the target 
and three lures in 3/4 views.  
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and cars (TD: M = .61, SD = .14; DP: M = .53, SD = .10)  [t(41) = 2.16 , p = .036]. The 
relative performance of individual DPs in the three conditions is shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
 
 
The analysis of response times (RTs; Figure 3.2b) revealed a main effect of Category 
[F(2,82) = 9.66, p < .001, η2 = .19]. Generally participants were slower when matching 
cars (M = 4118, SD = 1662), than faces (M = 3629, SD = 1169) [t(42) = 2.35, p = .024]  
or bodies (M = 3428, SD = 1069) [t(42) = 4.34, p < .001]. RTs were also significantly 
slower on face trials, than on body trials [t(42) = 2.16, p = .036]. The analysis revealed 
no main effect of Group [F(2,41) = .22, p = .638, η2 = .005], nor a Group × Category 
interaction [F (2,82) = 1.5, p = .229, η2 = .035].  
 
 
Figure 3.2. (a) Mean matching accuracy and (b) mean response times for the typically 
developing (TD) controls and the developmental prosopagnosics (DPs) in the three conditions. 
Error bars denote ± one SEM. (c) Scatter plots comparing participants' matching accuracy in 
the three conditions.  
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3.4.2 Correlational analyses 
In addition to the group-level analyses, we also examined the individual differences 
seen on our matching task using correlational analyses (Table 3.2). For the purposes of 
these analyses, we collapsed across the control (N = 23) and DP (N = 20) groups to 
yield a combined sample of 43. It is clear, however, that correlations described with 
larger sample sizes are associated with greater power and increased stability (e.g., 
Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013).  
We began by confirming that performance in our face and car conditions correlated 
with our diagnostic measures of face and car perception. Strong correlations were 
observed between participants’ matching accuracy in the face condition and their scores 
on the CFMT (r = .77, p < .001), PI20 (r = -.66, p < .001), and CFPT (r = -.71, p < 
.001). Performance in the cars condition also correlated with scores on the CCMT (r = 
.57, p < .001).  
Figure 3.3. Single-case data for the members of the DP group. For ease of comparison, cases 
are ordered by performance in the face matching condition. A z-score of zero denotes 
performance comparable with the mean of the control group.  
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Next, we sought to compare matching accuracy for bodies and cars with measures 
of face perception. Body matching accuracy correlated with scores on the CFMT (r = 
.46, p = .002), PI20 (r = -.31, p = .04), and CFPT (r = -.41, p = .006). Moderate 
correlations were found between car matching accuracy and both CFMT (r = .39, p = 
.009) and CFPT scores (r = -.37, p = .015). Matching accuracy for bodies (r = .51, p < 
.001) and cars (r = .31, p = .046) correlated with performance in the face condition 
(Figure 3.2c).  
Finally, we sought to compare our measures of body and car perception. 
Interestingly, we failed to find significant correlations between body and car matching 
accuracy, either in the combined sample (r = .23, p = .14), in the TD sample (r = .04, p 
= .86), or in the DP sample (r = .25, p = .28). We also failed to find any relationship 
between CCMT scores and performance in our body condition in the combined sample 
(r = .16, p = .30), in the TD sample (r = .07, p = .75), or in the DP sample (r = .06, p = 
.79). 
To compare the strength of correlations observed in the combined sample we used 
Steiger’s (1980) modification of Dunn and Clark’s z (1969), implemented using the 
‘cocor’ package (Diedenhofen & Musch, 2015) in R. There was some indication that 
the strength of the face-body correlation exceeded that of the body-car correlation [z = 
1.7, p = .045 (one-tailed)]. However, the strength of the face-body [z = 1.2, p = .12 
(one-tailed)] and body-car correlations [z = .52, p = .3 (one-tailed)] did not differ 
significantly from the face-car correlation.  
 
 
3.5 Discussion 
The present study sought to determine whether body perception is impaired in DP. 
Relative to age-matched TD controls, the DP sample exhibited impaired body matching 
accuracy at the group level, and several members of the sample were impaired at the 
single case level. These results provide the clearest behavioural evidence of impaired 
Table 3.2. Correlations observed between the diagnostic tests and matching accuracy for 
bodies, cars, and faces. None of the correlations with response times reached significance.  
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body perception in DP reported to date. Previous findings suggest that, in some cases 
of DP, ERP markers of body processing fail to show typical modulation by stimulus 
orientation (Righart & de Gelder, 2007). At the behavioural level, however, typical 
body matching accuracy has been described (Duchaine et al., 2006; Rivolta et al., 2016; 
Shah, Gaule, Gaigg et al., 2015). Our use of a larger DP sample and a sensitive task 
likely helped reveal body perception deficits. Consistent with previous reports 
(Behrmann et al., 2005; Dalrymple et al., 2016; De Haan & Campbell, 1991; Duchaine 
et al., 2007), a number of the DPs in the present study also showed evidence of wider 
object recognition difficulties. At the group level, the DPs were less accurate in the car 
matching condition than TD observers, and several DPs showed signs of impairment 
on the CCMT.  
Evidence of body perception deficits in DP accords with well-documented parallels 
between body and face perception (de Gelder et al., 2009; Minnebusch & Daum, 2009; 
Peelen & Downing, 2007; Slaughter et al., 2004). For example, the EBA-FBA and 
OFA-FFA networks for body and face processing, respectively, recruit spatially 
adjacent regions of occiptotemporal cortex (Peelen & Downing, 2007). Indeed, the FFA 
and FBA partially overlap in some observers (Peelen & Downing, 2005). Given the 
diffuse white matter differences described in occipitotemporal regions of some DPs 
(Gomez et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2009), entirely typical body perception would be 
surprising. Similarly, the accurate perception of face and body shape may depend on 
holistic processing (Murphy et al., 2016; Robbins & Coltheart, 2012a, 2012b). Should 
cases of DP result from atypical holistic processing (Avidan et al., 2011; DeGutis et al., 
2012; DeGutis et al., 2014; Palermo et al., 2011), one might therefore expect problems 
perceiving both faces and bodies.  
While the incidence of body agnosia may be higher in DP than in the typical 
population, body perception deficits do not appear to be a universal feature of DP. At 
the group level, the deficits do not appear to be as strong as for faces, and only 4 of the 
DPs exhibited significant body perception deficits at the single-case level. Again, this 
is not surprising given previous evidence that the perceptual processing of bodies and 
faces appears to dissociate. For example, neuropsychological patients have been 
described who exhibit severely impaired body perception, but spared face perception 
(Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997). Conversely, other patients exhibit severe 
face recognition, but typical body perception (Susilo, Yovel, Barton, & Duchaine, 
2013). The application of transcranial magnetic stimulation to EBA and OFA also 
	
	
107	
appears to selectively impair the perception of bodies and faces, respectively (Pitcher 
et al., 2009).  
In light of co-occurring deficits of body and car perception, it is tempting to conclude 
that DPs have a domain general perceptual deficit. Interestingly, however, we observed 
little or no relationship between observers’ car perception ability and their body 
perception. We speculate that forms of developmental agnosia affecting the perception 
of faces, bodies, and objects may be best thought of as independent neurodevelopmental 
conditions. A key feature of neurodevelopmental conditions is that they co-occur; for 
example, the incidence of several conditions is elevated in ASD relative to the typical 
population (Baron-Cohen et al., 2013; Bird & Cook, 2013; Dziuk et al., 2007; Jones et 
al., 2009; Matson & Shoemaker, 2009; van Steijn et al., 2014). Though often 
overlooked by vision scientists, it is widely recognised in psychiatry that genetic or 
environmental factors that predispose an individual to one developmental condition, 
often increase their risk of developing others (Bishop & Rutter, 2008; Gilger & Kaplan, 
2001; Kaplan, Dewey, Crawford, & Wilson, 2001; Rutter, 1997; Rutter et al., 2011). 
Observers predisposed to developing DP may therefore be at risk from developing body 
agnosia, and wider object recognition difficulties.   
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Chapter 4: Normal composite face effects in developmental prosopagnosia 
4.1 Abstract  
Upright face perception is thought to involve holistic processing, whereby local 
features are integrated into a unified whole. Consistent with this view, the top half of 
one face appears to fuse perceptually with the bottom half of another, when aligned 
spatially and presented upright. This ‘composite face effect’ reveals a tendency to 
integrate information from disparate regions when faces are presented canonically. In 
recent years, the relationship between susceptibility to the composite effect and face 
recognition ability has received extensive attention both in participants with normal 
face recognition and participants with developmental prosopagnosia. Previous results 
suggest that individuals with developmental prosopagnosia may show reduced 
susceptibility to the effect suggestive of diminished holistic face processing. Here we 
describe two studies that examine whether developmental prosopagnosia is associated 
with reduced composite face effects. Despite using independent samples of 
developmental prosopagnosics and different composite procedures, we find no 
evidence for reduced composite face effects. The experiments yielded similar results; 
highly significant composite effects in both prosopagnosic groups that were similar in 
magnitude to the effects found in participants with normal face processing. The 
composite face effects exhibited by both samples and the controls were greatly 
diminished when stimulus arrangements were inverted. Our finding that the whole-face 
binding process indexed by the composite effect is intact in developmental 
prosopagnosia indicates that other factors are responsible for developmental 
prosopagnosia. These results are also inconsistent with suggestions that susceptibility 
to the composite face effect and face recognition ability are tightly linked. While the 
holistic process revealed by the composite face effect may be necessary for typical face 
perception, it is not sufficient; individual differences in face recognition ability likely 
reflect variability in multiple sequential processes.  
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4.2 Introduction 
In recent years, research has revealed substantial individual differences in face 
processing ability. Whilst ‘super-recognisers’ make up the upper tail (Russell, 
Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2009), the lower-end of the distribution is composed of 
individuals with developmental prosopagnosia9 (DP). DP is a neurodevelopmental 
condition characterised by difficulties recognising facial identity, despite normal 
intelligence, typical low level vision, and no history of brain damage (Behrmann & 
Avidan, 2005; Cook & Biotti, 2016; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006b). DP was once 
thought to be extremely rare (McConachie, 1976), but one in every 50 people are now 
thought to experience lifelong face recognition difficulties severe enough to disrupt 
their daily lives (Kennerknecht, Ho, & Wong, 2008; Kennerknecht et al., 2006). 
Individuals with DP typically utilise non-face cues including voice, gait, and hairstyle 
to recognise others. Consequently, they often experience great difficulties when non-
face cues are unavailable or changed, or when familiar people are encountered out of 
context.  
Numerous papers have suggested that diminished holistic face processing may 
underlie the difficulties seen in DP (Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Carbon, 
Grüter, Weber, & Lueschow, 2007; DeGutis, Cohan, Mercado, Wilmer, & Nakayama, 
2012; DeGutis, Cohan, & Nakayama, 2014; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Lobmaier, Bölte, 
Mast, & Dobel, 2010; Palermo et al., 2011). Typical face perception appears to involve 
a rapid parallel analysis, whereby local features are integrated into a unified whole 
(Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; 
McKone & Yovel, 2009; Piepers & Robbins, 2013). Evidence of holistic face 
perception is provided by the composite face effect, where the top half of one face 
appears to fuse perceptually with the bottom half of another, when the two halves are 
aligned and presented upright (Hole, 1994; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). The 
resulting illusion-induced interference disrupts observers’ ability to judge the identity 
(Young et al., 1987), physical resemblance (Hole, 1994), age (Hole & George, 2011), 
gender (Baudouin & Humphreys, 2006), and attractiveness (Abbas & Duchaine, 2008) 
of constituent face halves (for reviews see Murphy, Gray, & Cook, 2017; Rossion, 
2013). When face halves are inverted, observers show little or no interference (McKone 
																																								 																				
9 We use the term developmental prosopagnosia instead of congenital prosopagnosia to indicate the 
possibility that in some cases the disorder may not be present at birth. 
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et al., 2013; Susilo, Rezlescu, & Duchaine, 2013). Importantly, the composite effect 
reveals a tendency to integrate feature information from disparate regions when faces 
are presented canonically, consistent with holistic theories of face perception (Farah et 
al., 1998; Maurer et al., 2002; McKone & Yovel, 2009; Piepers & Robbins, 2013).  
The suggestion that DP results from disrupted holistic processing is closely related 
to the view that the whole-face binding process measured by the composite face effect 
contributes to face recognition ability (DeGutis, Wilmer, Mercado, & Cohan, 2013; 
Farah et al., 1998; Maurer et al., 2002; Piepers & Robbins, 2013). However, studies 
comparing observers’ susceptibility to the composite face effect and their face 
recognition ability have yielded mixed results (Murphy et al., 2017). In cases of 
acquired prosopagnosia (AP), individuals are left with face recognition difficulties 
following brain injury. While some APs exhibit reduced composite face effects relative 
to matched controls (Busigny, Joubert, Felician, Ceccaldi, & Rossion, 2010; Ramon, 
Busigny, & Rossion, 2009), others exhibit typical susceptibility to the original matching 
procedure (Finzi, Susilo, Barton, & Duchaine, 2016; Rezlescu, Pitcher, & Duchaine, 
2012). Where composite face effects and face recognition ability have been compared 
in samples drawn from the general population, some authors have observed positive 
associations (DeGutis et al., 2013; Engfors, Jeffery, Gignac, & Palermo, 2017; Richler, 
Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011), whilst others have found little or no correlation (Konar, 
Bennett, & Sekuler, 2010; Rezlescu, Susilo, Wilmer, & Caramazza, 2017; Wang, Li, 
Fang, Tian, & Liu, 2012).  
The literature is also inconsistent with respect to the relationship between 
individuals’ susceptibility to the composite face effect and other putative markers of 
holistic representation, including the part-whole (Tanaka & Farah, 1993) and face-
inversion effects (Yin, 1969). For example, some authors have found associations 
between susceptibility to the composite face effect and the part-whole effect (DeGutis 
et al., 2013). However, other studies have found no association between susceptibility 
to the composite face effect and the part-whole effect (Rezlescu et al., 2017; Wang et 
al., 2012), or between composite face effects and perceptual decrements induced by 
face inversion (Rezlescu et al., 2017). These findings cast doubt on the view that a 
unitary process underlies holistic face processing. Where different measures of holistic 
processing are unrelated or weakly correlated in the typical population, 
neuropsychological dissociations might also be seen in the DP population. 
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Although studies have described a number of individuals with DP who exhibit 
composite effects comparable with those of matched controls (Le Grand et al., 2006; 
Schmalzl, Palermo, & Coltheart, 2008; Susilo et al., 2010), three studies have 
concluded that DP is associated with reduced susceptibility to the composite face effect 
at the group level (Avidan et al., 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, the case for diminished composite effects in DP remains unconvincing. 
In at least one study, inspection of single-case data suggests that previously reported 
group results have been strongly influenced by the presence of outliers in DP samples 
(Palermo et al., 2011). In other studies, DP samples perform poorly in the baseline 
‘misaligned’ condition making it hard to interpret putative differences in composite 
effect susceptibility (Liu & Behrmann, 2014).  
Given the uncertainty about the functional significance of the holistic processes 
revealed by the composite face effect (Finzi et al., 2016; Konar et al., 2010; Rezlescu 
et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2012) and the popular view that DP may be caused by 
diminished holistic representation (Carbon et al., 2007; DeGutis et al., 2012; DeGutis 
et al., 2014; Lobmaier et al., 2010), obtaining a better understanding of composite face 
effects in DP is theoretically important. It may also have implications for interventions 
aimed at improving face recognition in DP (e.g., DeGutis et al., 2014). The present 
study therefore sought to confirm that DP is associated with reduced composite face 
effects at the group level. We describe two experiments employing independent 
samples of DP participants collected in the UK and the USA (N = 16 and N = 24) and 
complementary paradigms (simultaneous and sequential matching). Contrary to 
previous group studies (Avidan et al., 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et al., 
2011), we find no evidence for diminished composite face effects in DP.  
4.3 Experiment 1 
In our first experiment we compared the composite face effects of DPs and matched 
controls using a simultaneous matching procedure (Hole, 1994). Composite effects seen 
with upright faces were compared with those seen with inverted faces. Whereas strong 
effects of alignment are seen when composite faces are presented upright, interference 
is greatly reduced when composites are constructed from inverted faces (Susilo et al., 
2013). This comparison is useful as it addresses the possibility that effects of 
misalignment found with upright faces are due to general factors rather than face-
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specific processes (McKone et al., 2013; Rossion, 2013). We also examined composite 
effects for pseudo-words which resemble the effects found for upright faces (Anstis, 
2005). For the sake of brevity, however, details of the procedure and results for pseudo-
words are provided as supplementary material.   
4.3.1 Methods  
4.3.1.1 Participants  
Two groups of observers completed the procedure; 16 individuals with DP (Mage = 
43.56 years, SDage = 15.09 years, 3 males), and a control group comprising 16 
neurotypical adults (Mage = 39.81 years, SDage = 12.95 years, 10 males). All observers 
were resident in the UK. Ethical approval was granted by the local ethics committee 
and the study was conducted in line with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants 
provided informed consent prior to testing. 
4.3.1.2 Diagnostic testing 
DP participants were recruited through www.troublewithfaces.org. All members of 
the DP sample described lifelong face recognition difficulties that affected their daily 
lives. None of the DPs had a history of brain injury or psychiatric disorder (e.g., 
Schizophrenia, Autism Spectrum Disorder). Diagnostic evidence for the presence of 
DP was collected using the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT; Duchaine & 
Nakayama, 2006a) the Twenty-Item Prosopagnosia Index (PI20; Gray, Bird, & Cook, 
2017; Shah, Gaule, Sowden, Bird, & Cook, 2015), and a Famous Face Test suitable for 
use with UK residents (FFTUK). Scores on the CFMT were compared against data from 
50 typical observers reported by Duchaine & Nakayama (2006a). Participants also 
completed the Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT; Duchaine, Germine, & 
Nakayama, 2007) to determine whether face recognition deficits had an apperceptive 
origin (De Renzi, Faglioni, Grossi, & Nichelli, 1991). While participants were not 
selected on the basis of these scores, the DP sample was impaired at the group level 
[t(22) = 2.34, p = .029].  Scores on the CFPT and PI20 were compared with a group of 
56 controls (Mage = 40.25 years, SDage = 13.71 years, 24 males). Comparison data for 
the FFTUK was collected from a sample of 20 controls (Mage = 30.4 years, SDage = 10.27 
years, 9 males). When tested on the CFMT, all DPs scored at least 1.53 standard 
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deviations below the mean performance of the comparison sample. All DPs tested10 
also scored at least 2 standard deviations below the mean of the comparison samples 
on the FFTUK and the PI20. Diagnostic information is presented in Table 4.1.  
 
 
4.3.1.3 The composite task 
Face composites were constructed from images of emotionally neutral faces taken 
from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 
1998). Faces were cropped to exclude external facial features (e.g. ears, hairline). Face 
halves containing the eyes were used as target regions. Face composites subtended 8° 
of visual angle, vertically. The to-be-judged regions subtended 4°. In the misaligned 
conditions, the horizontal offset corresponded to approximately 25% the width of a 
face.  
In total, 40 face composites were employed. Each composite was allocated a partner 
arrangement of the same type with which it would be presented simultaneously. For 
half the composite pairs, the target regions were identical, for half the pairs the target 
regions differed. Following the standard composite design (also referred to as the 
																																								 																				
10 In Experiment 1, two DPs did not complete FFTUK. In Experiment 2, two DPs did not complete the 
FFTUS and two did not complete the ONFRT. 
Table 4.1. Scores for each developmental prosopagnosic in Experiment 1 on the 20-Item 
Prosopagnosia Index (PI20), the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT), the Cambridge Face 
Perception Test (CFPT), and the Famous Faces Test (FFTUK). Z-scores are shown in 
parentheses. Negative z-scores denote performance worse than the typical mean. The mean 
and standard deviation of the comparison samples are provided below.  
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original design; Murphy et al., 2017; Rossion, 2013), the distractor regions within each 
pair were always different. The two target regions appeared at the same vertical position 
in the display (the lower edge of each target region was aligned to the vertical midpoint 
of the display). Two dashed guidelines were imposed over the arrangements to clearly 
delineate the stimulus regions to be judged. Example displays are presented in Figure 
4.1a. 
 
Testing took place at City, University of London. Participants judged whether the 
regions shown within the guidelines were identical or not. Composite displays were 
presented until a response was registered. Participants were asked to respond with both 
speed and accuracy. Each pair was presented twice in each alignment condition with 
side (left or right) counterbalanced, yielding 120 ‘same’ trials and 120 ‘different’ trials 
(10 pairs × 2 presentations × 2 levels of alignment × 3 composite types). Composite 
type (upright faces, inverted faces, pseudo-words) was interleaved randomly within 
blocks of 60 trials. Six practice trials were provided. The experiment was programmed 
Figure 4.1. (a) In our first experiment, trials presented pairs of composite arrangements 
simultaneously. Composites were visible until a response was registered. (b) In our second 
experiment, trials presented pairs of face composites sequentially. Composites were presented 
for 200 msec each, with an inter-stimulus-interval of 400 msec during which a black display 
was presented.  
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in MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA) using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
Prior to testing the DPs and age-matched controls, we piloted our novel procedure 
on a group of 25 young neurotypical adults (Mage = 18.92 years, SDage = 1.42 years, 3 
males) to ensure the tasks yielded the expected results. These data are provided in the 
supplementary material. The sample exhibited a clear composite effect for upright faces 
that accords closely with the existing literature. Reassuringly, we found 
disproportionate effects of Alignment on ‘same’ trials, where the presence of the 
illusion makes it harder to detect that target regions are identical, consistent with 
previous reports (e.g., Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2004). As expected, 
composite effects were greatly diminished when arrangements were constructed from 
inverted faces.  
4.3.2 Results  
Where stimulus displays are visible until participants respond, there is a trade-off 
between response speed and response accuracy; slower responding allows observers to 
collect more perceptual evidence, and thereby reduce errors. Under these conditions, 
many observers approach ceiling on accuracy measures (e.g., Calder, Young, Keane, & 
Dean, 2000; Palermo et al., 2011). To facilitate clear interpretation, we therefore present 
both the response speed and accuracy data (Table 4.2). 
 
 
4.3.2.1 Accuracy 
First, we compared the composite face effects exhibited by the groups in their 
accuracy data (Figure 4.2). Our analyses revealed evidence of clear composite effects 
for upright faces. As expected, we observed a significant main effect of Alignment 
Table 4.2. Mean accuracy and response time measures from Experiment 1. Standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses.  
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[F(1,30) = 19.04, p  < .001, η2 = .388], a main effect of Trial Type [F(1,30) = 5.91, p = 
.021, η2 = .165], and an Alignment × Trial Type interaction [F(1,30) = 36.72, p < .001, 
η2 = .550]. The analysis indicated that the composite effects exhibited by the controls 
and DPs did not differ. We observed no main effect of Group [F(1,30) = .145, p = .706, 
η2 = .005], and the effects of Alignment [F(1,30) = .1.35, p = .254, η2 = .043], Trial 
Type [F(1,30) = 1.41, p = .245, η2 = .045], and the Alignment × Trial Type interaction 
[F(1,30) = 2.99, p = .094, η2 = .091], did not interact with Group. We also note that the 
Alignment × Group interaction failed to reach significance when the analysis was 
restricted to ‘same’ trials [F(1,30) = 2.61, p = .117]. When considered separately, the 
neurotypical controls showed effects of Alignment [F(1,15) = 12.187, p = .003, η2 = 
.448] and an Alignment × Trial Type interaction [F(1,15) = 35.161, p < .001, η2 = .701]. 
Clear effects of Alignment [F(1,15) = 6.855, p = .019, η2 = .314] and an Alignment × 
Trial Type interaction [F(1,15) = 8.238, p = .012, η2 = .355] were also seen in the DP 
group.  
Neither group showed evidence of composite effects for inverted faces. The analysis 
revealed a significant effect of Trial Type [F(1,30) = 23.43, p < .001, η2 = .439], but 
the effects of Alignment [F(1,30) = 1.29, p = .264, η2 = .041], and the Alignment × 
Trial Type interaction [F(1,30) = .41, p = .527, η2 = .013] failed to reach significance. 
As expected, the main effects of Trial Type [F(1,30) = 60.96, p = .000, η2 = .670] and 
Alignment [F(1,30) = 16.71, p = .000, η2 = .358] both varied significantly as a function 
of Composite Type (upright face, inverted face). We observed no main effect of Group 
[F(1,30) = .09, p = .763, η2 = .003], and none of the other main effects or interactions 
varied as a function of group [all F’s < 0.9, p’s > .35].  
4.3.2.2 Response times 
Next, we compared the composite face effects exhibited by the groups in their 
response time data (Figure 4.2). Analysis of response latencies for the upright faces 
revealed main effects of Alignment [F(1,30) = 56.339, p < .001, η2 = .653], and Trial 
Type [F(1,30) = 28.80, p < .001, η2 = .490], and an Alignment × Trial Type interaction 
[F(1,30) = 32.219, p < .001, η2 = .518]. The analysis indicated that similar composite 
face effects were seen for controls and DPs. No effect of Group was observed [F(1,30) 
= 1.496, p = .231, η2 = .048], and the effects of Alignment [F(1,30) = .101, p = .753, η2 
= .003], Trial Type [F(1,30) = .101, p = .753, η2 = .003], and the Alignment × Trial 
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Type interaction [F(1,30) = .424, p = .520, η2 = .014], did not vary as a function of 
Group. Once again, the Alignment × Group interaction failed to reach significance 
when the analysis was restricted to ‘same’ trials [F(1,30) = .043, p = .838]. The 
neurotypical controls showed effects of Alignment [F(1,15) = 25.108, p < .001, η2 = 
.626] and an Alignment × Trial Type interaction [F(1,15) = 14.720, p = .002, η2 = .495]. 
Highly significant effects of Alignment [F(1,15) = 31.517, p < .001, η2 = .678] and an 
Alignment × Trial Type interaction [F(1,15) = 19.722, p < .001, η2 = .568] were also 
seen in the DP group.  
 
Figure 4.2. Results from Experiment 1 for composite arrangements constructed from upright 
faces (top) and inverted faces (bottom). Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean.  
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Neither group showed evidence of a composite face effect for inverted faces in their 
response time data. The main effects of Trial Type [F(1,30) = 3.421, p = .075, η2 = 
.102] and Alignment [F(1,30) = 2.831, p = .103, η2 = .086], and the Alignment × Trial 
Type interaction [F(1,30) = 2.808, p = .104, η2 = .086], all failed to reach significance. 
The main effect of Alignment [F(1,30) = 20.646, p < .001, η2 = .408] and the Alignment 
× Trial Type interaction [F(1,30) = 10.638, p = .003, η2 = .262] varied significantly as 
a function of Composite Type (upright faces, inverted faces). No main effect of Group 
was observed [F(1,30) = 1.459, p = .236, η2 = .046] and none of the effects or 
interactions varied as a function of Group [all F’s < 0.8, p’s > .38]. 
4.3.2.3 Individual differences 
Next we sought to determine how susceptibility to the composite face effect related 
to individual differences in face processing ability in our sample of 16 DPs. Scores on 
the CFMT (r = -.186, p =.491) and the upright CFPT (r = .219, p =.416) failed to 
correlate with a measure of the composite effect based on accuracy (Δaccuracy = 
%Correctaligned - %Correctmisaligned).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Inverse efficiency scores (IES) for aligned composites plotted against those seen 
for misaligned composites, for upright faces (left), inverted faces (middle), and pseudo-words 
(right). Points lying to the left of the dashed line are indicative of typical composite effects 
(performance misaligned > performance aligned).  
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Similarly, composite effects based on response time (Δlatency = RTaligned - 
RTmisaligned), failed to correlate with performance on the CFMT (r = .194, p =.471) or 
the upright CFPT (r = -.072, p =.792). Finally, we sought to derive a single measure of 
performance that combined response times and accuracy. We therefore computed 
Inverse Efficiency Scores (IES; Figure 4.3) by adjusting participants’ response times 
(RTs) upwards in proportion to their error rate [IES = RT / % correct] (Townsend & 
Ashby, 1978). No correlation was observed between composite face effects (ΔIES = 
IESaligned - IESmisaligned) and their performance on the CFMT (r = .216, p =.422) or their 
CFPT scores (r = -.176, p = .514).  
4.4 Experiment 2 
In our first experiment, we examined whether 16 individuals with DP exhibited 
diminished composite face effects using a simultaneous matching paradigm. Contrary 
to previous reports (Avidan et al., 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et al., 2011), 
we found that the DPs and controls exhibited comparable composite face effects. 
However, DP is known to be a heterogeneous condition (Eimer, Gosling, & Duchaine, 
2012; Stollhoff, Jost, Elze, & Kennerknecht, 2011; Susilo & Duchaine, 2013). For 
example, some individuals appear to perceive facial expressions normally, whereas 
others exhibit impaired expression recognition (Biotti & Cook, 2016; Duchaine, Parker, 
& Nakayama, 2003; Duchaine, Yovel, Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2006; Humphreys, 
Avidan, & Behrmann, 2007). Similarly, some individuals with DP recognize objects 
normally, while others exhibit broader object recognition deficits (Behrmann, Avidan, 
Marotta, & Kimchi, 2005; Biotti, Gray, & Cook, 2017; Dalrymple, Elison, & Duchaine, 
2017; Duchaine, Germine et al., 2007). In light of this heterogeneity, it is possible that 
a subgroup of the DP population exhibits diminished composite effects, but is under-
represented in our first sample. 
Moreover, the use of simultaneous matching in Experiment 1 differs from the 
sequential matching tasks employed in the previous studies that have reported group 
differences (Avidan et al., 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et al., 2011). In our 
second experiment, we therefore tested a different group of DPs with a sequential 
matching composite task.  
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4.4.1 Methods  
4.4.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-four individuals with DP (Mage = 40.1 years, SDage = 13.2 years, 6 males) 
participated in the study. The performance of the DPs was compared to a control group 
comprising 22 neurotypical adults (Mage = 45.8 years, SDage = 13.9 years, 5 males). All 
observers were US residents. Ethical approval was granted by the local ethics 
committee and the study was conducted in line with the Declaration of Helsinki. All 
participants provided informed consent prior to testing. 
4.4.1.2 Diagnostic testing 
DP participants were recruited through the Dartmouth/Harvard/UCL Prosopagnosia 
Research Center website (www.faceblind.org). All complained of lifelong face 
recognition difficulties that affected their daily lives.  
 
 
Table 4.3. Scores for each developmental prosopagnosic in Experiment 2 on the Cambridge 
Face Memory Test (CFMT), The Famous Faces Test (FFTUS), and the Old-New Faces Test 
(ONFT). Z-scores are shown in parentheses. Negative z-scores denote performance worse than 
the typical mean. The mean and standard deviation of the comparison samples are provided 
below.  
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Convergent diagnostic evidence for the presence of DP was collected using the 
CFMT, the Old-New Face Recognition Test (ONFRT; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005), 
and a Famous Faces Test suitable for use with US residents (FFTUS; Duchaine & 
Nakayama, 2005). 
When tested on the CFMT, all DPs scored at least 1.7 standard deviations below the 
mean performance of the comparison sample described by Duchaine and Nakayama 
(2006a). All DPs tested2 also scored at least 2 standard deviations below the mean of 
the controls on the FFTUS and the ONFRT (comparison data taken from Duchaine, 
Yovel, & Nakayama, 2007; Susilo, Wright, Tree, & Duchaine, 2015). DPs also 
completed the CFPT and the Leuven Perceptual Organization Screening Test (L-POST; 
Torfs, Vancleef, Lafosse, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2014). All DPs scored within the 
normal range on the L-POST, suggesting typical mid-level vision. Detailed diagnostic 
results are provided in Table 4.3. 
4.4.1.3 The composite task  
The stimuli and procedure were adapted from the composite task employed by Susilo 
et al.  (2013; Experiment 3). Face composites were constructed from greyscale 
photographs of Caucasian male children posing neutral expressions (Figure 4.1b). The 
children were photographed wearing a black ski-cap to occlude their hairline. When 
viewed from 40 cm, aligned faces subtended 10° vertically and 6.5° horizontally, and 
misaligned faces 10° × 9°. All subjects were tested remotely via www.testable.org, a 
platform that enables precise control of experiments conducted online11. Participants 
were asked to do the task in an environment in which they would not be disturbed and 
to employ a viewing distance of around 40 cm.  
Experimental trials presented two face composites sequentially for 200 ms each, 
with an inter-stimulus interval of 400 ms during which a black display was presented. 
Composites were either both aligned or both misaligned, both upright or both inverted 
(Figure 4.1b). Participants were asked to indicate with a keypress whether the target 
regions (the face halves containing the eyes) were the “same” (identical) or “different” 
(not identical) while ignoring the distractor regions, which were always different. There 
																																								 																				
11	 One DP had technical difficulties, but a switch to another browser resolved the issue. This 
individual completed approximately one third of the trials before the task crashed, at which point the 
individual switched browsers and did the full task on the new browser. 
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were 90 trials per orientation; 60 in which the target regions were the same (30 aligned, 
30 misaligned) and 30 where the target regions were different (15 aligned, 15 
misaligned), making 180 trials in total. Orientation (upright, inverted), Alignment 
(aligned, misaligned), and Trial Type (same, different) were randomly interleaved. Six 
practice trials were provided.  
4.4.2 Results 
Matching procedures that present composites sequentially for pre-determined 
intervals (in this case 200 ms) afford less opportunity for a trade-off between speed and 
accuracy, because participants cannot accumulate more perceptual evidence by 
responding slowly. In Experiment 2, our primary analyses focus on accuracy (% 
correct). Descriptive statistics for accuracy scores and RTs achieved by the two groups 
are presented in Table 4.4.  
 
 
4.4.2.1 Accuracy 
The combined dataset was subjected to ANOVA with Alignment (misaligned, 
aligned) and Orientation (upright, inverted) as within-subjects factors, and Group (DP, 
NT) as a between-subjects factor (Figure 4.4). The analysis revealed main effects of 
Orientation [F(1,44) = 30.96, p < .001, η2 = .413] and Alignment [F(1,44) = 84.33, p < 
.001, η2 = .65], as well as a highly significant Alignment × Orientation interaction 
[F(1,44) = 75.21, p < .001, η2 = .63], reflecting a larger difference between aligned and 
Table 4.4.  Mean accuracy and response time measures from Experiment 2. Standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses.  
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misaligned trials when composites were shown upright. The main effect of Group was 
not significant [F(1,44) = 0.20, p = .65], and neither the Group × Orientation interaction 
[F(1,44) = 0.07, p = 0.79], nor the Group × Alignment interaction [F(1,44) = 0.61, p = 
.44] reached significance. Most critically, however, the Orientation × Alignment 
interaction did not vary as a function of Group [F(1,44) = 0.75, p = .39]. As expected, 
controls’ ability to discriminate the misaligned target regions exceeded their 
discrimination of the aligned targets when the faces were upright [t(21) = 6.95, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 1.48], but not when arrangements were inverted [t(21) = .33, p = .75]. The 
DPs exhibited a similar pattern, but their ability to discriminate the misaligned target 
regions exceeded their discrimination of the aligned targets in both the upright [t(23) = 
7.78, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.59] and inverted [t(23) = 2.70, p = .013, Cohen’s d = .55] 
conditions.  
Unlike controls, DPs showed an effect of alignment for inverted trials. Nevertheless, 
we do not believe this difference is indicative of qualitatively differently face 
processing. First, the Alignment × Orientation interaction did not vary as a function of 
Group; both the DP and NT controls showed much larger alignment effects for upright 
faces than for inverted faces. Second, it is not uncommon for typical observers to show 
small but significant composite effects for inverted faces12. For example, Susilo and 
colleagues (2013) used the same inverted composite task used here and found a 
significant alignment effect in a large sample of typical observers (N = 242) with a 
magnitude similar to that exhibited by the DPs in this experiment (Typical observers: 
4.0%, DPs: 5.0% respectively).  
4.4.2.2 Response times 
The response latency data was analysed using a mixed-model ANOVA with 
Orientation (upright, inverted) and Alignment (aligned, misaligned) as within-subjects 
factors, and Group (DP, NT) as a between-subjects factor. Main effects of Orientation 
[F(1,44) = 12.71, p = .001, η2 = .22] and Alignment [F(1,44) = 22.04, p < .001, η2 = 
.32] were observed, as well as a significant Orientation × Alignment interaction 
																																								 																				
12	Composite face stimuli that include a gap of a few pixels between the target and distractor regions 
may be less likely to produce composite effects when arrangements are inverted (Rossion & Retter, 
2015). It remains unknown how the presence or absence of this feature affects composite face processing 
in observers with DP. Addressing this issue in future studies of the composite effect in DP may prove 
worthwhile.  
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[F(1,44) = 21.80, p < .001, η2 = .32]. However, no main effect of Group was observed 
[F(1,44) = .46 p = .50]. The effects of Orientation [F(1,44) = .60, p =.44], Alignment 
[F(1,44) = 2.58, p = .12], and the Orientation × Alignment interaction failed to interact 
with Group [F(1,44) = .88, p = .35].  
4.4.2.3 Individual differences 
Once again, no correlation was observed between the DPs’ composite face effects 
(Δaccuracy = %Correctaligned - %Correctmisaligned) seen in the upright condition and their 
scores on the CFMT (r = -.05, p = .81) or CFPT (r = -.07, p = .77).  
 
Figure 4.4. Results of Experiment 2. Top panels present accuracy scores for the two groups on 
the upright (left) and inverted composites (right). Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the 
mean. Bottom panels show accuracy scores seen for aligned composites plotted against those 
seen for misaligned composites, for upright faces (left) and inverted faces (right). Points lying 
to the right of the dashed line are indicative of typical composite effects (performance 
misaligned > performance aligned).  
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We present the individual effects seen for the DPs and age-matched controls (Figure 
4.4) to illustrate that the failure to find a group difference is not due to the presence of 
outliers.  
Some cases of developmental prosopagnosia appear to have an apperceptive profile 
– whereby individuals have problems forming perceptual descriptions of faces – while 
other cases may have selective problems with face learning or face memory (De Renzi 
et al., 1991). Insofar as the whole-face binding revealed by composite face effect has 
been characterised as a face encoding process (Murphy et al., 2017; Rossion, 2013), it 
is possible that susceptibility to the composite face effect is reduced only in 
apperceptive cases of DP. We took advantage of the large sample size employed in 
Experiment 2 to examine this possibility in more detail. The DPs were split into 
apperceptive (N = 12) and non-apperceptive (N = 12) subgroups. Members of the 
apperceptive subgroup performed at least 2 SDs below the mean of the comparison 
sample on the CFPT. Contrary to the foregoing speculation, however, we found no 
difference in the size of the composite effects (Δaccuracy) exhibited by the subgroups 
in the upright [t(22) = .324, p = .749] or inverted [t(22) = .273, p = .787] conditions. 
The lack of relationship between scores on the CFPT and composite effect sizes accords 
with previous findings with typical observers (Rezlescu et al., 2017) and DPs (Palermo 
et al., 2011).  
4.5 Discussion 
The present study assessed whether individuals with DP exhibit diminished 
composite face effects at the group level. Across two experiments conducted on 
separate samples and using different paradigms, we find no evidence for diminished 
composite-face effects in this population. In our first experiment, a group of 16 DPs 
showed typical composite face effects when tested on a simultaneous matching 
procedure. In our second experiment, a separate group of 24 DPs also showed typical 
composite face effects when tested on a sequential matching procedure. Contrary to 
previous reports (Avidan et al., 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et al., 2011), 
these findings indicate that diminished composite face effects are not a characteristic 
feature of DP. These results have important implications, both for our understanding of 
DP and for our interpretation of the composite face effect.  	
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4.5.1 Composite face effects in developmental prosopagnosia 
Our results accord with findings from previous case studies that have described 
typical composite face effects in individual DPs (Le Grand et al., 2006; Schmalzl et al., 
2008; Susilo et al., 2010). In particular, Le Grand and colleagues (2006) described 
typical composite effects in seven out of eight DPs tested. Similarly, having tested 
seven family members with DP, Schmalzl et al. (2008) found typical composite effects 
in the four youngest cases (aged 4-40 years) and atypical composite effects only in the 
three oldest cases (aged 66-87 years). Interestingly, we note recent findings from typical 
observers suggesting that composite face effects may behave differently in samples of 
older adults; for example, the composite processing of older observers may be less 
efficient (Wiese, Kachel, & Schweinberger, 2013) and be more susceptible to general 
factors (Meinhardt, Persike, & Meinhardt-Injac, 2016). In contrast, our results are 
inconsistent with previous reports of reduced composite face effects in DP at the group 
level (Avidan et al., 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et al., 2011). Having 
examined the processing of upright and inverted face composites in 40 individuals with 
DP (aged 21-63 years), our results suggest most members of this population exhibit 
normal composite face effects. On the other hand, close examination of the previous 
group studies calls their conclusions into doubt.  
In their first experiment, Palermo and colleagues (2011) found that a sample of 12 
DPs were slower to name the emotion of a target region when aligned with a distractor 
region expressing an incongruous emotion. However, inspection of the distribution 
suggests this difference was strongly influenced by the results from a single DP whose 
aligned RTs were considerably faster than their misaligned RTs - a reversed composite 
effect (see Palermo et al., 2011, Figure 5). Further complicating interpretation, neither 
the DPs nor the controls showed composite effects in their error rates. In their second 
experiment, controls and nine DPs were required to match the top halves of face 
composites presented sequentially for 200 ms each. Given the short presentations, 
accuracy is the most critical measure of composite effects, and the DPs and controls 
showed clear and nearly identical composite effects in their accuracy data. The evidence 
for atypical composite effects cited by the authors is derived from RTs. However, the 
Alignment × Group interaction seen in the RT data failed to reach significance when 
analysed in the standard manner (p > .3). The group difference was only significant 
	
	
135	
when adjusted for performance in the baseline misaligned condition, a point we discuss 
further below.  
Avidan and colleagues (2011) reported that a sample of 14 individuals with DP 
showed diminished effects of alignment both in their RTs and error rates, when 
matching upright composites presented sequentially. The age of the DP sample is older 
than is typical in this literature; half the DP participants were aged 60 years or older 
(mean age = 52.5 years; range 31-79 years). Inspection of the single-case data is further 
complicated by the fact that aligned and misaligned trials were blocked, and completed 
in a different order by different DPs. Whilst this treatment may have little effect on the 
performance of typical observers (e.g., Le Grand et al., 2004), DPs may be prone to 
order effects resulting from practice, fatigue, or test anxiety. Within their DP sample, 
those individuals who showed weaker composite face effects showed greater local bias 
(r = .52) on a compound letter task (Navon, 1977). Where observed, weaker composite 
face effects therefore seem to be related to wider global processing difficulties. It is 
possible that a subgroup exists within the DP population characterized by a global 
processing deficit affecting performance on composite face and compound letter tasks. 
However, the present results together with previous reports, suggest that this profile is 
relatively uncommon. For example, many DPs exhibit typical perception of global 
motion and Glass patterns (Le Grand et al., 2006), typical Gestalt completion 
(Duchaine, 2000; Duchaine et al., 2006), and process compound ‘Navon’ stimuli 
typically (Duchaine, Germine et al., 2007; Duchaine, Yovel et al., 2007; Schmalzl et 
al., 2008).  
Lastly, Liu & Behrmann (2014) reported that eight DPs showed reduced composite 
effects for left and right face halves when tested using the complete design. However, 
several factors undermine our confidence in these findings. First, the three DPs with 
the lowest holistic processing index, exhibited surprisingly normal performance on the 
diagnostic tests (e.g. MN and SH had CFMT scores of 73.6% and 79.2%, and WA 
exhibited above average famous face recognition). Second, inspection of the composite 
results indicates that the DPs performed much worse in the baseline misaligned 
condition than the matched controls. This feature of the data suggests that the reduced 
composite effects described reflect problems encoding local regions rather than 
aberrant integration processes. Distractor halves perceived as homogenous or 
nondescript by prosopagnosics may afford weaker perceptual prediction, and thereby 
exert less illusory bias in the aligned condition, than distractor halves perceived as 
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distinctive. In an attempt to factor in baseline differences, the authors computed a 
holistic processing index, where modulation in the aligned condition is expressed 
relative to misaligned performance. Crucially, this measure and similar indices (see 
Avidan et al., 2011; Palermo et al., 2011) make unfounded assumptions about the 
relationship between performance in misaligned conditions and susceptibility to the 
composite effect; it is not clear what constitutes a “typical” composite effect where 
observers exhibit atypical misaligned performance.   
Traditionally, it has been assumed that the face inversion (Yin, 1969), composite 
face (Young et al., 1987), and part-whole effects (Tanaka & Farah, 1993), reflect the 
operation of a single process or mechanism (Farah et al., 1998; Maurer et al., 2002; 
McKone & Yovel, 2009; Piepers & Robbins, 2013). However, mounting evidence 
suggests that individuals’ susceptibility to the composite face effect not only fails to 
correlate with their face recognition ability, but also appears weakly related to other 
putative measures of holistic face processing (Rezlescu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2012; 
but see DeGutis, Wilmer et al., 2013). As a result, we do not wish to claim that every 
facet of holistic face processing is typical in DP. Given that different measures of 
holistic processing are unrelated or weakly correlated in the typical population, 
neuropsychological dissociations might also be seen in the DP population. While DPs 
may show typical susceptibility to the composite face effect, other effects attributed to 
holistic face processing may be aberrant; for example, many DPs may show diminished 
face inversion effects (Duchaine et al., 2006; Shah, Gaule, Gaigg, Bird, & Cook, 2015; 
Tree & Wilkie, 2010), absent part-whole effects for the eye region (DeGutis et al., 
2012), and commonly report excessive reliance on local features for identity 
recognition (DeGutis et al., 2012; Shah, Gaule, Sowden et al., 2015).  
It is worth noting an interesting inconsistency in the DP literature highlighted by our 
findings. In both experiments, our DPs showed large composite effects with upright 
faces yet little or no composite effects with inverted faces (see also Susilo et al., 2010). 
Most DPs also show better performance with upright faces than inverted faces when 
tasks are sensitive and performance is not affected by restrictions of range (Duchaine, 
Germine et al., 2007; Duchaine, Yovel et al., 2007; Garrido, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 
2008).  Similarly, a study comparing event-related potentials (ERPs) indicated upright 
and inverted Mooney faces were processed differently by DPs (Towler, Gosling, 
Duchaine, & Eimer, 2016). These results indicate that DPs process upright and inverted 
faces differently, however they are inconsistent with findings from an ERP study of 
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face processing in DP (Towler, Gosling, Duchaine, & Eimer, 2012). In typical 
observers, inverted faces reliably elicit larger N170 potentials than upright faces 
(Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Eimer, 2000; Rossion et al., 1999). 
A group of 16 DPs, however, showed no difference in their N170s to upright and 
inverted faces at the group level (Towler, Fisher, & Eimer, 2017; Towler et al., 2012). 
While the reason for the discrepancy between these findings is unclear, it appears that 
behavioural inversion effects and the N170 inversion effect are measuring different 
aspects of face processing.   
4.5.2 Composite face effect and face recognition ability 
The view that individual differences in holistic face processing, inferred from 
susceptibility to the composite face effect, predict face recognition ability is widespread 
(DeGutis et al., 2013; Farah et al., 1998; Maurer et al., 2002; Piepers & Robbins, 2013; 
Richler et al., 2011). This interpretation owes much to the correlated observations that 
orientation inversion renders faces harder to recognise (Yin, 1969) and greatly reduces 
the composite face effect (Young et al., 1987). Consistent with this view, composite 
studies employing the congruency design have found a positive correlation between 
composite effects and face recognition ability (DeGutis et al., 2013; Richler et al., 
2011). However, the functional significance of the composite face effect has been called 
into question by other studies that have found little or no correlation between typical 
observers’ composite face effects – measured using the standard design – and their face 
recognition ability (Konar et al., 2010; Rezlescu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2012). 
Reports of diminished composite face effects in DP (Avidan et al., 2011; Liu & 
Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et al., 2011) have been cited as evidence that the process 
responsible for the composite face effect makes a necessary contribution to face 
recognition ability (Murphy et al., 2017). Our findings suggest this inference is 
potentially misleading.  
Typical composite effects in the DPs tested here, and in other cases described 
previously (Le Grand et al., 2006; Schmalzl et al., 2008; Susilo et al., 2010), as well as 
evidence that some acquired prosopagnosics exhibit normal face composite effects 
(Finzi et al., 2016), suggest a complex relationship between susceptibility to the 
composite face effect and face recognition ability. Face recognition is thought to depend 
on a processing stream that can be fractionated at several stages (Bruce & Young, 
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1986). The whole-face binding indexed by the composite effect appears to be intact in 
individuals with DP suggesting that the locus of their impairment lies elsewhere in the 
face processing stream. However, the binding process revealed by the composite effect 
may still make a causal contribution to face recognition ability; i.e., the composite 
process may be necessary, but not sufficient, for typical face perception. Cases of 
acquired prosopagnosia have been described where face recognition deficits are 
associated with aberrant composite effects (e.g., Busigny et al., 2010; Busigny et al., 
2014; Ramon et al., 2009), and no neuropsychological cases have been described who 
show no evidence of a composite effect but normal performance on tests of face 
perception and face recognition.  
Typical composite face effects in DP and in some cases of acquired prosopagnosia 
(Finzi et al., 2016; Rezlescu et al., 2012), accord with other evidence that the processes 
underlying the composite effect are difficult to disrupt. Photographic negation disrupts 
observers’ ability to encode 3D face shape (Kemp, Pike, White, & Musselman, 1996), 
but has little effect on the strength of the composite face effect (Hole, George, & 
Dunsmore, 1999; Taubert & Alais, 2011). Similarly, composite effects can be seen with 
abstract cartoon faces that contain only schematic facial features, but bear little 
resemblance to naturalistic faces (Murphy et al., 2017). Moreover, several markers of 
face processing, notably the ability to use the internal features (Ellis, Shepherd, & 
Davies, 1979; Osborne & Stevenage, 2008; Young, Hay, McWeeny, Flude, & Ellis, 
1985) and achieve view-point invariance (Longmore, Liu, & Young, 2008), are strongly 
modulated by facial familiarity. In contrast, compelling composite effects can be seen 
with entirely unfamiliar faces (Hole, 1994). Together with the findings from 
prosopagnosia, insensitivity to negation, abstraction, and familiarity, suggest that the 
composite face effect is resilient and disrupted only by gross changes to the faciotopy 
(e.g., misalignment, inversion) or catastrophic damage to the face processing stream.  
4.5.3 Face composite designs 
Like most previous studies of composite effects in DP (e.g., Avidan et al., 2011; Le 
Grand et al., 2006; Palermo et al., 2011; Schmalzl et al., 2008), we employed the 
standard design in both experiments, where the distractor regions always differ. There 
has been considerable debate about the merits of an alternate congruency design, 
employing a full factorial combination of target regions (same, different) and distractor 
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regions (same, different) (Richler & Gauthier, 2014; Rossion, 2013). Some authors 
have suggested that congruency designs mitigate the effects of response bias (for 
discussion see Richler & Gauthier, 2014). However, congruency designs have been 
criticized because the predicted effect on congruent-different trials – where different 
distractor halves are paired with different target halves – is unclear (Robbins & 
McKone, 2007), and because the congruency design produces composite effects for 
stimuli that do not yield demonstrable composite illusions (Rossion, 2013). The 
additional trials may induce domain-general facilitation / interference effects that differ 
from the illusory interference seen for upright-aligned face composites (Murphy et al., 
2017; Rossion, 2013). Crucially, because the standard design is thought to limit the 
domain-general effects of congruency, the present findings represent a conservative test 
of the hypothesis that composite face effects are diminished in DP. Where observed, 
domain-general congruency effects may be expected to attenuate a group difference 
arising from a face-specific deficit.  
4.5.4 Conclusion 
In summary, we have described two experiments that sought to compare the 
composite face effects seen in typical observers and those with DP. Having employed 
complementary procedures and independent samples we find convergent results: 
evidence of highly significant composite effects in typical controls and DP groups that 
were indistinguishable. Contrary to previous reports, these results suggest that the 
whole-face binding process indexed by the composite face effect is intact in DP, 
indicating that the locus of this condition lies elsewhere in the face processing stream.   
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4.6 Supplementary material 
4.6.1 Pseudo-word composite task 
In addition to the upright and inverted composite face conditions employed in 
Experiment 1, we also examined composite effects for pseudo-words, because they 
resemble the effects found for upright faces (Anstis, 2005). By employing an additional 
comparison with a non-face composite effect we hoped to determine whether any 
diminished composite effects result from a face-specific deficit or from a non-specific 
problem affecting global processing of configurations. We elected to use pseudo-words 
in light of recent suggestions that the visual processing of words and faces may recruit 
similar neurocognitive mechanisms (Behrmann & Plaut, 2013; Hills, Pancaroglu, 
Duchaine, & Barton, 2015; Ipser, Ring, Murphy, Gaigg, & Cook, 2016). 
 
 
 
Four-letter pseudo-words written in lower-case Juice ITC font were used to create 
the composites following the procedure described by Anstis (2005). Pseudo-word 
composites subtended 8° of visual angle, vertically. The to-be-judged regions 
subtended 4°. In the misaligned conditions, the horizontal offset corresponded to 
approximately 25% the width of pseudo-word. 40 pseudo-word composites were 
Figure 4.5. Trials presented pairs of composite arrangements simultaneously. Composites were 
visible until a response was registered. 
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employed. Each composite was allocated a partner arrangement of the same type with 
which it would be presented simultaneously. For half the composites pairs, the target 
regions were identical, for half the pairs the target regions differed. The distractor 
regions within each pair were always different. The two target regions appeared at the 
same vertical position in the display (the lower edge of each target region was aligned 
to the vertical midpoint of the display). Two dashed guidelines were imposed over the 
arrangements to clearly delineate the stimulus regions to be judged. Example displays 
are presented in Figure 4.5. Participants judged whether the regions shown within the 
guidelines were or were not identical. Composite displays were presented until a 
response was registered. Participants were asked to respond with both speed and 
accuracy. Arrangements were shown until a response was registered. Each pair was 
presented twice in each alignment condition with side (left or right) counterbalanced. 
Composite type (upright faces, inverted faces, pseudowords) was interleaved randomly 
within blocks of 80 trials.  
4.6.2 Pilot testing of composite tasks for upright faces, inverted faces, and pseudo-
words  
Before testing the simultaneous matching task on the sample of DPs and age-
matched controls, we piloted the task on a sample of 25 young neurotypical adults (Mage 
= 18.92 years, SDage = 1.42 years, 3 males). We describe the results here (see Table 4.5 
and Figure 4.6).  
 
 
Table 4.5. Descriptive statistics for the piloting conducted with young neurotypical controls. 
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.  
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4.6.2.1 Accuracy 
Analysis of the accuracy data (% correct) for the upright face composites revealed a 
main effect of Alignment [F(1,24) = 29.12, p = .000, η2 = .548]. Target regions were 
harder to discriminate in the aligned than in the misaligned condition. We also observed 
a main effect of Trial Type [F(1,24) = 28.62, p = .000, η2 = .544] and a significant Trial 
Type × Alignment interaction [F(1,24) = 45.93, p = .000, η2 = .657], whereby aligned 
distractors were particularly detrimental when targets were the same. 
No composite effect was observed for the inverted face arrangements. We did not 
see a main effect of Alignment [F(1,24) = .01, p = .922, η2 = .000], nor an Alignment 
× Trial Type interaction [F(1,24) = 2.36, p = .137, η2 = .09]. We observed a main effect 
of Trial Type [F(1,24) = 12.12, p = .002, η2 = .336], whereby participants made more 
errors when the target regions differed than when they were identical.  
Analyses suggested only a weak pseudo-word composite effect in the accuracy data 
of the young adults. While we found a main effect of Trial Type [F(1,24) = 9.15, p = 
.006, η2 = .276] and an Alignment × Trial Type interaction [F(1,24) = 5.74, p = .025, 
η2 = .193], the critical main effect of Alignment failed to reach significance [F(1,24) = 
1.25, p = .274, η2 = .05].  
4.6.2.2 Response times  
Analysis of response latencies (ms) revealed a main effect of Alignment for upright 
face composites [F(1,24) = 21.41, p = .000, η2 = .471]. Participants were slower to 
discriminate target regions when the distractors were aligned than when distractors 
were misaligned. We also found a main effect of Trial Type [F(1,24) = 31.08, p = .000, 
η2 = .564], which interacted significantly with Alignment [F(1,24) = 16.04, p = .001, 
η2 = .401]. When distractor and target regions were aligned, we observed a 
disproportionate interference effect on same trials. 
The response latency analysis revealed little evidence of a composite effect for 
inverted faces. While we observed a significant Alignment × Trial Type interaction 
[F(1,24) = 5.42, p = .029, η2 = .184], we found no main effects for either Alignment 
[F(1,24) = .83, p = .371, η2 = .034], nor Trial Type [F(1,24) = .14, p = .707, η2 = .006]. 
The response latency analysis revealed a strong composite effect for pseudo-words. 
We observed a significant main effect of Alignment [F(1,24) = 71.30, p = .000, η2 = 
.748], whereby participants took longer to discriminate target regions in the aligned 
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condition. We also observed a significant main effect of Trial Type [F(1,24) = 8.97, p 
= .006, η2 = .272] and a significant Alignment × Trial Type interaction [F(1,24) = 15.68, 
p = .001, η2 = .395]. Overall participants responded slower on same trials, but this effect 
was particularly pronounced in the aligned condition. 
 
 
4.6.3 Group comparison: pseudo-words 
Group analyses for the upright and inverted face composites are reported in the main 
text of the paper. Here we describe additional comparison of the pseudo-word 
composite effects exhibited by the two groups (see Table 4.6 and Figure 4.7).  
Figure 4.6. Mean accuracy and RTs exhibited by young NT controls during the piloting 
procedure. Error bars represent ± standard error of the mean. 
	
	
144	
 
4.6.3.1 Accuracy  
We observed a significant effect of Alignment [F(1,30) = 8.33, p = .007, η2 = .217], 
whereby participants made more errors in the aligned condition. The main effect of 
Trial Type was also significant [F(1,30) = 4.446, p = .043, η2 = .129], but the Alignment 
× Trial Type interaction did not reach significance [F(1,30) = 1.078, p = .308, η2 = 
.035]. The pseudo-word composite effects were comparable for the two groups: No 
main effect of Group was observed [F(1,30) = 2.651, p = .114, η2 = .081], and neither 
the main effect of Alignment [F(1,30) = .049, p = .826, η2 = .002], the main effect of 
Trial Type [F(1,30) = 1.220, p = .278, η2 = .039], nor Alignment × Trial Type 
interaction [F(1,30) = .302, p = .587, η2 = .010], varied as a function of Group.  
4.6.3.2 Response times 
Both groups showed evidence of pseudo-word composite effects in their response 
latency data. Main effects of Trial Type [F(1,30) = 51.765, p = .000, η2 = .633] and 
Alignment [F(1,30) = 95.193, p = .000, η2 = .760] were observed, as well as a 
significant Alignment × Trial Type interaction [F(1,30) = 15.495, p = .000, η2 = .341]. 
No main effect of Group was observed [F(1,30) = .560, p = .460, η2 = .018]. Neither 
the effects of Alignment [F(1,30) = .065, p = .801, η2 = .002], nor Trial Type [F(1,30) 
= .297, p = .590, η2 = .010], varied as a function of Group. However, a significant 
Alignment × Trial Type × Group interaction was observed [F(1,30) = 1.220, p = .001, 
η2 = .310]. Whereas the NTs showed disproportionate effects of Alignment on same 
trails, the DPs showed significant effects of Alignment on both same and different trials. 
 
 
Table 4.6. Mean accuracy and RTs exhibited by the NT and DP groups in the pseudo-word 
condition. 
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Figure 4.7. Mean accuracy and RTs exhibited by the DPs and aged-matched NT controls during 
the piloting procedure. Error bars represent ± standard error of the mean.  
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Chapter 5: Is developmental prosopagnosia best characterised as an apperceptive 
or mnemonic disorder? 
5.1 Abstract  
Traditionally, developmental prosopagnosia (DP) has been thought of as an 
apperceptive condition that hinders individuals’ ability to encode face structure. 
However, several authors have recently raised the possibility that some DPs, perhaps 
the majority, may be able to form accurate percepts, but are unable to maintain those 
percepts over time. The present study sought to distinguish these possibilities. In 
Experiment 1, 72 DPs and 54 typical controls completed the Cambridge Face 
Perception Test, a task that measures face perception ability in a way that minimises 
the memory demands. Not only were the DPs impaired at the group level, but closer 
analysis suggested that the entire DP distribution was shifted relative to the scores of 
controls. In Experiment 2, a subset of these participants (16 DPs; 22 controls) 
completed a delayed match-to-sample task with face and car stimuli, with a retention 
interval of 1-second (low demand) or 6-seconds (high demand). As expected, 
participants with DP were worse than typical observers at matching faces, and were 
disproportionately impaired at matching faces relative to cars. However, the relative 
degree of impairment seen in the DPs did not interact with retention interval; they 
exhibited similar levels of impairment when matching faces with 1- and 6-second 
delays. Some heterogeneity is likely in any neurodevelopmental population, and DP is 
no different. Generally, however, these findings suggest i) that in the majority of cases, 
DP is associated with some degree of apperceptive impairment, and ii) STFM 
impairment may be relatively uncommon in this population. 
5.2 Introduction 
Developmental prosopagnosia13 (DP) is a neurodevelopmental condition associated 
with difficulties recognising familiar faces and distinguishing unfamiliar faces, that 
occurs in people with normal intelligence and typical visual acuity, and in the absence 
of manifest brain injury (Behrmann & Avidan, 2005; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006b; 
																																								 																				
13	We use the term developmental prosopagnosia instead of congenital prosopagnosia to indicate the 
possibility that in some cases the disorder may appear during development and not necessarily from birth. 
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Susilo & Duchaine, 2013). Historically, the condition was thought to be rare 
(McConachie, 1976), but current estimates suggest that 2% of the general population 
may experience face recognition difficulties severe enough to disrupt their daily lives 
(Kennerknecht et al., 2006; Kennerknecht, Ho, & Wong, 2008). The fact that DP often 
runs in families suggests the condition has a genetic component (Duchaine, Germine, 
& Nakayama, 2007; Johnen et al., 2014; Schmalzl, Palermo, & Coltheart, 2008), a 
finding that accords with the broader view that face recognition ability is a heritable 
trait (Shakeshaft & Plomin, 2015; Wilmer et al., 2010; Zhu et al., 2010). At the neural 
level, studies suggest that DP is associated with reduced structural (Gomez et al., 2015; 
Song et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2009) and functional (Avidan & Behrmann, 2009; 
Lohse et al., 2016; Rosenthal et al., 2017) connectivity within the occipito-temporal 
face processing network. Due to their characteristic deficits, DPs often rely on non-
facial cues like voice, hairstyle, and walking gait to recognise familiar others (Cook & 
Biotti, 2016; Shah, Gaule, Sowden, Bird, & Cook, 2015). 
5.2.1 Apperceptive characterisation  
Traditionally DP has been thought of as an apperceptive form of prosopagnosia (De 
Renzi, Faglioni, Grossi, & Nichelli, 1991); a condition with a perceptual origin that 
hinders individuals’ ability to encode the structure of faces (Behrmann & Avidan, 2005; 
Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006b; Susilo & Duchaine, 2013). Consistent with this view, 
many DPs exhibit difficulties distinguishing unfamiliar faces presented simultaneously 
(Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Biotti & Cook, 2016; Biotti, Gray, & Cook, 2017; 
Duchaine et al., 2007; Shah, Gaule, Gaigg, Bird, & Cook, 2015; White, Rivolta, Burton, 
Al-Janabi, & Palermo, 2017) or sequentially, either side of sub-second interval 
(Duchaine, Yovel, Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2006; Fisher, Towler, & Eimer, 2017; 
Le Grand et al., 2006; Yovel & Duchaine, 2006). In addition to problems matching or 
recognising facial identities, many DPs appear to have problems recognising facial 
emotion (Biotti & Cook, 2016; Burns, Martin, Chan, & Xu, 2017; Duchaine et al., 
2006), facial age (Ariel & Sadeh, 1996), and facial gender (Ariel & Sadeh, 1996; Esins, 
Schultz, Stemper, Kennerknecht, & Bulthoff, 2016). Moreover, electrophysiological 
markers thought to index early face encoding (e.g. the N170 ERP component) are often 
atypical in cases of DP (Fisher, Towler, & Eimer, 2016; Towler, Fisher, & Eimer, 2017; 
Towler, Gosling, Duchaine, & Eimer, 2012; Towler, Parketny, & Eimer, 2016). This 
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profile of deficits is consistent with a locus of impairment early in the face processing 
stream, before the processing of identity and other facial attributes bifurcates (Bruce & 
Young, 1986; De Renzi et al., 1991; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). 
According to one influential apperceptive account, a failure to process faces 
holistically – whereby facial features are integrated into a non-decomposable whole 
(Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; McKone & Yovel, 2009b; Piepers & Robbins, 
2013) – may underlie the face recognition difficulties seen in DP (Avidan et al., 2011; 
DeGutis, Cohan, Mercado, Wilmer, & Nakayama, 2012; DeGutis, Cohan, & 
Nakayama, 2014; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et al., 2011). Consistent with this 
view, individuals with DP are thought to be less sensitive to facial orientation 
(Duchaine et al., 2006; Shah, Gaule, Gaigg et al., 2015; Tree & Wilkie, 2010), and 
sometimes have problems distinguishing faces using feature configurations (Le Grand 
et al., 2006; Yovel & Duchaine, 2006). It has also been argued that some DPs show 
reduced susceptibility to visual illusions thought to index holistic face processing, 
including the part-whole (DeGutis et al., 2012) and composite face effects (Avidan et 
al., 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et al., 2011). Where observed, aberrant 
processing of configurations may extend to non-face stimuli (Avidan et al., 2011). 
5.2.2 A deficit of perceptual encoding or perceptual maintenance? 
The case for an apperceptive characterisation of DP is not as strong as it first appears. 
Several findings suggest that some DPs may encode face structure typically; for 
example, some individuals with DP exhibit broadly typical discrimination of unfamiliar 
faces presented simultaneously (Bowles et al., 2009; Dalrymple, Garrido, & Duchaine, 
2014; McKone et al., 2011; Ulrich et al., 2017), and apparently normal recognition of 
facial emotion (Dobel, Bölte, Aicher, & Schweinberger, 2007; Humphreys, Avidan, & 
Behrmann, 2007; Lee, Duchaine, Wilson, & Nakayama, 2010; Palermo et al., 2011), 
facial age and facial gender (Chatterjee & Nakayama, 2013; DeGutis, Chatterjee, 
Mercado, & Nakayama, 2014). Many DPs also exhibit typical susceptibility to visual 
illusions thought to arise from the holistic encoding of facial structure, in particular the 
composite face effect (Biotti, Wu et al., 2017; Le Grand et al., 2006; Susilo et al., 2010; 
Ulrich et al., 2017). Notably, Biotti et al. (2017) recently described two group studies – 
using independent samples of 16 and 24 DPs – neither of which found evidence of 
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reduced composite effects. These behavioural results indicate that early structural 
encoding may be intact in many cases of DP.  
Rather than characterise DP as an apperceptive condition, several authors have 
raised the possibility that many cases of DP – perhaps even the majority – may be 
caused by impaired short-term face memory (STFM); that DPs may be able to form 
accurate percepts, but are unable to maintain those percepts over time (Dalrymple et 
al., 2014; Dalrymple & Palermo, 2016; Jackson, Counter, & Tree, 2017; Stollhoff, Jost, 
Elze, & Kennerknecht, 2011; Ulrich et al., 2017). A similar possibility has been 
suggested in the literature on autism spectrum disorder (ASD), where a systematic 
review concluded that a delay of a few seconds between the presentation of the target 
and test faces disproportionately impairs matching or recognition performance in this 
population (Weigelt, Koldewyn, & Kanwisher, 2012). While the suggestion that faces 
may benefit from domain-specific memory processing is relatively new, the implied 
dissociation between perceptual processes responsible for face encoding, and memory 
processes responsible for maintaining face representations, is consistent with evidence 
that face memory follows a different developmental trajectory relative to perceptual 
memory for other objects (Weigelt et al., 2013).  
Consistent with the possibility that DP may be caused by aberrant STFM, many 
cases of DP have been described (Bowles et al., 2009; Dalrymple et al., 2014; McKone 
et al., 2011; Ulrich et al., 2017) who exhibit impaired performance on diagnostic tests 
with a memory component such as the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT; 
Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006a), but perform within the typical range on tests with a 
minimal memory component such as the Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT; 
Duchaine et al., 2007). When DPs are required to retain faces in memory for brief 
periods, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) reveals wider activation in 
prefrontal regions implicated in working memory, relative to controls (Avidan, Hasson, 
Malach, & Behrmann, 2005), suggesting that percept retention may be effortful. 
Similarly, where observed, neural differences in DP are sometimes more pronounced 
in anterior (extended) regions of the face processing network, than in posterior (core) 
areas thought to be responsible for early structural encoding (Avidan et al., 2014). 
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5.2.3 Present study 
The present study sought to examine whether DP is best characterised as i) a disorder 
of STFM, where these individuals initially form accurate perceptual descriptions of 
faces, but struggle to maintain these representations over time; or ii) as an apperceptive 
condition, where face recognition difficulties arise from poor encoding of face 
structure.  In Experiment 1, we examined the performance of a large sample of DPs  
(N = 72) on the CFPT. In Experiment 2, we compared the face-matching ability of a 
subset of these DPs (N = 16) following 1- and 6-second retention intervals. Consistent 
with an apperceptive characterisation, we find that DPs not only perform poorly on the 
CFPT at the group-level, but show signs of a shifted distribution (Experiment 1) and 
show similar levels of matching impairment relative to controls at short and long 
retention intervals (Experiment 2). 
5.3 Can DPs discriminate simultaneously presented faces? 
Several studies have found that small samples of DPs make more errors on the CFPT 
than groups of matched TD controls (e.g., Shah, Gaule, Gaigg et al., 2015). As has been 
noted elsewhere, however, individual DPs sometimes fail to exhibit significant 
impairment at the single-case level – i.e., they score within 2 SDs of mean typical 
performance on this task (e.g., Bowles et al., 2009; Ulrich et al., 2017). Consequently, 
it is possible that group differences in CFPT performance, where observed, are driven 
by a handful of DPs with apperceptive impairments who produce outlying error scores.  
A second possibility is that apperceptive deficits are widespread in the DP 
population, but that the CFPT does not always reveal clear evidence of impairment. The 
distribution of CFPT scores produced by DPs and controls might be expected to overlap 
to some degree given that the CFPT is known to yield noisy estimates of perceptual 
ability (Bowles et al., 2009). The sequential sorting task employed by the CFPT may 
also render it more susceptible to compensatory strategies such as moving closer to the 
display or seeking trivial details that distinguish faces. By adopting these strategies, 
DPs with apperceptive problems may sometimes achieve CFPT scores within the 
normal range.  
It is difficult to distinguish these rival views by examining the scores from single 
cases of DP. However, these accounts make different predictions about the distributions 
of CFPT scores that should be seen in DP samples. According to the apperceptive subset 
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view, the distribution of CFPT scores produced by TDs and DPs should differ only in 
terms of the lower tail of their distributions; i.e. the DP distribution should be identical 
to that of controls, with the exception of some outlying individuals at the lower tail who 
make a disproportionate number of errors. According to the shifted distribution view, 
however, evidence of impairment should be seen in both the upper and lower tail of the 
DP distribution – not only should the worst DPs make more errors than the worst 
controls, but the best DPs should be unable to achieve scores comparable with the best 
controls. We sought to test these rival predictions by examining the distribution of 
CFPT scores produced by a large sample of DPs and controls. 
5.3.1 Methods 
5.3.1.1 Participants 
In total, 126 adults participated in Experiment 1, 72 with DP (30 males; Mage = 42.34 
years, SDage = 11.77 years) and 54 typically developed (TD) controls (23 males;  
Mage = 39.20 years, SDage = 13.36 years). Neither participant age [t(124) = 1.400, p = 
.164] nor proportion of males [X2(1) = .01, p = .920] differed significantly between the 
two groups. Ethical approval was granted by the local ethics committee. The study was 
conducted in line with the ethical guidelines provided by the 6th (2008) Declaration of 
Helsinki. All participants provided informed consent and were debriefed after the 
experimental procedure (i.e., the aims and rationale of the study were explained).  
5.3.1.2 Diagnostic testing 
DP participants were recruited through www.troublewithfaces.org and reported 
lifelong face recognition difficulties in the absence of brain injury or psychiatric 
disorder (e.g., ASD, schizophrenia). Diagnostic decisions were based primarily on 
participants’ scores on the Twenty-Item Prosopagnosia Index (PI20; Gray, Bird, & 
Cook, 2017; Shah, Gaule, Sowden et al., 2015) and the CFMT (Duchaine & Nakayama, 
2006a). As expected, the groups differed significantly in their PI20 [t(124) = 29.156, p 
< .001] and CFMT scores [t(124) = 19.357, p < .001]. Summary statistics for both 
groups are provided in Table 5.1 and detailed diagnostic information for each DP is 
provided as supplementary material. The development of standardised diagnostic 
criteria for DP still appears some way off (Barton & Corrow, 2016; Dalrymple & 
Palermo, 2016; Shah, Gaule, Sowden et al., 2015). However, the use of convergent self-
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report evidence and scores on objective, computer-based tasks may be a particularly 
effective approach to the identification and classification of DP; for example, less than 
1.5% of the general population score below 65% on the CFMT and more than 65 on 
the PI20 (see Gray et al., 2017).  
 
 
5.3.1.3 Stimuli and procedure 
The CFPT assesses face perception ability in such a way as to minimize the memory 
demand on participants. Trials present a target face and a series of six faces that 
resemble the target to varying degrees (Figure 5.1a). Participants have 60 seconds to 
sort the six faces in order of target-face similarity. Eight trials present the target and test 
faces upright, eight present the faces inverted. Trials are scored by calculating 
deviations from the correct order. Participants were given the option of completing the 
CFPT using a trackpad or mouse – whichever they found easier to use. All participants 
were tested individually at the troublewithfaces.org lab, under tightly controlled 
conditions, in return for a small honorarium. 
5.3.2 Results and discussion 
Participants’ scores on the CFPT were analysed using ANOVA with Orientation 
(upright, inverted) as a within-subjects factor, and Group (DP, TD) as a between-
subjects factor (Figure 5.1b). The analysis revealed main effects of Orientation 
[F(1,124) = 370.862, p < .001, ηp2 = .749] and Group [F(1,124) = 10.650, p < .001, ηp2 
= .079] with more errors seen when faces were inverted and less precise sorting 
exhibited by the DP group. However, it also yielded a significant Orientation × Group 
interaction [F(1,124) = 251.784, p < .001, ηp2 = .670]. The DPs (M = 50.64, SD = 15.35) 
made disproportionately more errors than the controls (M = 29.41, SD = 9.35) on the 
Table 5.1. Diagnostic information for the DP and TD samples employed in Experiment 1. 
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upright trials of the CFPT [t(124) = 9.601, p < .001]. However, the DPs (M = 69.86, SD 
= 13.11) also made more errors than controls (M = 63.37, SD = 15.74) on the inverted 
trials [t(124) = 2.522, p = .013].  
 
 
Figure 5.1. (a) Each trial of the Cambridge Face Perception Test presents simultaneously a 
target face and a series of six faces that resemble the target to varying degrees. Participants 
have 60 secs to sort the six items in order of target-face similarity. (b) Mean performance of the 
TD (N = 54) and DP (N = 72) groups in the upright and inverted conditions of the CFPT. (c) 
Each participant’s performance on the upright trials plotted against their inverted performance. 
(d) Analysis of the best, moderate, and worst performers from the sample indicated that the 
entire distribution of DP scores was shifted relative to the distribution of TD scores. 
*denotes p < .05; ** denotes p < .01; *** denotes p <.001. Error bars denote ±1SEM. 
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While the scores of the TD observers were more sensitive to the orientation 
manipulation (upright vs. inverted presentation), this may simply reflect the fact that 
the DPs are closer to floor performance in the upright condition (also see Klargaard, 
Starrfelt, & Gerlach, 2018). In addition to the group difference (DPs < TDs) seen for 
the inverted trials of the CFPT, we found evidence of correlation between observers’ 
scores on the upright and inverted trials (N = 126, r = .370, p <.001; Figure 5.1c). These 
findings accord with the view that the visual processing of upright and inverted faces 
may differ quantitatively (Gold, Mundy, & Tjan, 2012; Murphy & Cook, 2017; Sekuler, 
Gaspar, Gold, & Bennett, 2004; Susilo, Rezlescu, & Duchaine, 2013), not qualitatively 
(McKone & Yovel, 2009a; Rossion, 2008). 
Next, we ranked the TD (N = 54) and DP (N = 72) samples based on individuals’ 
performance on the upright trials of the CFPT and split each distribution into thirds: 
best performing TDs (N = 18, Mage = 37.83) and DPs (N = 24, Mage = 43.08), 
intermediate TDs (N = 18, Mage = 37.94) and DPs (N = 24, Mage = 41.38), and poorest 
performing TDs (N = 18, Mage = 41.83) and DPs (N = 24, Mage = 42.58). Strikingly, the 
TD controls outperformed the DPs at each level of their respective distributions: best 
performers [t(40) = 11.304, p < .001], intermediate performers [t(40) = 15.596, p < 
.001], poorest performers [t(40) = 13.051, p < .001] (Figure 5.1d). This pattern argues 
against the view that group differences on the CFPT reflect the presence of a few 
individual DPs with an apperceptive deficit. Instead, these results favour the view that 
the entire distribution of CFPT scores produced by the DPs is shifted relative to that of 
TD controls.  
To illustrate how apperceptive impairment in DP might produce a shifted 
distribution of CFPT scores similar to that observed, we have shown the effects of 
inflating each typical observer’s CFPT error score by 90% (Figure 5.2). This inflation 
coefficient is akin to the application of a hypothetical apperceptive deficit that increases 
the number of sorting errors made. As can be seen, this simple model provides a 
reasonable approximation of the distribution of scores seen in the DP sample. To be 
clear, we are not claiming that DP always impairs perceptual encoding of faces by 90%; 
rather, we present this demonstration as a proof-of-principle. We merely seek to 
illustrate that an apperceptive deficit might plausibly produce the distribution of CFPT 
scores seen in our DP sample.   
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In light of its poor psychometric properties, researchers are discouraged from using 
the CFPT for diagnostic purposes (Bowles et al., 2009). In the present study, decisions 
to classify people as DP were therefore based principally on individuals’ PI20 and 
CFMT scores. We note, however, that observers’ CFPT scores correlated closely both 
with their CFMT (N = 126, r = -.665, p <.001) and PI20 scores (N = 126, r = .662, p 
<.001). Contrary to the prevailing view that the CFMT is a test of ‘face memory’, this 
finding suggests that the individual differences revealed by the PI20 and CFMT may in 
large part reflect individuals’ ability to encode face structure.  
5.4 Do face matching deficits seen in DP increase as a function of retention 
interval? 
It has been proposed that many DPs – possibly the majority – experience deficits of 
STFM but exhibit intact encoding of face structure (Dalrymple et al., 2014; Dalrymple 
& Palermo, 2016; Jackson, Counter, & Tree, 2017; Stollhoff, Jost, Elze, & 
Kennerknecht, 2011; Ulrich et al., 2017). Experiments that directly test whether the 
face matching and face recognition deficits seen in DP are sensitive to memory load are 
therefore particularly important. For this reason, we sought to revisit a finding described 
by Shah, Gaule, Gaigg, Bird, and Cook (2015). This previous study utilised a delayed 
match-to-sample task whereby participants were required to identify a target stimulus 
from a test display of four items (target plus three lures). Memory demands were 
Figure 5.2. To illustrate the shifted distribution account, we modelled the effects of inflating 
each typical observer’s error score by 90%, akin to the application of a hypothetic 
apperceptive deficit. This simple model provides a reasonable approximation of the range 
of scores seen in the DP population.  
	
	
163	
manipulated by varying the delay between the presentation of the target and the test 
array. This approach is useful as it allows systematic manipulation of the memory 
component of the task, but ensures the perceptual demands – associated with the 
encoding of target and test items – are held constant (Shah, Gaule, Gaigg et al., 2015). 
If DP is associated with impaired STFM, disproportionate impairment should be seen 
after longer retention intervals, relative to shorter retention intervals. Contrary to this 
prediction, however, Shah and colleagues found that their DP sample (N = 15) exhibited 
comparable deficits at short (2-second) and long (8-second) intervals.  
In the original study described by Shah et al. (2015) the same images were used to 
present items in the study and test phases. Consequently, targets were always seen from 
the same frontal viewpoint. In the present study, we examined observers’ ability to 
match items viewed from the same frontal perspective (constant-viewpoint matching), 
and across a viewpoint disparity of 45° (different-viewpoint matching). While constant- 
and different-viewpoint matching appear similar, they may differ substantially in their 
perceptual and mnemonic demands. First, observers sometimes match unfamiliar faces 
using superficial pictorial cues (Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000; Megreya & Burton, 
2006). Because  rotation introduces substantial disparity between target and test images, 
different-viewpoint matching is less susceptible to this strategy than constant-viewpoint 
matching (Longmore, Liu, & Young, 2008). Instead, different-viewpoint matching is 
thought to tax observers’ ability to form and maintain a view-invariant structural 
description (Bruce & Young, 1986; Marr & Nishihara, 1978). Second, a particular type 
of short-term memory – visual working memory (Baddeley, 1992, 1993, 2010) – has 
been hypothesised that supports the rotation and manipulation of percepts. While 
constant- and different-viewpoint face matching both tap some short-term memory 
processes, different-viewpoint matching places greater demands on visual working 
memory. In light of their different mnemonic demands, these two tasks may behave 
differently as a function of retention interval, and be differentially affected in DP. 
On half the trials, we used a retention interval of 1-second (low demand); on half the 
trials, we used a retention interval of 6-seconds (high demand). The short interval used 
in this study (1-second) is shorter than that employed previously (2-seconds; Shah, 
Gaule, Gaigg et al., 2015), thereby reducing further the memory demands in the low 
demand condition. We recognize, however, that the retention of percepts for 1 second 
still represents a memory demand. Crucially, our aim in the short interval condition was 
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to minimise, not to eliminate, the memory demands of the matching task14. Participants’ 
face matching ability was compared to that seen with cars to determine if deficits, where 
observed, were face-specific, or whether they extended to a non-face object category.    
5.4.1 Methods 
5.4.1.1 Participants 
A subset of the DPs (N = 16, 6 males; Mage = 41.50 years, SDage = 12.58 years) and 
TDs (N = 22, 9 males; Mage = 38.23 years, SDage = 13.39 years) from Experiment 1 
completed Experiment 2 (Table 5.2). None of the DPs were included in the sample 
described by Shah et al. (2015). Neither participant age [t(36) = .763, p = .451] nor 
proportion of males [X2(1) = .045, p = .551] differed significantly between the two 
groups. Ethical approval was granted by the local ethics committee. The study was 
conducted in line with the ethical guidelines provided by the 6th (2008) Declaration of 
Helsinki. All participants provided informed consent and were fully debriefed after the 
experimental procedure.  
As expected, the TD controls (MCFMT = 85.1%, SDCFMT = 10.2%; MPI20 = 39.0, SDPI20 
= 9.0) differed significantly from the DPs (MCFMT = 55.9%, SDCFMT = 7.9%; MPI20 = 
79.9, SDPI20 = 8.1) in their PI20 [t(36) = 14.390, p < .001] and CFMT [t(36) = 9.574, p 
< .001] scores. In addition to the CFMT, CFPT and the PI20, all participants in 
Experiment 2 (DPs and controls) also completed the Cambridge Car Memory Test 
(CCMT; Dennett et al., 2011) to measure their non-face object recognition ability. The 
TD controls (M = 73.9%, SD = 12.8%) and the DPs (M = 63.5%, SD = 8.4%) differed 
significantly in terms of their performance on the CCMT [t(35) = 2.837, p = .008]. All 
participants were also screened for colour blindness using Ishihara’s Tests for Colour-
Blindness (Ishihara, 1993). 
																																								 																				
14	The key strength of this paradigm is that it allows the manipulation of memory demands in a way that 
leaves the perceptual demands of the task unaltered. Having a no interval condition (i.e., where the target 
is presented alongside the array of 4 test items) would have violated this logic. Although presenting the 
5 faces simultaneously would further reduce the memory demands, this reduction would be confounded 
with an increase in perceptual and attentional demands. 
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5.4.1.2 Stimuli and procedure 
Each category (faces, cars) comprised 50 exemplars. Both categories were further 
organised into 5 subsets of 10 exemplars based on approximate similarity. Cars were 
sorted into subsets based on their size and class (e.g. Saloons / Sedans / SUVs). Faces 
were sorted based on aspect-ratio, pigmentation, and eye-brow colour. Each exemplar 
was depicted twice: once in frontal view, once in 3/4 view. When viewed at 57 cm, the 
Table 5.2. Scores of each developmental prosopagnosic on the 20 Item Prosopagnosia Index 
(PI20), the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT), The Cambridge Face Perception Test 
(CFPT). The z-scores provided for the CFPT are based on performance in the upright condition. 
Note. The prosopagnosics’ scores on the diagnostic procedures were compared with the group 
of 54 controls described in Experiment 1 (23 males). All but one of the DPs scored at least two 
standard deviations below the comparison average on the PI20 and the CFMT. The case for 
including this individual (M2) in our DP sample was bolstered by his poor score (< 3 SDs below 
the mean) on a UK variant of the Famous Face Recognition Task.  
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faces subtended 6° of visual angle vertically; the cars subtended 3.5° vertically. Face 
stimuli (male Caucasian faces) were created using FaceGen Modeller Version 3.3 
(Singular Inversions Inc.). Car stimuli were generated through www.3dtuning.com.  
The structure of the delayed matching task is shown in Figure 5.3. Each trial started 
with a fixation point (750 ms) on a blank screen. A single target stimulus was then 
presented centrally for 400 ms. Targets were always shown in frontal view. A given 
facial identity or car model could appear as a target only once in each viewing condition.  
 
In all other respects, the choice of target was randomly determined by the experimental 
program. The offset of the target was followed by a retention interval during which a 
mask image was presented. The mask was constructed by recombining regions cropped 
from other target images from the same category. An array of four test items followed 
the retention interval. The array comprised the target and three lures selected at random 
from the same within-category subset. On half of the trials, test stimuli were presented 
in frontal view (here, the target and test stimuli were shown from the same viewpoint). 
On the remaining trials, test stimuli were presented in 3/4 view (here, the target and test 
Figure 5.3. Illustration of the stimuli and procedure employed in our delayed matching task. 
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stimuli were shown from different viewpoints). Test arrays were visible until a keypress 
response was registered. Participants were asked to respond with speed and accuracy.  
The factorial combination of stimulus type (faces, cars), retention interval (short, 
long), viewpoint (frontal, 3/4) yielded eight types of trial, which were randomly 
interleaved. There were 20 trials of each type, yielding 160 trials in total. Given the 
large number of face and car stimuli required by the procedure it was necessary to 
recycle stimuli from each pool of 50 items. Some stimulus items therefore appeared 
multiple times across the procedure, either as targets or lures. Six practice trials 
preceded the experiment. No feedback was provided during the procedure. The task 
lasted approximately 45 minutes and included three short breaks. The task was 
programmed in MATLAB using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 
1997). 
5.4.2 Results and discussion 
5.4.2.1 Group analyses 
Matching accuracy (Figure 5.4a) was analysed using ANOVA with Stimulus Type 
(faces, cars), Retention Interval (short, long), and Viewpoint (frontal, 3/4) as within-
subjects factors, and Group (DP, TD) as a between-subjects factor. The analysis 
revealed significant main effects of Viewpoint [F(1,36) = 52.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .59] 
and Retention Interval [F(1,36) = 48.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .57], whereby a change of 
viewpoint and a longer retention interval were associated with poorer matching 
accuracy, respectively. However, there was no main effect of Stimulus Type [F(1,36) 
= 3.16, p = .084, ηp2 = .081], nor did we see a Retention Interval × Viewpoint interaction 
[F(1,36) = .001, p = .982, ηp2 = .000]. As expected, we observed a significant effect of 
Group [F(1,36) = 10.35, p = .003, ηp2 = .22], as well as a significant Group × Stimulus 
Type interaction [F(1,36) = 6.11, p = .018, ηp2 = .145], indicating that the DPs were 
worse overall, but disproportionately impaired at face matching. Crucially, however, 
no further interactions with Group were seen on the face (all Fs < .45, ps > .50) or car 
trials (all Fs < .60, ps > .45). When matching accuracy for cars and faces was analysed 
in separate ANOVAs, we observed a significant effect of Group for face trials [F(1,36) 
= 15.072, p < .001, ηp2 = .295], but not for car trials [F(1,36) = 1.869, p = .180, ηp2 = 
.049]. 
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To evaluate the effects of the two within-subjects manipulations we computed 
measures expressing each observer’s viewpoint effect (same-viewpoint matching 
accuracy – different-viewpoint matching accuracy) and their retention interval effect 
(short-interval matching accuracy – long-interval matching accuracy). The retention 
interval effects of the TDs (M = 9.7%, SD = 12.1%) and the DPs (M = 12.0%, SD = 
8.7%) did not differ [t(36) = .689, p = .495] and all DPs exhibited retention interval 
effects within 2 SDs of the typical mean. Similarly, the viewpoint effects of the TDs 
(M = 6.5%, SD = 8.5%) and DPs (M = 5.5%, SD = 11.1%) did not differ [t(36) = .319, 
p = .752] and all DPs exhibited viewpoint effects within 2 SDs of the typical mean.  
Figure 5.4. Mean (a) accuracy and (b) response times for the two groups on the delayed-
matching task. Performance is broken down by Viewpoint (frontal, 3/4) and Retention Interval 
(short, long). Simple contrasts were non-significant unless otherwise indicated. *denotes  
p < .05; ** denotes p < .01; *** denotes p <.001. Error bars denote ±1SEM. 
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We also analysed participants’ response times (Figure 5.4b) using ANOVA with 
Stimulus Type (faces, cars), Retention Interval (short, long), and Viewpoint (frontal, 
3/4) as within-subjects factors, and Group (DP, TD) as a between-subjects factor. The 
analysis revealed main effects of Stimulus Type [F(1,36) = 5.33, p = .027, ηp2 = .129], 
Viewpoint [F(1,36) = 52.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .593], and Retention Interval [F(1,36) = 
98.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .733]. Overall, participants responded faster on face trials than on 
car trials, were faster when identifying frontal views of targets than 3/4 views, and were 
faster following short retention intervals than long retention intervals. The analysis 
revealed no main effect of Group [F(1,36) = 2.65, p = .112, ηp2 = .069], nor a Group × 
Stimulus Type interaction [F (1,36) = .01, p = .931, ηp2 = .000]. No further interactions 
with Group were seen on the face (all Fs < .75, ps > .39) or car trials (all Fs < .90, ps > 
.35). When analysed in separate ANOVAs, the response times of the DPs and the TD 
controls did not differ significantly on either face [F(1,36) = 2.012, p = .165, ηp2 = .053] 
or car trials [F(1,36) = 2.845, p = .100, ηp2 = .073].  
In both the accuracy and response time analyses, Group failed to interact 
significantly with either Retention Interval or Viewpoint. In order to evaluate the 
strength of evidence provided by these null results, we subjected these interaction 
effects to Bayesian analysis in JASP (JASP-Team, 2018) with default prior width. 
Analysis of the Group × Retention Interval interaction seen in the accuracy data 
indicated that the observed data were 2.64 times more likely to occur under the null 
model, than under an alternative. The observed Group × Viewpoint interaction was 3.02 
times more likely to occur under the null model, than under an alternative. Analysis of 
the Group × Retention Interval interaction seen in the response time data indicated that 
the observed data were 3.05 times more likely to occur under the null model, than under 
an alternative. The observed Group × Viewpoint interaction was 2.90 times more likely 
to occur under the null model, than under an alternative.  
5.4.2.2 Correlational analyses 
The group analyses described above reveal comparable deficits at short and long 
retention intervals, replicating the findings of Shah and colleagues (2015). The 
insensitivity of the DP deficit to retention interval suggests that poor perceptual 
encoding – not aberrant STFM – may be responsible for the face recognition problems 
seen in this population. If this view is correct, performance in our matching task should 
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correlate with participants’ scores on the CFPT – a measure of face encoding ability 
(Experiment 1). Consistent with this prediction, overall matching accuracy (i.e., 
collapsing across viewpoint and interval conditions) correlated closely with 
performance on the CFPT (r = -.743, p < .001; Figure 5.5a). Highly significant 
correlations were seen between CFPT scores and face matching accuracy in all 
conditions (Table 5.3). In the combined sample, CFPT scores were also correlated with 
overall car matching accuracy (r = -.326, p = .046), however this correlation was 
significantly weaker than that seen between the CFPT and face matching [z = 2.59, p < 
.001]. As expected, observers’ matching ability at short intervals correlated closely with 
their performance at longer intervals for both faces (r = .810, p < .001) and cars (r = 
.689, p < .001; Figure 5.5b).  
 
 
The group analyses also indicate that, relative to controls, DPs showed similar levels 
of impairment in both the constant-viewpoint and different-viewpoint matching 
conditions. This finding suggests that observers may be using the same perceptual 
strategy to achieve both types of matching. Consistent with this possibility, we found 
that observers’ (N = 38) different-viewpoint face matching ability correlated closely 
with their constant-viewpoint face matching ability (r = .846, p <.001). A similar 
relationship was seen for cars (r = .743, p < .001), as shown in Figure 5.5c. Some 
correlation was also seen between same-viewpoint face matching and same-viewpoint 
car matching (r = .376, p = .02), and between different-viewpoint face matching and 
different-viewpoint car matching (r = .387, p = .016). However, both between-class 
correlations were significantly lower than the within-class correlations seen for faces (z 
= 3.54, p <.001; z = 3.49, p < .001) and cars (z = 2.35, p = .019; z = 2.30, p = .021). 
Having collapsed across viewing angle and retention interval, a moderate correlation 
Table 5.3. Correlations seen between participants’ scores on the CFPTupright and their accuracy 
and response time (RT) performance in each of the matching conditions. Associated p values 
are reported in brackets. 
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was seen between observers’ face and car matching in the combined sample (r = .437, 
p = .006).   
Figure 5.5. (a) The relationship between observers’ CFPT scores and their face (left) and car 
(right) matching ability. (b) Scatterplots depicting the relationship between constant- and 
different-viewpoint matching for faces (left) and cars (right). (c) Scatterplots depicting the 
relationship between long- and short-interval matching accuracy for faces (left) and cars (right).  
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The correlations seen between observers’ short- and long-interval matching 
accuracy (faces: r = .810; cars: r = .689), and between their constant- and different-
viewpoint matching accuracy (faces: r = .846; cars: r = .743) indicate that the task has 
good reliability. Reassuringly, matching accuracy for faces and cars also correlated with 
our other measures of face and car processing (Table 5.4). In particular, strong 
correlations were observed in the combined sample between participants’ face 
matching accuracy and their scores on the CFMT (r = .67, p < .001), but not the CCMT 
(r = .25, p = .14). Conversely, car matching accuracy correlated with scores on the 
CCMT (r = .55, p < .001), but not the CFMT (r = .29, p = .082).  
 
 
5.5 General discussion 
The present study sought to examine whether DP is best characterised as i) a disorder 
of STFM, where these individuals initially form accurate perceptual descriptions of 
faces, but struggle to maintain these representations over time; or ii) as an apperceptive 
condition, where face recognition difficulties arise from poor encoding of face 
structure. First, we had 72 DPs and 54 TD controls complete the CFPT, a task that 
measures face perception in a way that minimises participants’ memory load and is 
therefore thought to index structural encoding ability. We found that the DPs were 
clearly impaired at the group level, and showed evidence of a shifted distribution. Next, 
a subset of these participants (16 DPs and 22 TD controls) completed a delayed match-
Table 5.4. Correlations between participants’ scores on the Cambridge Face Memory Test 
(CFMT), the upright condition of the Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT), the 20-item 
Prosopagnosia Index (PI20), the Cambridge Car Memory test (CCMT), and face and car 
matching performance. Associated p-values are shown in parentheses. Accuracy and response 
time (RT) measures have been collapsed across viewing conditions. 
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to-sample task for faces and cars, with a retention interval of 1-second (low demand) 
or 6-seconds (high demand). As expected, participants with DP were worse than TD 
controls at face matching. Interestingly, however, the relative degree of impairment 
exhibited by the DPs did not interact with retention interval. Observers’ scores on the 
CFMT (Experiment 1) and the delayed matching task (Experiment 2) – both ostensibly 
measures of ‘face memory’ – were found to correlate strongly with their performance 
scores on the CFPT.  
5.5.1 Evidence for an apperceptive characterisation 
Some heterogeneity is likely in any neurodevelopmental population, and DP is no 
different. Generally, however, our results support an apperceptive characterisation of 
this condition. In our first experiment, we found that a large sample of DPs exhibited 
clear impairment on the CFPT when analysed at the group level. Despite the limitations 
of the CFPT – in particular, its psychometric properties make it poorly suited for 
quantifying individual differences (Bowles et al., 2009) – we found evidence that the 
distribution of CFPT scores seen in the DP sample was shifted relative to that of typical 
controls. Given that the CFPT is thought to measure individuals’ ability to encode 
accurately the structure of faces, these results suggest i) that in the majority of cases, 
DP is associated with some degree of apperceptive impairment; and ii) that cases of DP 
arising solely from STFM impairment may be relatively uncommon in this population.  
This conclusion is further suggested by the results of our second experiment where 
we found that the face matching deficits seen in DP were insensitive to retention 
interval; i.e., that very similar levels of impairment were seen at the short and long 
intervals. To date, only one other study has used a delayed match-to-sample task to 
explore the perceptual and mnemonic contributions to DP (Shah, Gaule, Gaigg et al., 
2015). In this study, the authors found that 15 DPs exhibited comparable face matching 
deficits at short (2 seconds) and longer (8 seconds) intervals. We replicated this result 
in a sample of 16 different DPs. In addition, the present results show that DPs still 
exhibit similar impairments at short and long retention intervals when a 45° viewpoint 
disparity exists between target and test items. Importantly, the results of Experiment 2 
exclude the possibility that DPs have a particular problem retaining percepts in a way 
that supports rotation and manipulation (working memory; Baddeley, 1992, 1993, 
2010).  
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The view that the face matching deficits seen in DP are relatively insensitive to 
memory load is also suggested by a finding recently described by Jackson, Counter, 
and Tree (2017; Experiment 1). Rather than vary retention interval, the authors 
manipulated memory load by increasing the number of target faces observers had to 
memorise (one, two, three, or four). Participants were asked whether a single test image 
presented a second later was one of the targets. As expected, the authors found that 
matching accuracy decreased as a function of the number of target faces held in memory 
(a main effect of Memory Load), and that relative to controls, DPs performed poorly in 
all conditions (a main effect of Group). Crucially, however, the relative impairment of 
the DPs did not increase with memory load15. The insensitivity of the DPs’ deficits to 
the memory load manipulation mirrors the findings of the present study. Once again, 
this result suggests that the matching deficits observed have a perceptual origin; for 
example, the DPs in the experiment described by Jackson and colleagues (2017) may 
have had problems forming a perceptual description of the test face, and thus exhibited 
poor matching at all levels of the memory load manipulation.  
5.5.2 Reconsidering the case against apperceptive accounts 
Many DP samples – including ours – include individual DPs who show marked 
impairment on the CFMT but who exhibit only marginal impairment on the CFPT. The 
fact that the CFMT (a task with both perceptual and memory components) is more 
likely to reveal clear deficits at the single-case level than the CFPT (a task that assesses 
face perception with minimal memory demands) has led many to speculate that DP may 
often be caused by aberrant STFM, and not impaired perceptual encoding (Bowles et 
al., 2009; Dalrymple et al., 2014; McKone et al., 2011; Ulrich et al., 2017). Where 
observed, however, we recommend authors to treat this apparent dissociation with 
caution. First, the CFPT is simply a less reliable measure than the CFMT (Bowles et 
al., 2009). The fact that the CFPT has relatively few trials, and the way sorting 
performance is scored, may make it less likely to reveal single-case differences than the 
																																								 																				
15	In the second experiment described by Jackson et al (2017), trials presented four faces sequentially for 
500 ms each, followed by a maintenance interval of one second. Participants were asked whether a single 
test image presented a second later was one of the targets. In their analysis, the authors examined how 
observers’ discrimination varied as a function of the position of the target in the sequence (first, second, 
third, fourth). Although the DPs performed relatively poorly in all categories, their serial-position 
functions closely resembled those of the controls; for example, both the DPs and controls were more 
accurate when matching recently presented targets.  
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CFMT. Second, the CFPT and CFMT differ not only in terms of their respective 
memory components, but also in terms of their fundamental perceptual demands. It is 
unclear whether the basic structure of the sorting task employed in the CFPT renders it 
more susceptible to compensatory strategies (e.g., moving closer to the display, looking 
for trivial details that distinguish faces). Third, having analysed a large sample of DPs 
and controls we found evidence that observers’ CFPT scores correlate closely with their 
CFMT scores (r = .665). This finding suggests that, despite its name, CFMT 
performance may be heavily influenced by individuals’ perceptual encoding ability.  
Individuals with an apperceptive face processing deficit would be expected to 
exhibit aberrant perception and recognition of facial expression (Biotti & Cook, 2016, 
2017; De Renzi et al., 1991; Duchaine, Parker, & Nakayama, 2003). Studies describing 
(seemingly) typical recognition of facial emotion in DP (e.g., Humphreys et al., 2007; 
Ulrich et al., 2017) therefore appear to challenge the view that the majority of 
individuals with DP exhibit some degree of apperceptive impairment. We note, 
however, that sensitive psychophysical tasks – and appropriate analyses – may be 
required to detect expression recognition difficulties arising from impoverished 
structural description. Having employed expression morphing and the estimation of 
psychometric functions, Biotti and Cook (2016) found that subtle expression 
recognition deficits were relatively common in a sample of 17 DPs (see also Burns et 
al., 2017). In contrast, tasks that simply require participants to label prototypical 
expressions (‘basic emotions’) may be prone to ceiling effects and lack the sensitivity 
necessary to detect subtle deficits (for related discussion, see Ipser & Cook, 2015).    
Recent evidence suggests that most individuals with DP show typical susceptibility 
to the composite face effect (Biotti, Wu et al., 2017; Esins et al., 2016; Le Grand et al., 
2006; Susilo et al., 2010; Ulrich et al., 2017), a visual illusion thought to index holistic 
face processing (Murphy, Gray, & Cook, 2017; Rossion, 2013). While these results 
suggest that holistic face processing may be intact in DP, they by no means exclude all 
apperceptive accounts of the condition. For example, DPs may have an apperceptive 
problem that affects local feature descriptions. Consistent with this possibility, many 
DPs struggle to make judgements about local regions shown in isolation (Biotti & 
Cook, 2016; Duchaine et al., 2006; Liu & Behrmann, 2014). We also note recent 
evidence from aperture viewing paradigms suggesting that the ability to process local 
regions may be a key determinant of face recognition performance (Murphy & Cook, 
2017).  
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5.5.3 Insensitivity of face matching deficits to viewpoint disparity 
Different-viewpoint matching is thought to be a better test of face perception ability 
than constant-viewpoint matching (e.g., Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006a). To match 
unfamiliar faces across different viewpoints, observers must infer the 3D structure of a 
target face from an ambiguous 2D image depicting a single view. This represents a 
substantial computational challenge (Todd, 2004). In the absence of an image-change, 
constant-viewpoint matching can in principle be accomplished using superficial 
pictorial cues (Hancock et al., 2000; Megreya & Burton, 2006). One might therefore 
expect DPs to show greater impairment, relative to controls, when matching across 
different viewpoints. The fact that our DPs exhibited similar deficits when matching 
faces shown from the same viewing angle, and faces shown from different viewing 
angles (Experiment 2), is therefore striking. Rather than dissociation between constant-
viewpoint and different-viewpoint face-matching, our results suggest association: our 
participants appear to have used a similar process in both conditions. This is further 
suggested by the fact that participants’ constant-viewpoint matching ability was closely 
related to their different-viewpoint matching ability.  
One possibility is that observers accomplished both types of face matching through 
superficial pictorial cues, and that DPs experience difficulties using this strategy. This 
seems unlikely for two reasons. First, image matching is by definition a domain-general 
process (Hancock et al., 2000; Megreya & Burton, 2006). Crucially, however, our DPs 
were unimpaired at car matching in our second experiment. Similarly, the DPs tested 
by Shah et al. (2015) showed typical matching of chairs, butterflies, and hands. These 
convergent findings argue against a simple picture matching deficit. Second, face 
matching accuracy – but not car matching accuracy – correlated with the face-
recognition problems encountered by observers outside the lab, as measured by the PI20 
(e.g., mistaking familiar people for strangers, failing to recognise people in the absence 
of vocal cues, problems recognising people wearing hats or different hairstyles). These 
difficulties seem unlikely to reflect aberrant processing of trivial pictorial cues. Instead, 
this correlation underscores the fact that the processes measured by our matching task 
have meaningful consequences for the day-to-day social interactions of our 
participants.  
Instead, we favour the view that observers use ‘face-centred’ (Bruce & Young, 1986; 
Marr & Nishihara, 1978) structural descriptions to achieve both constant-viewpoint and 
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different-viewpoint face matching16. We speculate that i) these structural descriptions 
augmented the matching performance of typical observers in both the constant-
viewpoint and different-viewpoint matching conditions; and ii) the DPs were 
outperformed in all viewing conditions because they were hampered by imprecise 
structural descriptions. There is little doubt that seeing to-be-learned individuals in 
different poses, with different expressions, from different viewing angles (so-called 
exemplar variation) aids face learning (e.g., Ipser, Ring, Murphy, Gaigg, & Cook, 2016; 
Murphy, Ipser, Gaigg, & Cook, 2015). The suggestion that observers form face-centred 
descriptions of unfamiliar faces from a single 2D image may therefore seem counter-
intuitive. Consider, however, that computer programs have been described that do 
precisely this: i.e., extrapolate a morphable, posable 3D model of a human face from a 
single image of a novel face, using the covariation present in a set of training images 
(e.g., FaceGen Modeller). Once derived, these morphable posable models can be used 
to estimate how the target face will appear from different viewing angles (e.g., Jones, 
Dwyer, & Lewis, 2017). In a similar way, the human visual system may use the 
statistical regularities present in the faces it has encountered in the past to estimate the 
likely 3D structure of novel faces.  
5.5.4 Is DP associated with a face-specific or domain-general deficit? 
It remains unclear whether the deficit seen in DP is face-specific or indicative of a 
domain-general impairment (Gerlach, Klargaard, & Starrfelt, 2016; Geskin & 
Behrmann, 2017). On the one hand, we observed a significant group difference on the 
CCMT and evidence of a modest correlation (r = .437) between face and car matching 
accuracy. In our first experiment, we also found that the DP group made more errors 
than the typical controls when sorting inverted faces, regarded by some as a measure of 
domain-general perceptual ability (e.g., Rossion, 2008, 2013). On the other hand, our 
DPs were unimpaired in the car matching condition of Experiment 2, and other authors, 
																																								 																				
16	We use the term face-centred rather than view-invariant to reflect the fact that these representations 
do not exhibit perfect view invariance. We note, however, that observers’ matching performance – in the 
present study and elsewhere – typically far exceeds chance even when pairs of unfamiliar faces are 
presented with large viewpoint disparities. Given the highly complex 3D shape of the human face, and 
the fact 3D structure must be recovered from a highly ambiguous 2D image, this is a remarkable 
achievement of the human visual system.    
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for example, Shah et al. (2015; N = 15 DPs) and Esins et al. (2016; N = 16 DPs), have 
found that DPs’ performance on the CCMT is comparable with matched controls.  
Evidence of idiosyncratic, inconsistent object recognition deficits in DP accords well 
with the independent disorders hypothesis - the view that forms of developmental 
agnosia affecting faces and objects are best thought of as independent 
neurodevelopmental conditions (Gray & Cook, 2018). This account predicts the 
existence of ‘pure’ cases of DP and developmental object agnosia (DOA), individuals 
who experience impaired face recognition but typical object recognition (Duchaine et 
al., 2006), and vice versa (Germine, Cashdollar, Düzel, & Duchaine, 2011). However, 
the independent disorders hypothesis also predicts that the incidence of DOA will be 
higher in DP than in the wider population due to common genetic or environmental risk 
factors. For example, susceptibility to aberrant structural development of occipito-
temporal cortex (e.g., reduced density and coherence of white matter tracts or atypical 
neural migration) may be a common risk factor for DP and DOA (see also Susilo & 
Duchaine, 2013). 
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Chapter 6: Overview and discussion 
The present Chapter will provide a summary of the findings presented in the empirical 
Chapters (i.e. 2-5) and their significance within the wider context of the cognitive 
mechanisms that may play a role in the nature and aetiology of DP. For each study the 
limitations and pending issues will be examined, highlighting those questions that have 
not been answered and constitute the basis for future research. In Section 6.1 I will 
examine the experiments described in Chapter 2, which investigated facial emotion 
recognition in individuals with DP using sensitive psychophysical tests. In Section 6.2 
I will review the experiment described in Chapter 3, which investigated body 
recognition in DP. In Section 6.3 I will examine the study described in Chapter 4, which 
tested the susceptibility of individuals with DP to the composite face illusion. In Section 
6.4 I will review the experiments reported in Chapter 5, which measured the 
contribution of perceptual encoding and short term face memory in DP’s recognition 
impairments. Finally, in Section 6.5 a general conclusion will summarise the key 
findings of this thesis and suggest future directions for the study of DP. 
6.1 Impaired perception of facial emotion in Developmental Prosopagnosia 
(Chapter 2) 
6.1.1 Summary and interpretation 
This study sought to systematically examine expression recognition in DP, testing a 
sizable sample of individuals with DP on sensitive psychophysical tasks. Previous 
literature had reported mixed results: some authors failed to find emotion recognition 
deficits in DP (e.g., Palermo et al., 2011; Humphreys et al., 2007; Dobel, Bölte, Aicher, 
& Schweinberger, 2007), whereas others reported widespread difficulties (e.g., Burns, 
Martin, Chan, & Xu, 2017; Duchaine et al., 2006; Ariel & Sadeh, 1996; de Haan & 
Campbell, 1991; Duchaine, Murray, Turner, White, & Garrido, 2009; Minnebusch, 
Suchan, Ramon, & Daum, 2007; Schmalzl et al., 2008). In Experiments 1 and 2 
participants had to recognise the emotion depicted by faces drawn from morph 
continua, wherby expressions varied in ambiguity (Experiment 1) or intensity 
(Experiment 2). We sought to determine whether the use of sensitive methods could 
reveal more widspread deficits in the DP population. Morphing technique allowed us 
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to generate more sensitive tests by creating ambiguous stimuli that placed greater 
demands on perceptual and decision processes.  
In Experiment 1 we investigated the ability of DPs to make binary categorisations 
of whole-face emotional expression stimuli created by morphing two distinct facial 
expressions. Three morph continua (i.e., anger-happiness, disgust-sadness, fear-
surprise) were produced by blending together two faces of the same actor expressing 
different emotions. Each continuum contained seven stimuli which varied in emotion 
amount from 20% to 80% in equidistant 10% increments. Participants were presented 
with each stimulus individually and had to make binary decisions on which emotion 
was depicted. Data were modelled by fitting psychometric functions and revealed that 
relative to controls DPs were significantly less accurate when discriminating between 
fearful and surprised facial expressions. Crucially, the performance at this task highly 
correlated (r = .78) with the ability of participants to detect physical differences 
between faces, measured by the CFPT. Moreover, single-case analyses showed that 
only the apperceptive subgroup of DPs were impaired, whereas the non-apperceptive 
individuals did not differ from typically developed participants. 
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate two possible accounts for the findings 
emerged in Experiment 1, given that impairments occurred only in the fear-surprise 
morph continuum. On one hand, participants with DP may struggle at integrating 
information from different facial regions into a perceptual whole, finding more difficult 
to form a unified perceptual description of facial expressions. On the other hand, DPs - 
particularly those with an apperceptive profile - may find it problematic to encode the 
local information in the eye region, resulting in difficulties discriminating between 
fearful and surprised faces. Therefore, Experiment 2 sought to examine participants’ 
ability to recognise facial emotion from the eyes. Stimuli consisted of eye regions 
drawn from four different morph continua (i.e., happiness, sadness, anger, fear) in 
which we merged an actor’s facial expression with their neutral expression, creating 
three levels of intensity for each emotion continuum (high-70%, moderate-50%, low-
30%). Results showed that relative to controls prosopagnosics were impaired at 
categorising facial emotion in the 70% and 50% conditions. As for Experiment 1, when 
DPs were divided into two sub-groups only the apperceptive prosopagnosics showed 
impairment at this task.  
Overall, the use of sensitive tasks, which avoided performance accuracy ceiling 
effects, allowed to reveal widespread difficulites recognising facial emotion in DP. 
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Specifically, prosopagnosics were less accurate at making binary classifications of 
whole-face expressions (Experiment 1), and even when the emotion had to be 
recognised locally using cues from the eye-region only (Experiment 2). These 
difficulties appeared to be face-specific, as performance on a comparable vocal affect 
recognition task was intact (Experiment 3). One of the most compelling findings of this 
study was the striking correlation between facial emotion recognition accuracy and 
performance on the CFPT. Individual differences observed within the DP population, 
which in this study was broadly divided into apperceptive and non-apperceptive 
subtypes, provided a strong evidence that different behavioural profiles may stem 
depending on where the deficit occurs in the face processing stream. Specifically, 
apperceptive DPs may have difficulties forming view-invariant structural descriptions 
of faces at early stages of encoding, with consequent problems in the processing of both 
identity and expression (Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby et al., 2000).   
6.1.2 Limitations and outstanding questions 
The leading models of face perception contamplate a clear separation between the 
processing of identity and expression (e.g., Bruce & Young, 1986). However, there is  
evidence suggesting that these two processing streams may be less independent than 
currently thought (e.g., Johnson, 2005; de Gelder, Frissen, Barton, & Hadjikhani, 2003; 
Knight & Johnston, 1997). For example, emotion-identity interference has been shown 
in a task where observers had to judge either the identity or the expression of stimuli 
which kept varying orthogonally along these directions (Schweinberger, Burton, & 
Kelly, 1999). In his commentary on the study, Van den Stock (2017) suggested two 
explanations of our results. First, assuming an emotion-identity interaction, a reduced 
performance on emotion recognition tasks in DP would be predictable irrespective of 
the locus of impairment in the processing stream, as the main characteristic of DP 
consists of identity recognition deficits. Therefore, one of the claims of Van den Stock 
(2017) is that emotion recognition impairments in DP may originate later identity 
processing and not at the structural description phase as suggested by our findings. 
However, the fact that in our study expression recognition strongly correlated with 
performance on the CFPT hinted that deficits were associated with poor structural 
encoding. Moreover, many DPs have been reported to exhibit poor identity recognition 
but intact emotion recognition (e.g., Dobel, Bölte, Aicher, & Schweinberger, 2007; 
	
	
190	
Humphreys, Avidan, & Behrmann, 2007; Palermo et al., 2011), suggesting that emotion 
deficits are not an inevitable consequence of identity problems.  
The second point raised by Van den Stock in his commentary (2017) concerns the 
specificity of the difficulties observed. Aberrant expression recognition in DP could 
reflect a domain-general deficit affecting general visual processing. The main argument 
against this view consists of the evidence of lack of relationship between expression 
recognition accuracy in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 and performance on tests 
of object recognition (i.e., the Cambridge Car Memory Test and the Cambridge Bike 
Memory Test). Nevertheless, the extent to which these tasks tap similar mechanisms 
remains unknown and needs additional examination. 
Crucially, the experiments presented in Chapter 2 exposed the importance of task 
sensitivity in detecting emotion recognition impairments in DP. On one hand, when 
tasks are too easy participants with DP have sufficient ability to label prototypical 
‘basic’ emotions, performing within typical ranges. Conversely, very demanding tasks 
may also fail to reveal clear differences because the performance of the controls can be 
variable. Accordingly, in Experiment 2 we found clear discrepancies when 50% of 
emotion information was provided to the observer, but failed to detect differences when 
only 30% of task-relevant information was shown. It is important that forthcoming 
studies use sensitive tasks where typical observers score within the ‘dynamic range’, 
avoiding both ceiling and floor effects.   
A spontaneous consideration on these results may question the relevance of such 
deficits, given that they appear to be relatively subtle. As a matter of fact, the expression 
of emotions in real life is often subtle itself, and efficient social interactions rely greatly 
on the ability to perceive and accurately classify these subtle facial changes. A failure 
in detecting slight expressions may result in inadequate behavioural responses, which 
may be a cause of social disabilities. In the DP population, in particular, these deficits 
may exacerbate identity face recognition difficulties, affecting the development of 
social skills, and ultimately reducing the quality of social interactions.      
A key open question that needs to be addressed relates to the frequency of expression 
recognition deficits in DP. Future research will have to clarify whether all DPs or only 
an apperceptive subset of them show signs of impaired facial emotion recognition.  
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6.2 Impaired body perception in Developmental Prosopagnosia (Chapter 3) 
6.2.1 Summary and interpretation 
The study presented in Chapter 3 aimed to investigate body recognition in DP. 
Previous evidence on the topic was limited, and existing behavioural studies reported 
typical body and body parts matching accuracy in prosopagnosics (Duchaine, Yovel, 
Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2006; Rivolta, Lawson, & Palermo, 2016; Shah, Gaule, 
Gaigg, Bird, & Cook, 2015). However, many parallels between body and face 
perception had been reported, including the recruitment of adjacent brain areas in the 
visual cortex (Peelen & Downing, 2007) and comparable inversion effects (e.g., Cook 
& Duchaine, 2011; Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 2003; Robbins & Coltheart, 2012). 
Our study aimed to explore body recognition in a sizable sample of individuals with 
DP and using a sensitive task. 
Individuals with DP (N = 20) and typical observers (N = 23) completed a delayed 
match-to-sample task in which they had to match exemplars of faces, headless male 
torsos and cars. As expected, prosopagnosics were impaired at the face trials, but 
crucially they also showed evidence of impaired body and object recognition accuracy 
at the group level, and several individuals exhibited difficulties also at the single case 
level. However, we observed little or no relationship between observers' car perception 
ability and their body perception ability. The lack of relationship between observers’ 
performance at cars and torsos trials suggested that body and object recognition 
impairments in DP may co-occur independently.   
Taken together these results revealed that some individuals with DP tend to show 
impaired body perception. This finding accords with the evidence of many neuro-
cognitive correspondences between faces and bodies. In fact, given the proximity of 
brain areas subtending the processing of faces (i.e., the occipital face area and the 
fusiform face area) and bodies [i.e, the extrastriate body area (EBA) and the fusiform 
body area (FBA)], perfectly typical body recognition would be unlikely. Instead, 
differences in the organisation of white matter tracts in occipitotemporal regions well-
documented in DP (e.g., Gomez et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2009) may explain co-
occurring body perception deficits. Similarly, looking at cognitive similarities in the 
processing of faces and bodies, both possibly relying on configural information, it is 
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expected that those individuals with DP experiencing aberrant holistic processing may 
exhibit problems with the perception of both categories of stimuli.  
6.2.2 Limitations and outstanding questions  
One of the aspects that may weaken the conclusions of this study is the use of torsos, 
instead of whole bodies. Some authors may argue that torsos would be better described 
as body parts, and previous studies on body recognition have used whole figures, 
headless or with masked faces. Accordingly, the inversion effect indicative of holistic 
processing has always been found using whole bodies. However, torsos unlike other 
body parts elicit strong responses both in EBA and FBA (Taylor, Wiggett, & Downing, 
2007). The decision of using torsos was influenced by the possibility that observers, 
especially those with body perception deficits, would benefit from limb-matching 
strategies. Moreover, torsos allowed us to present body stimuli in a scale that 
emphasised 3D shape variation minimising image-matching strategies. It is likely that 
whole bodies may recruit different mechanisms than those involved in torso processing. 
However, the stimuli used in this study were sufficiently challenging for the DPs. 
A crucial conclusion of the study was based on the lack of correlation between car 
and body matching accuracy. Given the null result, it is imperative to acknowledge that 
the combined sample size (N = 43) was not particularly big for making confident 
inferences and strong interpretations. However, the key result for the purpose of the 
study was the lack of association that emerged between the two non-face conditions. If 
the group differences observed for the three categories reflected a single domain-
general deficit, body and car perception ability would have clearly correlated.   
Critically, the two types of deficit do not seem to be associated and they may likely 
present as independent developmental agnosias. This idea would not be surprising as 
co-occurrence is a common phenomenon in developmental disorders. For example, it 
is well established that Autism Spectrum Disorder tends to present with an array of 
other developmental conditions such as alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013), ADHD 
(Leitner, 2014), and dyslexia (Jones et al., 2009). While the probability to develop one 
of these disorders is higher in the autistic population compared to the general 
population, all the listed conditions can occur independently from each other. Co-
occurrence indicates that common genetic or environmental factors may play a role in 
the aetiology of different neurodevelopmental disorders. Since the publication of the 
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present study, Gray and Cook (2018) proposed that DP may be due to an increased 
susceptibility to atypical neurostructural development of the occipitotemporal cortex, 
resulting in a greater predisposition to various forms of visual agnosia. Future research 
must explore whether DP, developmental object agnosia and developmental body 
agnosia can exist as independent conditions, rather than as manifestations of a common 
aberrant domain-general mechanism.  
Finally, this study raised interesting considerations for a new framework of body 
recognition research. What can be defined as body in the context of social perception 
research remains unanswered. Even where people use whole bodies there are some 
disagreements about the inclusion of the head region, and the inclusion of feet and 
ankles, which often are cropped. For example, the presence of the face or the head may 
influence the inversion effects observed with body stimuli. In many cases, body stimuli 
are also clothed and it is not clear how this affects the underlying visual processing. In 
fact, the presence of clothing occludes surface reflectance information and often 
introduces sharp boundaries between different stimulus regions. Future studies will 
have to clarify how these aspects impact on observers’ visual processing of body 
stimuli.  
6.3 Normal composite face effects in developmental prosopagnosia (Chapter 4) 
6.3.1 Summary and interpretations 
The study presented in Chapter 4 sought to investigate whether DP is associated with 
reduced susceptibility to the composite face illusion. Faces are typically perceived 
using holistic processing, whereby local features are integrated into a unified whole. 
When the top half of one face is paired with the bottom half of a different face, observers 
tend to fuse them perceptually when presented upright and aligned. This ‘composite 
effect’ (CFE) results from an implicit tendency to integrate information from disparate 
regions when faces are presented canonically (i.e., the effect disappears when the two 
halves are misaligned or when faces are inverted). Some authors have proposed that 
susceptibility to this illusion may be associated to better face recognition skills (e.g., 
Rivest, Moscovitch, & Black, 2009; Rossion, 2013; Murphy, Gray, & Cook, 2017). 
Accordingly, previous studies showed that individuals with DP are less sensitive to the 
CFE, suggestive of reduced holistic face processing (e.g., Palermo et al., 2011; Avidan, 
Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014).  
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Two independent samples of prosopagnosics took part in tasks investigating CFE 
using different paradigms. In Experiment 1 (NDPs = 16) participants took part in a 
simultaneous composite matching task, while in Experiment 2 (NDPs = 24) observers 
completed a sequential composite matching task. In both tasks participants had to match 
the eyes of composite displays presented either upright or inverted, aligned or 
misaligned. Results failed to show evidence of diminished CFEs in both samples of 
individuals with DP, who responded faster and more accurately when composites were 
inverted or misaligned.  
These findings conflict with previous evidence reporting diminished CFE at the 
group level in participants with DP (Palermo et al., 2011; Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 
2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014). However, the interpretation of previous studies’ results 
may be compromised by the composition of their samples. In the typical population age 
plays a critical role in observers’ sensitivity to the composite face illusion and older 
participants have been reported to be less sensitive to configural processing (Meinhardt, 
Persike, & Meinhardt-Injac, 2016; Wiese, Kachel, & Schweinberger, 2013). 
Accordingly, aberrant CFE in DPs is likely to be evident only in older cases (e.g., 
Schmalzl, Palermo, & Coltheart, 2008; Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011).  
Another factor that may lead to dissimilar results consists of the way performance is 
measured. Previous reports have mainly focussed their analyses on response times. For 
example, in Palermo and colleagues (2011) DPs and controls exhibited comparable 
CFEs in their accuracy data and the group difference only emerged in response times 
when these were adjusted for error rates in the misaligned condition. In particular, the 
authors failed to show a significant Alignment × Group interaction for RTs. 
Furthermore, the score distribution suggested that the group difference was highly 
influenced by the performance of a single DP who exhibited a reversed composite effect 
(i.e., their aligned RTs were much faster than their misaligned RTs).  
Finally, specific problems encoding local face regions, which are often observed in 
DP, may influence the occurrence of atypical CFEs. For example, DP participants in 
Liu and Behrmann (2014) performed significantly worse than typical observers in the 
baseline misaligned condition, indicative of reduced local processing. Composite face 
tasks require observers to encode local regions and make perceptual decisions on their 
similarity or dissimilarity. Therefore, the execution of this task is based on the 
assumption that observers exhibit typical local processing of faces. Distractor halves 
perceived as non-distinctive by DPs may lead to a weaker perceptual prediction and 
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exert less illusory bias in the aligned condition, compared to distractor halves which are 
perceived as distinctive. In fact, any attempts to account for baseline differences by 
modulating the holistic processing index based on the performance in the misaligned 
condition result misleading; it is not clear what is a ‘typical’ CFE when participants 
display an atypical misaligned performance. Hence, assuming impaired configural 
processing using the composite face task in a population exhibiting atypical local 
processing, becomes problematic.  
6.3.2 Limitations and outsgtanding questions 
Differences in the task designs employed by our study and previous studies may 
contribute to the mixed findings. The choice of using the original versus the congruent 
(or complete) design in composite tasks complicates the interpretation of results. While 
in original designs the distractor regions always differ, in congruent designs a full 
factorial combination of target regions (same and different) and distractor regions (same 
and different) is used (e.g., Richler & Gauthier, 2014; Rossion, 2013), and holistic 
processing can be measured as a Congruency × Alignment interaction (i.e., 
performance is better in congruent trials and this congruency effect is modulated by 
alignment). It has been suggested that congruent designs allow to control for the effects 
of response bias, which vary as a function of congruency. For example, in original 
designs participants may have a tendency to respond ‘different’ in aligned trials for two 
potential reasons: i) less perceptual discriminability due to holistic processing; ii) a 
response bias due to the incongruent bottom halves. Crucially, since in original designs 
same trials, whose analysis is critical for the CFE, are always incongruent, participants’ 
responses can be affected by a congruency interference (see Richler & Gauthier, 2014).  
Our choice of using the original paradigm stems from concerns that effects obtained 
with the congruent design may confound the CFE with other effects attributable to 
general cognitive factors such as response facilitation, generic interference, attentional 
and decisional biases (Rossion, 2013). These effects may partially explain why 
congruent designs often yield to composite effects with stimuli that generate no tangible 
visual illusion (e.g., unfamiliar Chinese symbols, Hsiao & Cottrell, 2009), while the 
original design produces effects only for faces, and bodies to a certain degree (for a 
review see Murphy, Gray, & Cook, 2017). It is vital that our findings are replicated 
using other paradigms, including the complete design. This would provide further 
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support to our conclusions. Encouragingly, our findings have been recently replicated 
using a novel psychophysical variant of the composite face task that overcomes many 
of the problems associated with the different matching paradigms (Gray & Cook, 2017).  
Some readers may object to the fact that different face stimuli were used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore, how can we compare the results of simultaneous 
versus sequential matching tasks? Nevertheless, the fact the these experiments differ in 
their stimuli, procedures, and participants can be considered a strenght as the two 
datasets consist of independent tests of the same hypothesis, providing additional 
support to our conclusions.  
Taken together these considerations show a complex picture where holistic 
processing seems to be impaired in many DPs, yet our participants did not show reduced 
sensitivity to the composite face illusion. The CFE is not the only measure known to 
reflect holistic face processing. In fact, other perceptual phenomena like the inversion 
and the part-whole effects have been shown to originate from perceiving faces 
holistically (section 1.3.3.1). Traditionally these three phenomena have been thought to 
emerge as by-products of a single underlying mechanism (e.g., Farah, Wilson, Drain, 
& Tanaka, 1998; Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002), but recent evidence suggests 
that people’s susceptibility to the composite face illusion is rather weakly associated to 
other measures of holistic processing (see Rezlescu, Susilo, Wilmer, & Caramazza, 
2017). Therefore, our conclusions do not deny the existence of aberrant holistic 
processing in DP. On the contrary, we believe that holistic processing has a multifacet 
nature and different aspects of it may be impared in the DP population. Future research 
is necessary in order to distinguish between types of holistic face processing deficit, 
and to show how different profiles of impairment contribute to face recognition 
difficulties.  
Relative to this last point, our results directly inform the ongoing debate on whether 
sensitivity to the CFE is associated to face recognition ability. While some authors 
believe that holistic processing predicts face recognition in the general population, 
relying on evidence of positive correlations (e.g., DeGutis, Wilmer, Mercado, & Cohan, 
2013; Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011), other studies have questioned these 
conclusions, finding little or no correlation (e.g., Rezlescu, Susilo, Wilmer, & 
Caramazza, 2017; Wang, Li, Fang, Tian, & Liu, 2012). In addition, our results indicate 
that inferring face recognition ability from the CFE’s results can be misleading. Face 
recognition may be a complex skill which relies on multiple cognitive mechanisms - 
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the process reflected by the susceptibility to the CFE may make a necessary causal 
contribution to face recognition, but it may not be a key source of individual 
differences.  
6.4 Is developmental prosopagnosia best characterised as an apperceptive or 
mnemonic disorder? (Chapter 5) 
6.4.1 Summary and interpretations 
The study presented in Chapter 5 sought to investigate whether DP is associated with 
aberrant structural encoding of faces (i.e. apperceptive deficit) or difficulties 
maintaining visual percepts over time (i.e. mnemonic deficit). First, apperceptive 
deficits were explored by testing a large sample of DPs on the Cambridge Face 
Perception Test (CFPT) (Experiment 1). Next, a subset of DPs completed a delayed 
match-to-sample task with face and car stimuli, where both retention interval and 
viewpoint were manipulated (Experiment 2). 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate apperceptive impairments using the 
CFPT in a large sample of individuals with DP (N = 72). Participants had to sort six 
faces based on similarity with a target face. Stimuli were presented either upright or 
inverted, for a total of 16 trials. Many studies had reported that groups of DPs make 
more errors on the CFPT compared to controls. However, these differences rarely are 
reflected at the single-case level. Two competing explanations guided Experiment 1. 
One possibility is that group differences in the CFPT performance, where observed, are 
driven by a few DPs with apperceptive impairments. The second possibility is that 
apperceptive deficits are widespread in the DP population, but the CFPT may not be 
sensitive enough to detect them, leading to distributions of DPs’ and controls’ scores 
that overlap to some degree. In addition, the sequential sorting task employed by the 
CFPT may render it more prone to compensatory strategies, allowing apperceptive DPs 
to achieve scores within the normal range. Results revealed that relative to controls, 
DPs were impaired at the group level. Having split the groups based on their 
performance on the upright trials, we found evidence that the distribution of DP scores 
was shifted. Not only the worst-performing but also the best-performing DPs performed 
worse than the worst-performing controls and the best-performing controls, 
respectively. We found that inflating the CFPT scores of the typical observers by 90% 
provided a reasonable model of the distribution of DP scores. These findings support 
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our second hypothesis and suggest that some DPs may score typically due to the use of 
compensatory strategies, such as excellent attention to detail or visual acuity.   
The aim of Experiment 2 was to determine whether the face matching deficits 
observed in DP increase as a function of retention interval. A subset of DPs (N = 16) 
completed a delayed match-to-sample task using face and car stimuli, whereby 
participants had to select a target stimulus from a test display of four items. Memory 
demands were manipulated by introducing either a short (1 second) or a long (6 
seconds) retention interval between target presentation and test array. This 
manipulation allowed us to measure the contribution of perceptual versus mnemonic 
impairment by maintaining the perceptual demands constant. In particular, if DP is 
associated with an apperceptive impairment, similar deficits will emerge under 
conditions of high and low memory demand. On the other hand, if DPs exhibit a 
mnemonic profile, disproportionate impairment will emerge in the high memory 
demand condition. In addition, we sought to determine whether a change in viewpoint 
from target to test affected performance, particularly under different mnemonic 
demands. Results revealed that relative to controls, DPs were less accurate at matching 
faces. Crucially, the impairment was insensitive to both changes in retention interval 
and viewing angle, indicating that matching difficulties in DP may likely stem from an 
apperceptive deficit.  
Overall, this study revealed that DPs are impaired at the group level at a 
simultaneous sorting task which minimises memory demand (the CFPT), indicative of 
an apperceptive impairment (Experiment 1). Moreover, DPs were impaired at face 
matching, but the relative degree of impairment did not interact with retention interval 
(i.e., the levels of impairment were similar when matching faces viewed with a 1-
second delay and when matching faces viewed with a 6-second delay) (Experiment 2).  
Taken together these results suggest an apperceptive account of many cases of 
individuals with DP. Although heterogeneity is likely in the DP population, the lack of 
positive evidence for the mnemonic accounts is problematic. Consistent with an 
apperceptive account, the DPs made more errors on the CFPT at the group level 
compared to typically developed individuals. Moreover, not only the lower end but the 
entire distribution of DPs’ scores was shifted, indicating that also the best performing 
DPs performed worse, on average, than controls. This result is likely to be due to poor 
perceptual encoding rather than impaired short term face memory, as memory load is 
kept minimal in this test. In support of this account, we showed that face matching 
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deficits in DPs are insensitive to retention interval, not only when matching across the 
same viewpoint, but also when the perspective of test items is rotated from the target. 
This finding suggests that prosopagnosics are able not only to retain percepts, but also 
mentally manipulate and rotate them, indicative of unimpaired working memory. The 
apperceptive account accords well with evidence of widespread expression recognition 
deficits in this population (Biotti & Cook, 2016; Duchaine, Parker, & Nakayama, 2003), 
and it may support recent suggestions of typical composite face effect in DP, whereby 
the lack of susceptibility to the perceptual illusion may originate from poor local 
processing rather than typical holistic processing.  
Finally, a striking result of this study consists of the insensitivity of face matching 
deficits to changes in viewpoint in DPs. We speculate that participants used a similar 
process when matching faces shown from the same and from different angles. This 
conjecture is reinforced by the close relationship that emerged between constant-
viewpoint and different-viewpoint matching abilities. Crucially, we exclude the 
possibility that observers may have used superficial pictorial cues to accomplish face 
matching in both conditions. In fact, DPs were unimpaired at car matching and it is well 
established that image matching relies on a domain-general process. Instead, it is likely 
that participants used view-invariant ‘face-centred’ structural descriptions to achieve 
both constant-viewpoint and different-viewpoint face matching. But while controls 
could benefit from these mechanisms, DPs were outperformed in both conditions 
because of less precise structural descriptions.  
6.4.2 Limitations and outstanding questions 
The fact that many DPs show typical performance on the CFPT has been taken as 
evidence of mnemonic impairment by previous reports (e.g., Bowles et al., 2009; Ulrich 
et al., 2017). Conversely, we showed that differences at the group level in the CFPT 
may rather indicate an apperceptive deficit, whereby, given the poor reliability of the 
CFPT, some apperceptive DPs may use compensatory strategies to perform typically. 
The CFPT is known to be a less reliable measure compared to other tests of face 
recognition ability due to its susceptibility to the use of compensatory strategies, 
reliance on low-level visual processing, and procedure requirements (e.g., use of 
trackpad, limited time). Therefore, the noisy nature of the CFPT limits the strength of 
our conclusions. Future research in the filed should prioritise the development of a 
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sensitive and reliable test of perceptual encoding. Such a measure might reveal even 
clearer evidence of widespread apperceptive impairment in the DP population.   
The basic finding of Experiment 2 was the lack of Retention Interval × Group 
interaction, whereby DPs did not show disproportionate impairments in the high 
memory demand condition. This results leaves open the possibility that a memory 
impairment may already occur within the 1 second interval, which corresponded to the 
low demand condition. The only way to address this point would have been adding a 
simultaneous matching condition, which did not require any memory retention. 
Critically, a no-interval condition would have changed the perceptual demands of the 
task, as five faces would appear in the test array rather than four. Therefore, any 
reduction in memory demand associated with the simultaneous presentation of five 
faces would be confounded with an increase in perceptual and attentional demands. 
Instead, we chose to consider performance at the CFPT as a proof that matching 
impairments are not associated to aberrant STFM. In fact, the performance distribution 
of a large sample of DPs was entirely shifted, suggestive of a clear apperceptive profile 
in most prosopagnosics. Moreover, even considering the occurrence of a mnemonic 
deficit at shorter retention intervals, it is rather challenging to explain the lack of any 
group difference increment as a function of retention interval. On the other hand, it is 
crucial to replicate these results using other experimental parameters, in particular 
longer retention intervals. In fact, our results do not exclude the possibility that DPs 
may have difficulties at face learning.  
Overall, this study provides evidence against a mnemonic impairment in most cases 
of DP, but focussing only to a specific type of memory: The short-term face memory. 
These findings do no discount the existence of a memory impairment occurring after 
encoding, and involving the association of the percept to semantic information stored 
in long-term memory. Emerging evidence reveals several cases of people who report 
severe difficulties in everyday face recognition, despite typical performance at the 
CFMT and the CFPT. Specific impairments involving semantic memory may be only 
detectable by tests measuring familiar face recognition (e.g., the Famous Faces Test), 
which require the access to semantic information to be able to retrieve a person’s 
identity. Future research needs to be done to investigate different profiles of DP, 
shifting the focus from unfamiliar to familiar face recognition, starting from unravelling 
the neuro-cognitive mechanisms that regulate face learning.     
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6.5 General conclusion 
This thesis sought to investigate profiles of impairment and cognitive mechanisms 
of DP using sensitive behavioural tasks. The heterogeneous nature of DP often yielded 
to mixed results and contradictory evidence. Traditionally, DPs have been clustered 
into two subgroups (i.e., apperceptive vs mnemonic), depending on where the deficit 
occurred in the face processing stream. Evidence for an apperceptive account was 
supported by studies showing face perception difficulties at the group level on face 
matching tasks, facial emotion, age and gender recognition (section 1.3.3). In addition, 
a major debate reported in this thesis consisted of the nature of impairment, which for 
some authors is face specific, while for others originates from an aberrant domain-
general mechanism (section 1.3.5.2). Inconsistent findings were also found in studies 
investigating cognitive mechanisms responsible for the condition. A pivotal account of 
DP suggested that impaired holistic processing of faces may be a crucial factor leading 
to poor face recognition (section 1.3.3.1). Several studies found reduced composite face 
effects in DPs, suggestive of diminished holistic processing in this population (section 
1.3.3.1.2). Finally, previous literature tried to associate DP with aberrant short term face 
memory, assuming normal face perception from typical performance of many DPs on 
the CFPT, a test which minimises memory demands (section 1.3.4).  
6.5.1 Towards an apperceptive account of DP  
The findings described in Chapter 2 provide strong evidence of widespread facial 
emotion recognition deficits at the group level in DP. Furthermore, aberrant expression 
recognition seems to be associated to apperceptive types of DP, whereby perceptual 
deficits affect early stages of structural encoding, before the neuro-cognitive pathways 
that analyse changeable and invariant facial information bifurcate. Crucially, 
apperceptive problems appear to be relatively common within the DP population as 
shown by our CFPT findings collected in a large sample of prosopagnosics (Chapter 
5). In this study, we showed that the entire distribution of DPs scores at the CFPT was 
shifted relative to controls, suggesting that difficulties were present at the group level 
despite some DPs scoring within the typical range (Experiment 1, Chapter 5). 
Accordingly, DPs impairments on a delayed match-to-sample task did not 
disproportionally increase from a short 1-second delay to a longer 6-second delay, 
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excluding a mnemonic deficit and supporting the apperceptive account (Experiment 2, 
Chapter 5).  
6.5.2 Local (rather than global) face processing may explain deficits in DP 
Contrary to some leading accounts of DP our findings seem to support the idea of 
impaired local processing. For example, previous studies have attempted to describe 
DP as a failure of holistic processing, whereby DP individuals struggle to integrate local 
face features into a perceptual whole. This idea emerged largely from evidence of 
reduced susceptibility of DPs to the composite face illusion (e.g., Palermo et al., 2011; 
Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014). Instead, we showed 
comparable CFE in DPs and controls using two independent samples of prosopagnosics 
and different paradigms (Chapter 4). Our results suggest that although some DPs may 
show aberrant holistic processing, the processes responsible for the CFE appear to be 
unimpaired in this population, reinforcing the idea that holistic processing does not stem 
from a single underlying mechanism (see Rezlescu, Susilo, Wilmer, & Caramazza, 
2017). One possibility emerging from some of the findings presented in this body of 
work is that processing of local features may be affected in many DPs. For example, 
we showed that the recognition of facial emotion was impaired also when judging 
expressions displayed by the eyes only (Experiment 2, Chapter 2). We advanced the 
possibility that some DPs, in particular those with apperceptive profiles, may struggle 
to encode facial shape from a very early stage of face processing, with consequent 
problems perceiving multiple facial attributes, such as identity or expression.  
Interestingly, new evidence emerged that challenges holistic accounts of face 
inversion effect (Murphy & Cook, 2017). Using a dynamic aperture paradigm, the 
authors tested face recognition of upright and inverted faces shown either in their 
entirety or viewed through a dynamic aperture that moved incrementally across the 
face. Results showed that regardless of the orientation of the face, perceiving a whole-
face is associated to better face perception than viewing the same face region-by-region. 
These findings suggest that perceptual decrements when viewing inverted faces may 
stem from poor descriptions of local regions rather than reduced configural processing.  
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6.5.3 The domain-specificity issue in DP and co-occurring developmental agnosias  
The study described in Chapter 3 addressed the domain-specificity issue, exploring 
non-face recognition in DP. Findings revealed co-occurring deficits of body and car 
perception, which were not associated to each other, excluding a domain-general 
account. We speculated the existence of different forms of developmental agnosia 
affecting the perception of faces, bodies, and object, which may co-occur as 
independent neurodevelopmental conditions. These may account for the fact that many 
of our participants exhibit non-face recognition deficits. This aspect makes it pivotal to 
include non-face control conditions when testing DPs and employing object recognition 
measures, such as the CCMT, in the diagnostic assessment.  
Co-occurrence is a typical phenomenon of many developmental disorders and 
common genetic, epigenetic and environmental factors may predispose one individual 
to a range of neurodevelopmental conditions. In the specific case of DP, it has been 
shown that abnormal development of the inferior longitudinal fasciculus contributes in 
face recognition impairments typical of this condition (e.g., Thomas et al., 2009; Song 
et al., 2015). Furthermore, depending on the specific locus of impairment along the 
tract, it is possible to predict perceptual deficits affecting non-face stimuli (Gomez et 
al., 2015). Therefore, co-occurring object recognition deficits seem to be by-products 
of aberrant neuro-substrates common to the neuro-cognitive processing of faces, 
objects, or bodies (see Gray & Cook, 2018). This idea goes against proposed accounts 
of DP resulting from an atypical single-mechanism responsible for the processing of 
faces as well as other classes of objects (e.g., Geskin & Behrmann, 2018). We rather 
propose that, where observed, object recognition impairments in DP present as 
independent developmental agnosias. Accordingly, we also predict the existence of 
dissociations, whereby the abnormal structural development of occipitotemporal areas 
can selectively impair the perception of object, or bodies, leaving face perception 
unaffected.   
6.5.4 Toward an apperceptive characterisation of DP 
Chapter 5 explored perceptual and mnemonic accounts of DP, finding that 
prosopagnosics are impaired at face matching both on a simultaneous task which 
minimises memory demands (Experiment 1, Chapter 5), and on a delayed match-to-
sample task were retention interval and viewpoint are manipulated from target to test 
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(Experiment 2, Chapter 5). Crucially, DPs do not show signs of disproportionate 
impairment as a function of retention interval, indicating that their deficit has an 
apperceptive, rather than mnemonic, origin. Previous studies have excluded 
apperceptive deficits by looking at CFPT results, a test whose reliability has been 
questioned, and from evidence of typical recognition of basic facial expressions. 
However, we showed that normal performances on the CFPT by some prosopagnosics 
may indicate the use of excellent compensatory strategies rather than typical face 
perception. In support, we presented evidence of a distribution shift in a large sample 
of DPs, indicative of deficits at the group level. This finding was corroborated by results 
on a delayed match-to-sample task (Experiment 2), where an increment in retention 
interval from 1 second to 6 seconds did not affect the size of impairment in DPs. We 
concluded that most DPs appear to have an apperceptive impairment that prevents them 
from reaching a typical performance even on very simple face recognition tasks.  
 
Taken together the findings reported in this thesis expand and enrich previous 
evidence. First, we show that apperceptive deficits seem to be relatively common in DP 
and difficulties deriving a structural description of face stimuli can be distributed in this 
population. Accordingly, prosopagnosics with severe perceptual deficits may also show 
co-occurring expression recognition impairments. Second, we illustrate that forms of 
developmental agnosia, especially those affecting face, body and object perception, can 
likely co-occur as independent neurodevelopmental conditions rather than as by-
product of a common aberrant domain-general process. Finally, we demonstrate that 
DP is not associated with reduced susceptibility to the composite face illusion, 
suggesting that other mechanisms may give rise to face recognition difficulties in this 
population.  
6.6 Limitations and future directions 
6.6.1 Theoretical definitions and constructs 
One of the main ongoing challenges in visual perception research consists of a lack 
of established and generally accepted theoretical definitions of key constructs. The 
studies presented in this thesis sought to investigate individual processes by using 
purposely-designed tasks in which we tried to measure the effect of the manipulation 
of specific variables on the process of interest (e.g. varying retention interval while 
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maintaining the perceptual demand constant to tap short term face memory). However, 
we do not intend to claim that our tasks tap one single process eliminating completely 
the effects of other processes. On the contrary, our intention is that of maintaining stable 
the influence of other interacting processes while varying the contribution of the 
process of interest.  
Existing theoretical positions tend to consider and refer to functions as independent 
constructs which can be potentially studied in isolation (e.g. Weigelt et al., 2013; Ulrich 
et al., 2017). This position posits a great empirical challenge. In fact, we believe that it 
is particularly difficult trying to distinguish between functions (e.g. local vs. global 
processing, face memory vs. face perception) without a clear definition of these 
constructs and without addressing their inevitable interplay. We may wonder, for 
example, where one starts and another one ends. A concrete example is provided by 
composite face tasks, which are used to study face holistic processing employing an 
ingenious paradigm that breaks down local versus global processing. Though, it is not 
clear what constitutes a ‘pure’ feature-based processing given that there is a degree of 
feature integration even in local processing – we may wonder to what extent the eye 
region is perceived using global versus local processing, for example. Therefore, when 
we observe normal composite face effects in DP not only are we not assuming normal 
holistic processing, but we are also avoiding strong claims relative to unimpaired local 
processing in our prosopagnosics.   
Another example of the tendency to consider cognitive processes as independent and 
potentially dissociable constructs arises from the DP diagnostic practice. Among 
various tests, the most commonly employed diagnostic measures (i.e. the CFMT and 
the CFPT) have been designed to measure either face memory or face perception, as 
they were implicitly thought of as separable components. Nonetheless, these measures 
inevitably tap both processes and they cannot be referred to as pure measures of either 
face memory or face perception. A failure in acknowledging their interplay may lead 
to misleading interpretations of diagnostic results. For example, the fact that the CFMT 
(a task with both perceptual and memory components) is more likely to reveal clear 
deficits at the single-case level than the CFPT (a task that assesses face perception with 
minimal memory demands) has led many to speculate that DP may often be caused by 
aberrant short term face memory, and not impaired perceptual encoding (e.g. Bowles 
et al., 2009; Dalrymple et al., 2014; McKone et al., 2011; Ulrich et al., 2017). Crucially, 
the CFPT and CFMT differ not only in terms of their respective memory components, 
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but also in their fundamental perceptual demands (i.e. they present different facial 
identities under different viewing conditions). Hence, not only do both these tasks have 
a perceptual demand, but they may even tax different types of perceptual processes. It 
is therefore misleading to equate the CFMT and CFPT to perceptual and mnemonic 
conditions in a controlled experimental manipulation. Although they differ in their 
respective memory demands, the differential memory load is confounded with 
numerous perceptual differences.  
Inadequate definitions limit research, including the studies described in this thesis. 
Therefore, future research will need to nail down constructs in order to design tasks that 
better tap one process or another. For example, whenever researchers explore 
mnemonic accounts in DP, we encourage proponents to articulate more clearly what 
types of memory processes are thought to be impaired, whether perceptual encoding is 
preserved entirely, and what constitutes ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ face memory.  
6.6.2 Heterogeneity in DP 
DP is considered a heterogeneous condition – individuals with DP have been 
reported to vary greatly in terms of specific combinations of face-specific and co-
occurring non-face deficits. Our prosopagnosics varied consistently regarding the 
specificity of their deficits. Overall, co-occurring object recognition impairments were 
inconsistent. In some studies, we were able to find clear group differences in object 
conditions, while in others non-face recognition was impaired only at the single case 
level. It appears that different studies may obtain different findings depending on the 
specific composition of the DP group (e.g., whereby samples are composed by more 
apperceptive DPs, researchers might find greater group differences at facial emotion 
recognition tasks, and vice versa).  
Apparent heterogeneity in DP has also been inferred by putative dissociations 
between performance on the CFMT and CFPT. First, artefactual dissociations may arise 
from the fact that the CFMT plays a key role in the diagnosis of DP, while the CFPT 
does not (i.e., a clear deficit on the CFMT is widely seen as necessary for a DP 
diagnosis). Where individuals fail to reach this criterion, they are often excluded from 
DP research. In contrast, CFPT scores are free to vary and they are usually provided 
only as an indication of whether a DP is apperceptive or mnemonic (see Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4). Therefore, considering this prevailing bias, it is unsurprising that the DP 
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literature reports many individuals who exhibit a clear deficit on the CFMT but not on 
the CFPT. The practice of preselecting individuals based on extremely poor CFMT 
scores (i.e., <2 SDs below the mean), and then reporting single-case analyses to imply 
that an individual’s CFMT deficit exceeds their CFPT deficit is known as ‘double 
dipping’ (Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009). Second, the CFPT is 
known to have poorer psychometric properties compared to the CFMT and it is 
therefore more likely to yield to noisy performance. For example, the format of the 
CFPT may render it more susceptible to compensatory strategies, than the CFMT (e.g. 
the side-by-side presentation of the faces, or the opportunity to study each trial display 
for a longer interval). Third, as previously mentioned, it is not clear whether meaningful 
theoretical inferences can be drawn from differential impairments on the CFPT and the 
CFMT, given that they differ not only in terms of their respective memory components, 
but also in their fundamental perceptual demands. Hence, the overarching point is that 
these putative dissociations between performance on the CFMT and the CFPT cannot 
be relied upon to make strong claims about DP heterogeneity.  
A way to control for heterogeneity in future studies will require the employment of 
larger samples of DPs, tested on a variety of different (and more sensitive) measures. 
Although results from single cases can be very informative when using sensitive 
measures, the combination of poor tests and single case analyses can give the illusion 
of more heterogeneity than there actually is. We therefore encourage future research to 
test DPs on an array of reliable measures which tap several different processes. For 
example, as already suggested by other authors (Geskin & Behrmann, 2017), DPs could 
be tested on many different categories of non-face objects. This may yield to a variety 
of impairment profiles, possibly due to particular mid-level vision deficits rather than 
an aberrant general mechanism.  
6.6.3 Methodological considerations 
Some of the limitations of the individual chapters have been reported in the previous 
sections. However, some general methodological considerations may also apply. First, 
measures of reliability and validity of our tasks were not formally reported and neither 
stated explicitly. Overall, good convergent validity was implied as performance on the 
face trials in our tasks correlated with diagnostic tests (i.e., the CFMT, the CFPT, and 
the PI20). In particular, correlations with the PI20 suggested that what we measured 
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with our tests was related to people’s actual difficulties outside the laboratory. Validity 
of the tasks presented in Chapter 2 was assessed by additional correlational analyses 
conducted post hoc. Participants’ performance on the emotion recognition task in 
Experiment 1 correlated with their performance on the emotion recognition task in 
Experiment 2 (r = 0.43, p = .009). The delayed matching task presented in Chapter 3 
had good convergent validity as performance in our face and car conditions correlated 
with our diagnostic measures of face and car perception, respectively (Table 3.2). 
Finally, the validity of the delayed match-to-sample task presented in Chapter 5 was 
implied by strong correlations observed in the combined sample between participants’ 
face matching accuracy and their scores on the CFMT (r = .67, p < .001), but not the 
CCMT (r = .25, p = .14). Conversely, car matching accuracy correlated with scores on 
the CCMT (r = .55, p < .001), but not the CFMT (r = .29, p = .082). We were also able 
to assess post hoc the internal reliability of the matching task in Chapter 5 by analysing 
the correlations between observers’ short- and long-interval matching accuracy (faces: 
r = .810; cars: r = .689), and between their constant- and different-viewpoint matching 
accuracy (faces: r = .846; cars: r = .743), which are equivalent to split-half measures of 
reliability.  
In the light of these considerations, it is crucial for future research to use reliable 
tasks. The employment of sensitive psychophysical measures could be a useful 
direction, especially when trying to avoid ceiling performance which may hinder more 
subtle impairments (not uncommon in DP). Assuring good reliability is especially 
important when interpreting null results. As discussed above, apparent dissociations 
between performance on the CFMT (a task with greater reliability) and the CFPT have 
often been taken as proof of a disproportionate impairment of face memory versus face 
perception, inflating the putative heterogeneity of the DP population.  
Another interesting post hoc analysis would have been looking at individual profiles 
considering DP participants who took part in all studies presented in this thesis. 
Regrettably, none of the participants participated in all the four studies. Our research is 
constrained by the availability of our participants, who generously give their time to 
take part in the studies. Nevertheless, future research is encouraged to test many DP 
participants on a range of measures. Previous studies who assessed prosopagnosics on 
several different tests had a limited number of participants, but they have been highly 
influential for the DP literature (e.g. Le Grand et al., 2006; Duchaine, Yovel, 
Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2006). 
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A further consideration concerns the way we analysed some of the correlations 
presented in the chapters. All the correlations of principle interest were significant at p 
< .001 and comfortably survived correction for multiple comparisons. Moreover, many 
of the correlations reported were independent of one another and thus did not increase 
type-I error rate.  
However, some may argue that our correlations were inflated as the range of abilities 
was broader than in the general population given that we collapsed the data obtained 
from controls with those obtained from individuals with DP. Therefore, the strength of 
the correlation would not have emerged if the same task was given to a group of people 
randomly sampled from the general population. Crucially, we are not trying to present 
results as something it would be naturally observed in the general population. Our aim 
is to use individual differences to examine whether a functional relationship exists 
between X and Y, rather than estimating the strength of the correlation seen between X 
and Y in the typical population.  
Finally, some of our studies lacked control tasks. For example, it would have been 
useful to add a visual perception task in the emotion recognition study presented in 
Chapter 2, in which participants had to recognise non-face objects drawn from morph 
continua. Performance on this task may have been beneficial to exclude any potential 
domain-general visual perception deficit in our DP sample. Instead, we relied on DPs’ 
performance on the Cambridge Car Memory Test (CCMT) and the Cambridge Bike 
Memory Test (CBMT) to assume typical general visual perception.  
6.6.4 Considerations on diagnostic criteria 
A standard diagnostic battery for the assessment of DP does not currently exist and 
different research laboratories are free to use different tests to recruit DP participants. 
In the studies reported here diagnostic decisions were typically based on the CFMT, the 
CFPT, and the PI20. However, while performance on the CFMT and the PI20 were 
taken as the main proof for a diagnosis, results on the CFPT were usually reported to 
provide an indication of whether a DP was apperceptive or mnemonic. While the use 
of the CFMT is conventional, results from the CFPT and the PI20 are controversial. 
Some authors have queried the CFPT because of its poor reliability and likelihood 
to yield to noisy performance. These limitations are mainly due to its format which may 
render it more susceptible to the use of compensatory strategies, compared to the 
	
	
210	
CFMT.  Therefore, if the CFPT lacks the reliability necessary to diagnose someone as 
DP or not DP, we should be cautious about making apperceptive versus non-
apperceptive classifications on this basis. Future research needs to generate a new 
measure of face perception, with better psychometric properties and less space for the 
use of compensatory strategies.   
The employment of the PI20 in the diagnostic practice of DP has also been 
debateable. The use of self-reports of face recognition difficulty has been discouraged 
based on evidence that people have little insight into their ability to recognise faces 
(e.g., Bowles et al., 2009; McGugin, Richler, Herzmann, Speegle, & Gauthier, 2012; 
but see Palermo et al., 2017). Moreover, some authors have erroneously implied that 
the correlation found in the original study between the PI20 and the CFMT (Shah et al., 
2015) was an estimate of the relationship between PI20 scores and face recognition 
ability in the general population (e.g., Bate & Tree, 2017; Bobak, Pampoulov, & Bate, 
2016; Palermo et al., 2017). However, the original study employed a sample with an 
incidence rate of DP (21%) which was clearly higher than the one observed in the 
general population, in order to test the relationship between PI20 scores and CFMT 
results across the entire range of abilities and hence validate the PI20 as a diagnostic 
instrument. This aspect contributed in increasing the strength of the correlation 
observed, as the sample used presented a distribution of abilities which is not typically 
found in the general population. However, a follow-up study using a narrower range of 
performances, confirmed the existence of a significant relationship between PI20 scores 
and performance on the CFMT (Gray, Bird, & Cook, 2017).  
Crucially, we never included our DP participants based exclusively on self-report 
evidence. Instead, we used PI20 scores as a diagnostic complement to objective 
computer-based tests, which can sometime yield to imprecise evidence. For example, 
variables such as lack of motivation, boredom, test anxiety, and poor mouse control 
have been reported to affect the execution of these tests. Furthermore, the use of 
compensatory strategies may lead to typical execution of diagnostic tests in individuals 
with a lifelong history of face recognition difficulties.  
Non-face recognition deficits in our participants have been assessed using the 
CCMT as this measure is matched in format and difficulty with the CFMT, providing 
a good comparison with face recognition difficulties. However, we recognise that the 
CCMT alone may be too restrictive to investigate the complexity of non-face object 
recognition. As recently suggested by some authors, future research should include tests 
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which assess a wider range of different non-face objects (see Geskin & Behrmann, 
2017). Moreover, including measures of mid-level vision may also be extremely 
interesting as it may unveil specific difficulties which would reflect in high-level vision 
(e.g., a specific deficit at perceiving curvature, but intact perception of straight lines, 
may affect the perception of objects such as flowers and cars, but not buildings).  
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